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THESES 
1. In the light of biblical evidence, the term Sveakness,' when used 
within a moral context, refers primarily to the innocent condition 
of a conscience whose deficient moral knowledge prevents guilt-
free participation in a particular practice. 
2. The danger of scandalum infirmorum exists, minimally, only where 
a difference of practice among believers has the potential for 
inducing someone whose conscience is weak to imitate another's 
behavior, against his own convictions. 
3. The tension that results from viewing neighbor love as the limit 
to Christian liberty can be resolved best by viewing love and 
freedom as ecclesially correlative. 
4. The suggestion that it was Moses' son Gershom whom the LORD 
sought to kill on their way to Egypt (Ex.4.22-26) enjoys strong 
exegetical support and is worthy of consideration. 
Cf. James B. Jordan, The Law of the Covenant: An Exposition of Exodus 
21-23 (Tyler, TX: Institute for Christian Economics, 1984). 
5. The description of idols and idolatry found in Psalms 115.3-8 and 
135.15-18 is extremely useful for understanding modern secular 
society. 
Cf. Herbert Schlossbcrg, Idols for Destruction (Washington, D.C.: Regnery 
Gateway, 1990). 
6. The suggestion of the Staten Bijbel that in Acts 8.Iff, lUxvreq, 6è 
Sveojtopiiaocv refers to the teachers who had been working in 
Jerusalem alongside the apostles, deserves widespread acceptance. 
7. The translation of 1 Peter 1.25b as 'Now this is the word which by 
the gospel was preached to you' (New King James Version) can be 
improved by omitting the italicized words from the rendering of 
the Aorist passive participle tixiyythaQtv. 
8. The New International Version of the Bible cannot satisfy those 
objections to the Revised Standard Version raised by Reformed 
believers, alleging translational inaccuracies and theological bias, 
which objections led to the production of the New International 
Version. 
9. The premise of so-called 'biblical universalism,' namely, that all 
people will be saved except those whom the Bible declares will be 
lost, seems to jeopardize the Bible's teaching about the necessity 
of faith for salvation. 
Contra Neal Punt, Unconditional Good News Toward an Understanding 
of Biblical Universalism (Grand Rapids. Eerdmans, 1980). 
10. Within twentieth century North American Christianity, Reformed 
theology provides a distinctive and necessary emphasis especially 
in the area of ecclesiology (its doctrine about the church). 
11. An evaluation of 'theonomy' will be most useful if it begins by 
understanding jtA,Tiptüooft in Matthew 5.17 as 'fulfill' instead of 
'confirm.' 
Cf. Greg L. Bahnsen, Theonomy in Christian Ethics, 2nd edition (Nutley, 
New Jersey. Craig, 1984) 39-86, Jakob van Bruggen, Matteiis Het evangelie 
voor Israel, Commentaar op het Nieuwe Testament, derde serie (Kampen: 
J.H. Kok, 1990) 92-93. 
12. The public reporting of morbidity and mortality rates pertaining 
to mothers committing abortion would probably dissuade many 
Americans from killing their children in this way. 
13. John Calvin's correspondence with Renee d'Este, duchess of Fer-
rara, provides significant perspectives for modern pastoral care. 
Cf. P.Y. De Jong, 'Calvin and the Duchess of Ferrara,' Mid-Amenca 
Journal of Theology, vol. 1, no 1 (Spring 198.5) 32-86. 
14. When Christian Reformed delegates to general synods of the 
Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland (synodaal) addressed the 
latter church as 'our mother church,' this historically inaccurate 
designation likely arose from an unfortunate, but persisting 
immigrant ecclesiastical insecurity. 
Cf. Doede Nauta, 'The Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland and the 
Christian Reformed Church,' Perspectives on the Christian Reformed 
Church Studies in Its History, Theology, and Ecumenicity, Peter De Klerk 
and Richard R. De Ridder, editors (Grand Rapids. Baker, 1983) 298-299. 
15. Proper catechism preaching will go a long way toward guarding 
church members from a dispensational method of Bible interpre-
tation. 
16. The church's understanding of ecclesiastical office and ordination 
is adversely affected when ministers whose principal work is not 
preaching, teaching or pasturing, nevertheless retain their 
ordination. 
17. Because the children's song 'You Cannot Hide from God' conveys 
a negative impression of God's omnipresence and omniscience, it 
should be neither taught to children nor sung in their presence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The trail leading to this effort was uncovered by our study, several 
years ago, of one denomination's approach to the question of so-called 
'worldly amusements' (movie attendance, dancing and card playing). 
Two landmark decisions framed a shift in attitude, the first in 1928, 
which essentially prohibited involvement in these activities, and the 
second in 1966, which permitted enjoyment of what was known by then 
as 'the film arts.'^ 
Careful reflection on the moral arguments employed to defend this 
shift will turn up an interesting fact: whereas in former days people 
could be swayed by, and sway others by, the caution not to 'give offense,' 
modern moral argument among some Christians no longer sounds the 
warning against 'causing others to stumble,' and no longer alerts us to 
the possibility that others with less moral ability might be inclined to 
imitate our moral permissions. 
There is a stillness in the forest of moral argument, where earlier 
there had been a chirp of caution, a warning whisper. 
Could it be that, as with so many other moral choices, so too with 
'the film arts,' individualism has invaded the most social of all sanctuar-
ies: the church? 
What, really, is 'giving offense'? Is the caution against 'offending 
others' or 'causing the weak to stumble' a valid moral appeal, or is it 
simply social control wearing a Sunday suit? What kind of moral sys-
tem has room for the notion of causing another person to stumble? 
Who, in fact, are 'the weak,' and who are 'the strong'? What is weak-
ness, anyway? 
These questions have to do with far more than choices of private or 
social entertainment. Listen to one of the earliest defenses behind a 
domestic mission policy of separate ecclesiastical development: 'The 
The 1928 discussion and decision can be found in Agenda 1928 van de synode van 
de Christelijke Gereformeerde Kerk m Amerika, Part I, 4-38, and Acta Synodi 1928 van de 
Christelijke Gereformeerde Kerk in Amerika, 86-89 One finds the 1966 discussion and 
decision in Acts of Synod 1966, 32-36, 316-361. We have detailed and evaluated some 
weaknesses of each position, and the differences between both, in The Christian Reformed 
Church and Theater Attendance. A Case Study in Calvinisttc Ethics, esp. 29-83. 
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domestic mission policy of separate ecclesiastical development: 'The 
[1857] Synod considers it desirable and scriptural that our members 
from the Heathen be received and absorbed into our existing congrega-
tions wherever possible; but where this measure, as a result of the 
weakness of some, impedes the furtherance of the cause of Christ among 
the Heathen, the congregation from the Heathen, already founded or 
still to be founded, shall enjoy its Christian privileges in a separate 
building or institution.'^ That such a mission policy, followed by many 
denominations in many countries, could be justified by appealing to 'the 
weakness of some' might arouse a skeptical grin among us. Unfortu-
nately, it seems that the abuse of the argument, among other things, 
accounts for its non-use today. 
That's where the trail began. And if, now, you should like to 
accompany us on an expedition along its route, here is an overview of 
the terrain. 
Its winding path will lead us deep into the evidence of Scripture, 
through the history of Christian ethics, and bring us eventually into an 
open clearing, looking out over the field of Christian ethics itself. 
Along the way one of the most surprising discoveries will be that what 
is 'going on' in the offense of the weak involves the relationship 
between Christian liberty and neighbor love. In fact, these will provide 
us with our points of reference on the horizon, enabling us to take a 
compass reading, find our bearing, and proceed to the next orienteering 
landmark. 
In Chapter 1 we leave the trailhead to plunge deep into the under-
growth of terms and definitions. Our expedition pushes off under the 
theme, 'Scandalum infirmorum: Christian liberty versus neighbor love.' 
After pausing first for a long, careful look at two cases of 'the strong 
and the weak' discussed in Scripture (1 Cor.8.1-11.1 and Rom.14.1-
15.13), we proceed to examine the work of four men who have walked 
this trail before us: Thomas Aquinas, John Calvin, Gisbert Voetius and 
Carl Henry. Our interest is sparked by their application of those 
Cited by John W de Gruchy in The Church Struggle m South Africa, 8 (emphasis 
added); the text of this resolution appears m 'The Dutch Reformed Churches and the 
Non-Whites,' Fact Paper 14, July, 1956 Lest we be inclined toward seventy, it should be 
mentioned that such a policy permitting separate ecclesiastical development was employed 
in North America until the 1960s by at least one Reformed denomination, for reasons no 
less ethnic. It would be unfair to allege in either case that mission policy was necessarily 
determined by motives of racism. 
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Scripture passages (and others), by their formulation of the problem and 
solution to it. The first leg of our expedition concludes as we frame the 
issues needing attention if scandalum infimiorum, or causing others to 
stumble, is to be avoided. In the interest of concreteness we offer 
several examples which people might think would serve well as modern 
test cases; but we will have to decide in Chapter 2 whether or not these 
illustrations indeed fit. 
The issues identified in Chapter 1 become the map for the second 
leg of our journey. In Chapter 2 we return to the trail, heading now 
into a synthesis of biblical and historical material, and an evaluation of 
the pioneering work examined earlier. Following our map will bring us 
deep into the thicket of questions regarding the nature of weakness, the 
process of stumbling, the arena of offense, and the theological context 
for best analyzing scandalum infimiorum as the collision between 
Christian liberty and neighbor love. 
Chapter 3 will lead us out, guiding us along the trail of biblical and 
theological considerations pertaining to communie sanctorum as the 
context for liberty serving love. How can the confession 'I believe one 
holy, catholic church, the communion of saints' resolve the conflict 
between strong and weak in the church? What can we learn from it 
about the nature and aim of freedom, and about the proper response to 
moral weakness in the church? 
Our trail will lead us out of the forest into the open field of 
Christian ethics. The value of our study for reflecting on all of 
Christian moral behavior is set forth briefly in an Epilogue entitled 'The 
ecclesial dimension of Christian ethics.' 




CHRISTIAN LIBERTY versus NEIGHBOR LOVE 
I.l Delimiting our subject 
As we set out on our trek, we must first scout the location of the 
trailhead, that is: examine and delimit the subject of our investigation. 
We begin by accepting as our working definition of Christian ethics 
that it reflects on people's responsible actions toward God and 
neighbor.^  Under the light of God's Word, this reflection encompasses 
several distinct components within moral action, including the elements 
of principle, context, consequence and motive. These latter two—conse-
quence and motive—are often determined only with great difficulty, and 
yet are just as important to Christian conduct as principle and context. 
Christian ethics deals with these matters, then, in terms of obligation 
and duty. 
But how much of Christian living involves obligation? 
It would be a serious misunderstanding to imagine that the 'field' of 
Christian conduct could be divided simply between matters belonging to 
Christian duty and those belonging to Christian liberty.'* Too easily the 
J Douma, Christian Morals and Ethics, 7, he explains the elements of this definition 
on pages 7-14. 
Legal philosophy, by contrast, does operate with this kind of classification This is 
defined and analyzed, entirely from the perspective of legal philosophy, by Joel Feinberg 
in his senes The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, especially volume 1, Harm to Others, 
and volume 2, Offense to Others These volumes form part of a study of the problem of 
Victimless crimes,' and yield some conclusions that are tantalizingly similar to those we will 
evaluate Consider Femberg's delimitation of his own subject 'We can also formulate the 
basic question of these volumes as one about the moral limits of individual liberty, under-
standing 'liberty' simply as the absence of legal coercion.' He divides civil morality into 
three categones 'We can think of every possible act as so related to a penal code that it 
must either be (1) required (a duty), (2) merely permitted (one we are 'at liberty' to do 
or forbear doing), or (3) prohibited (a cnme) Where coercive law stops, there liberty 
begins The citizen's zone of liberty, therefore, corresponds to the second clas> since (1) 
13 
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mistaken impression would be created that behavior occurring in one 
half (duty) may properly be evaluated, while actions performed or 
omitted in the other half (freedom) may not. In such a view, Christian 
ethics would be permitted to describe (and defend!) the boundaries of 
each half, and to busy itself with judgments concerning only matters of 
duty. 
This view imagines & freedom whose field and function are morally 
neutral (or better: amoral). Such a view of moral freedom collides with 
any suggestion that, since many deeds performed in 'freedom' have 
consequences, these actions are properly subject to evaluation. 
The fact is that many actions, whether proceeding in freedom or 
fi^om duty, affect other persons. Consequences can range from the other 
becoming more—or less^wealthy, wise, happy, friendly, efficient, 
generous, etc. Among the myriad results we could imagine is this 
outcome: one's action can occasion another's moral injury or lead 
another into sin. Think only of children, so easily led into wrongdoing 
as they follow negative examples of others around them. 
liie primary aim of our study is to show that Christian moral 
responsibility includes intending, as one consequence of our actions, 
that others are not morally injured (negative), but protected from moral 
harm and assisted in their moral progress (positive). Here, consequence 
and motive merge to form a partnership; considering, as best one can, 
the negative and positive effects of one's action upon another person 
ought shape one's motive for committing or omitting that action. 
Now, the Bible narrates several episodes where people were led into 
sin by the actions of others. It is important to note that often these 
actions themselves were wrong. 
On the Bible's first pages we learn of Eve leading Adam to join her 
in wrongdoing (Gen.3.6). Scripture tells of the prophet Balaam who led 
Israel into sexual sin (Num.22-25), a spiritual seduction that receives 
repeated attention throughout both Old and New Testaments 
(Josh.24.9,10; Neh. 13.2; Mic.6.5; 2 Pet.2.15; Jude 11; Rev.2.14). Another 
very strange episode, narrated in 1 Kings 13.11-32, involves a prophet 
from Bethel who seduces a man of God from Judah to come to his 
home and eat, contrary to the LORD'S express prohibition. Another 
tragic episode occurred when Israel brought Moab and her king Mesha 
and (3) are alike in directing coercive threats at him. . . .The goal of this work then is to 
trace the contours of the zone in which the citizen has a moral claim to be at liberty, that 
is, free of legal coercion' (Harm to Others, 7). 
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to such despair through her unmerciful military tactics which violated 
divine proscriptions (in Dt.20.19-20), that he sacrificed his son as an 
offering to Chemosh, presumably beseeching his god for deliverance (2 
Ki.3.13-27). Rather than offer Moab conditions of peace, Israel 
employed total annihilation, driving Mesha to make the wall of his 
besieged city an altar of sacrifice to his god, where he offers a most 
costly sacrifice: his son. In other words, Israel by her disobedience led 
Moab to do what she herself had been forbidden to do (cf. Lev. 18.21; 
20.3; Mic.6.7) and what God hates.' 
The Gospel of Matthew records one incident of potential—though 
unwarranted—iniuTy, involving Peter and the temple-tax. Peter was 
accosted in Capernaum by the temple-tax collectors who wished to know 
whether Jesus was in the habit of paying His share (Mt. 17.24-27). As 
prescribed in Ex.30.11-16, each Israelite twenty years and older was to 
pay at the census time a half-shekel as an atonement offering to the 
LORD. Peter assured the collectors that his Master was indeed in the 
habit of paying the tax, but later Christ invited Peter's further reflection 
on the matter by His question, 'From whom do the kings of the earth 
take customs or taxes, from their own sons or from strangers?' 
(Mt. 17.25). When Peter answered with the latter, Jesus said, 'Then the 
sons are free.' Presumably Peter too was free from the obligation of 
paying the temple-tax, though he was told to throw his fishing line in 
the Sea of Galilee, where he would catch a fish with enough money in 
its mouth to pay the temple tax for both Jesus and himself—'in order,' 
Jesus said, 'that we not offend them' (Mt. 17.27). Here the Lord waives 
His and Peter's right to exemption from the tax, to avoid the possibility 
that some, because of ignorance or unbelief, might misconstrue the 
omission as disdain for the temple.* Contrast this renunciation of 
messianic right with Christ's frequent assertions of His divine right over 
against His enemies before whom He wished to demonstrate Himself as 
the fulfillment of the law.' 
Each of these biblical episodes describes actual or potential moral 
injury. We could easily multiply examples of moral injury in our own 
times; in fact, we might even say that everyone is a potential victim of 
moral harm. Children come to mind almost instinctively as those most 
I. de Wolff, De geschiedenis der Godsopenbaring, 6:149; also C. van Gelderen, De 
boeken der Koningen, 2:395-3%. 
*H.N. Ridderbos, Matthew, 330. 
H.A.W. Meyer, Critical and Exegetical Handbook to the Gospel of Matthew, 318. 
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vulnerable and susceptible to injury through bad example. They need 
moral, as well as physical and emotional, development in order to travel 
without accident along the pathways of moral choice. But there are 
others: think of the new convert to the Christian faith, who sees experi-
enced believers doing things he associates with his 'old' way of life, and 
is then tempted to return to such a practice against his convictions. Or 
consider someone outside the faith, who appeals, in defense of his 
unbelief, to the bad example of Christian leaders. 
This study examines a certain group of people who are more prone 
than others to moral injury, identified in two specific cases (addressed 
by the apostle Paul) as believers with a "weak' conscience. That is, their 
consciences prevent them from undertaking (or omitting) certain 
activities, and they are in danger of being injured by others who enjoy 
the permission of their consciences to engage in (or omit) those 
activities. These cases are discussed in 1 Corinthians 8-10 and Romans 
14-15; often people will describe the participants in these episodes as 
'strong' and 'weak' Christians. 
Our interest extends beyond the people who are injured, to include 
the moral injury itself. What happens when a person with a 'weak' 
conscience is injured? This concern helps explain the title of this 
chapter: 'Scandalum Infirmorum: Christian Liberty versus Neighbor 
Love.' We hope to show that scandalum infirmorum, or offense of the 
weak, occurs at that point where liberty and love collide, where enjoying 
one's own moral permissions conflicts with the duty of caring for 
another's moral protection. 
Now that we have located the trailhead, we are ready to begin the 
hike. During the first leg, we will examine the cases discussed in 1 
Corinthians 8-10 and Romans 14-15. This order of presentation arises 
from the likelihood that the apostle Paul wrote 1 Corinthians before his 
letter to the church at Rome. Three questions will guide us as we walk 
through these passages: (1) What was the occasion under discussion? (2) 
What were the responses within the church? and (3) What were the 
results being addressed by the apostle? It will become apparent that 
each of these passages addresses a different situation, though there is a 
similarity of language at points. But we should emphasize here that the 
textual material leaves many of our questions unanswered, and the focus 
of our study neither permits nor requires extensive analysis of the 
possible answers. 
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1.2 Scandalum infirmorum and Scripture: two cases 
1.2.1 1 Corinthians 8.1-11.1 
In 1 Corinthians Paul deals with several problems about which 
these believers had apparently written him earlier. The treatment of a 
new case begins in 8.1, indicated by the formula (jtepl8é) employed also 
in 7.1 and 7.25. This case involves 'sacrificial foods' (ei5o)A^ )0v)Ta), a 
word that appears nine times in the NT (Acts 15.29; 21.25; 1 
Cor.8.1,4,7,10; 10.19; Rev.2.14,20) to refer to that which was sacrificed 
to an el8(ü>iov or 'idol.' Included in these offerings was everything from 
animals to produce, fruits, wine, cakes, fish, and milk products.' This 
sacrificial food was often divided into three portions, one to be 
consumed on the altar, another to be given to the priest, and a third to 
be enjoyed at a sacrificial meal.' 
Within the congregation were believers who had been converted 
from practices of pagan idol worship, which included participating in 
idol-meals and eating idol-food. Although they could subscribe to the 
confession that there is only one God and that idols were nothings (8.4), 
they nevertheless associated eating sacrificial food with idolatry."* 
There were others in the congregation who, by contrast, possessed 
the confidence of 'knowledge' which served as the warrant for their 
freedom to eat sacrificial food and participate in sacrificial meals. 
Although there is insufficient evidence to suggest that an open dispute 
had broken out in the Corinthian congregation, what is clear is that 
diversity of opinion existed within the church. It was this disagreement 
that they had submitted to the apostle for advice. 
In I Cor.8.1-6 Paul begins by comparing the relative effects of 
knowledge and love. All believers possess knowledge-in-general (v.la, 
where yvwovv is anarthrous), the kind that combines theoretical 
understanding with practical capacity for its use. But there is a kind of 
knowledge (v. lb, where yvmov^  has the article) that is insufficient to 
settle the dispute about sacrificial foods, because it consists of differing 
*Fnednch Buchsel, 'El&aXoV, [K.TA.].' TDNT, 2:375-379. 
L. Batelaan, De kerk van Konnthe en wij: De actualiteit van Paulus' eerste brief aan de 
Konnthiers (1 Kor. 8-11.1), 15-18, L. Batelaan, De sterken en zwakken in de kerk van 
Konnthe; and Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 356-357, 361. 
John C. Brunt, Paul's Attitude toward and Treatment of Problems involving Dietary 
Practice: A Case Study in Pauline Etiiics, 72. 
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insights and yields different actions, thus breaking the unity and 
commonality of the church at this point. Knowledge, by itself, inflates 
people, puffe them up like a pair of bellows. By contrast, love has the 
inherent quality of building up (cf. 1 Cor. 13.4). Holding something 
intellectually is not yet a sufficient qualification of knowledge. Right 
knowledge includes the use to which it is put. In other words, knowing 
something (v.2) must be combined with love of God (v.3). 
The solution, then, to the problem of eating food sacrificed to idols 
is clear: the primary requirement is love, the love that builds, a love that 
has its origin in love of God, a love that is the necessary and sufficient 
qualification of genuine knowledge. 
All of this comes to bear on the real problem, namely, the eating of 
food offered to idols (v.4). Later we shall observe the various contexts 
of this eating, but for now we note the context indicated by the parallel 
confession: 'an idol is a nothing, and a god other than the One is a 
nobody.' Here the food itself is connected to its use within the context 
of cultic religion. To understand the food, one needs to know about its 
use. 
Now, for the believer the fundamental thesis is that those objects 
of veneration and worship in pagan temples 'are' nothings and nobodies. 
There exists one, and only one, single, real God. But there are said to 
be other gods: emperors, the spirits of deceased persons who had lived 
distinguished lives, phenomena of nature (thunder, wind, fertility, etc.). 
Although in the OT, judges were called Dn*?^  (Ex.22.8-9; cf. Ps.82.1,6 
and Jn. 10.34-35), this term was used in a relative sense. Even the pagan 
emperor and his helpers were dependent on God as the source of their 
power and authority (cf. Rom.13.1,4). 
In contrast to pagan ascriptions of deity to many persons and 
things, for us Christians (emphatic i\ix\, v.6) ours is the unique God. 
He is 'the Father,' that is, the origin and source of the universe. The 
pagan's gods are nobodies because they cannot create anything (Ps.%.5); 
in fact, they are 'of the cosmos—reflecting the inescapable pantheism of 
all paganism. But notice: this God of ours is also the One 'fi-om whom 
everything is,' including food abused in idolatry! In contrast to pagan 
ascriptions of icópio^ to rulers and others, Christians have one Lord. He 
is Jesus Christ, whose claim to sovereignty rests in the fact that He too 
participated in creation: everything is through Him. He is the Owner, 
also of food abused in service to idols. With this confession believers 
acknowledge a duality, but no dualism; a creational independence, but 
no creaturely independentism. Creature and creator are two necessarily 
distinguishable, but related, entities. 
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In 1 Cor.8.7-13 the apostle aims his discussion still more pointedly 
by isolating the first difficulty: this knowledge (referring back to that 
knowledge discussed in w.4-6) is deficient among some believers, in that 
it does not yield the same implications and applications. It is important 
to stress that those with this deficiency were Christian believers, holding 
the confession about the only true God, Maker of heaven and earth. 
But this right confession was mixed with a consciousness of the idol, its 
place in religious veneration. It is likely that by force of habit and 
custom, they still consider the idols to be devils who take into their 
possession those foods offered to them; those who ate food sacrificed 
to idols would be infected and contaminated demonically. Regardless 
of whether the phrase 'until now' (hoq &pu, v.7) describes their 
consciousness or their eating, the connection is clear: the conscience of 
these believers pronounces a negative judgment, a disqualifying evalua-
tion, concerning the action of eating sacrificial foods. This 'mixed' 
knowledge yields a conscience that is weak and polluted in the presence 
of idol-food. Weakness is due to the domination of conscience by 
convictions concerning idols, while pollution results from temptation to 
and perhaps participation in eating sacrificial foods. 'Their problem is 
not in coming to a decision, not in not knowing about idols, but in 
carrying through with a decision that creates too great a moral 
dissonance for them, and thus leads them back into idolatry.'" Their 
conscience is defiled when they are led, through the example of the 
'strong,' to act contrary to their own convictions, and therefore not out 
of faith (cf. Rom. 14.23)." 
It may appear that Paul is rehearsing the Christian confession about 
God's uniqueness and creativity in order to convince the weak, to bring 
them to see the implications and applications of their belief so that they 
may join the strong. But this perception requires more careful 
nuancing, as we will seek to demonstrate below. At this point we 
mention three considerations that militate against that conception as 
stated. 
(1) If Paul's purpose is to instruct the weak, it is strange that he 
should use rather indirect and impersonal language: this knowl-
edge, says he, is not 'among all,' and 'some' have consciousness 
of the idol. In other words, in these verses Paul never address-
es the weak directly. 
"Fee, 381, n. 28. 
'^runl, Paul's Attitude, 85. 
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(2) Rather than emphasizing the correct content of knowledge, the 
apostle's purpose is to give guidance in the proper use of 
kiiowledge, namely, in love. 
(3) Nowhere does Paul suggest that the consciences of the weak 
should not have been polluted by the pagan religious use of 
sacrificial foods. 
Moving from description to declaration, Paul insists that neither 
food nor its use has an inherent spiritual or moral quality. Idol-food 
(ei8o>Xó©OTov) is, after all, only food (Ppwua)! (This will become 
important later in 10.25-28, when the apostle returns to the idea that 
the earth and its fullness are the LORD'S.) Eating and not eating have 
no advantage or disadvantage for our relationship to God. 
Having cleared the way in 8.8 by saying 'if we don't eat, we're none 
the worse,' the apostle for the first time addresses individuals directly. 
In view here is a part of the church whom he enjoins to act cautiously 
toward another part, to avoid the possibility that the 'competence' 
i&flwia, lit., authority, freedom, right) of 'strong' believers become a 
stumbling-block (npcxnco^^a) for those weak Christians described in 8.7. 
How that could happen is explained in 8.10: someone (presumably, one 
of 'the weak') might see them reclining in an idol-temple, partaking thus 
of sacrificial meals. 
It appears that those with 'knowledge' were participating in cultic 
meals at the temple dining halls. After his conversion to Christianity, 
the 'strong' Corinthian believer maintained contact with friends and col-
leagues, continuing to attend festive meals held at the religious social 
halls devoted to the service of a patron deity or a national god. He 
'knew/ in contrast to the weak, that an idol was nothing, that the gods 
alongside God were nobodies. And he correctly perceived that 
idol-food was ordinary food. But he went one step further: he viewed 
sacrificial meals as ordinary meals. 
This public behavior of the strong created moral dissonance in 
believers whose consciences were weak. The weak were in danger, 
ironically enough, of being 'edified' unto their ruin. The brother's (note 
first time use in this passage) dissonance was not merely psychological, 
but spiritual, with eternal consequences (v. 11, he will be 'destroyed'). 
All the more tragic in view of the fact that such weak Christians belong 
to those for whom Christ died—those whom He purchased and in whom 
He dwells. But the heart of this tragedy is that, sinning in this way 
against a fellow Christian by wounding his weak conscience, the strong 
believer sins against Christ Himself. To 'sin against Christ' is to stand 
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in the way of redemption's progress (cf. Mt.18.6; Mk.9.42; Lk.11.52; 
17.1-2), in this case, the redemption of the weak. 
Paul concludes with a maxim, a principle that reaches beyond his 
personal preferences to guide the Corinthian believers. The scope of 
Christian sacrifice and self-denial extends to the food we eat: permanent 
vegetarianism is preferable to a fellow believer's fall into sin (8.13). 
This leads us to the preliminary observation that rather than condemn-
ing or (re)educating the weak, the apostle subordinates the question 
about the permissibility of eating idol-food to the primary moral 
question concerning love for the weak believer. 
This self-denying love is further described with reference, in 1 Cor.9, 
to the apostle's own example. In spite of his expressed willingness to 
forego, forever, eating meat, Paul is an apostle, free in Christ whom he 
saw on the Damascus road. Although Paul and Barnabas had the right 
to depend on the Corinthian believers for support, to marry and takes 
wives on their journeys, to devote full attention to gospel preaching 
instead of supporting themselves by their trades (w.4-6), nevertheless 
they abstain from using their right, and instead exercise forbearance. 
They refuse their natural and lawful freedoms and rights, since their 
goal is to keep the path and progress of Christ's gospel clear of any 
obstructions which their use of rights might have occasioned. 
In short, Paul and his co-workers declined material support from 
the Corinthians, lest they prevent someone from coming to grace. So 
they endure everything resulting from that self-denial (cf. 1 Thess.2.9; 
1 Cor.4.6-13). In fact, the very idea that he should accept from their 
hands material support is so shocking that Paul would rather die than 
obscure what really is his ground of glorying: the ^ace of God which is 
sufficient for every need. Not only is Paul's gospel unique (proclaiming 
the God-Man Savior, risen and ruling), but his means of 'gospelizing' is 
correspondingly unique: Paul lived totally dependent upon the very 
grace he proclaimed. His method of gospel preaching glorifies the 
content of gospel preaching. 
In 9.19-23 the apostle draws together his argument with the contrast 
which lay at the heart of the Corinthian problem: freedom vs. slavery. 
As an apostle preaching free grace without putting himself in their debt, 
Paul was free of all (9.1), yet willingly their slave (v. 19). His purpose 
was clear: to win or gain more for Christ, a goal exemplified in his 
ministry to the Jews (those under the law) and the Gentiles (those 
without law), and to the weak. A key word in these verses is the little 
word 'as' ((5 )^: Paul became 'as' a Jew, 'as' a Gentile, and 'as' weak. 
Without placing himself in subservience to the ceremonial law, he 
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circumcised Timothy (Acts 16.3), and honored his and others' ceremoni-
al vows (Acts 18.18; 21.23). In subservience to Christ he could, with the 
Gentile believers, live free from the requirements of Mosaic ceremonies. 
Similarly, to the weak Paul became as weak, as though living under, and 
limited by, their convictions. 
Examples from Scripture and Israel's history are provided in 1 
Cor.10.1-13, preparing the way for Paul's warning in 10.14ff against 
idolatry. The strongs' claim of 'knowledge' apparently induced them to 
assume that their position as believers and their participation in the 
sacraments immunized them from 'falling.'" These OT examples show 
exactly the opposite, however. The comparisons with eating, drinking, 
idolatry and sexual immorality alert the Corinthian believers to the 
danger of spiritual arrogance that precedes a fall. 
With a pastoral urgency Paul brings his instruction to its climax in 
1 Cor.10.14-33, where he deals with three distinct questions relating to 
the use of sacrificial food. Each involves a particular context within 
which a Corinthian believer might encounter sacriHcial food: (1) the 
idol temple; (2) the marketplace; and (3) at an unbeliever's home. 
With regard to using idol-food in a pagan temple, Paul warns: Flee 
from idolatry! He has in mind participation at the meals in the idol-
temples at Corinth, as 10.17b-22 shows. Not only does the history of 
the OT church demonstrate the sensibility of this command (cf. 
10.1-13), but so does the nature of the NT sacrament of the Lord's 
Supper (v. 16). The cup and the bread are a communion (Koivwvia) of 
Christ Himself, as Paul asserts by means of questions expecting affirma-
tive answers. That is, eating-and-drinking means participation and 
fellowship with the one whose food is enjoyed. Moreover, eating-and-
drinking unites one in solidarity with others who are ingesting the same 
food (v. 17).'" To eat in an idol-temple is to associate with the altar; 
this was true of both OT Israel and their Jewish descendants still living 
in Paul's day, and of the believers in Corinth. To be 'communicants of 
the altar' (Kovvmvoi xoö euouxornpiou, v. 18) is to share in everything 
entailed in the worship of sacrifice: allegiance to the deity, veneration 
of his supposed powers and benefits, commitment to his service. 
But in light of 8.4, where the apostle denies the personality and 
existence of idol-gods, does not his argument here (10.19) imply just the 
'^Bnint, Paul's Attitude, 100. 
' t e e , 469. 
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opposite, namely, that idol-gods possess personality and existence? 
Communion entails two persons, at least—the worshiper and the one 
worshiped. True enough. What exists, however, is not the idol-god, but 
the demons who serve Satan himself (v.20).'' Idol-sacrifices are 
nothing less than sacrifices to devils, whereby one is brought into 
(comm)union with them. It is Christ or the demons, His food and drink 
or theirs. Not both. Otherwise those strong Corinthian believers risk 
provoking God to jealousy (v.22; cf. Dt.32.21). They may indeed be 
'strong,' but stronger than God? 
Participating at the feasts held in idol-temples was forbidden, 
therefore. But a second question was: What of the excess sacrificial 
food sold in the market? May Corinthian Christians use it? Already in 
6.12 Paul had insisted that 'all things are lawful for me, but not all 
things are helpful. All things are lawful for me, but I will not be 
brought under the dominion of anything.' In chapter 8 he added the 
criteria of love (v.l) and not causing a brother to fall (v.9). Here in 
10.23 he adds to the standard of 'helpfulness' that of edifying. Love 
seeks not its own (13.5), but the upbuilding of the other. Selfishness is 
its opposite. 
The excess sacrificial food was put up for sale in the macellum, the 
architecturally and economically prominent marketplace in ancient 
Roman and Hellenistic cities. Everything for daily needs was sold there: 
perishables like fruit, grain, bread, fowl, fish; daily utensils; religious 
paraphernalia used for celebrations and ritual observances.'* In 
addition, the macellum served as a butcher shop and a communal 
kitchen. Meals could be ordered from chefs specializing in the prepara-
tion of communal celebrations, and even eaten in the macellum. 
Though the macellum was not used for cultic purposes, its goods and 
services bore a religious stamp. But in addition to the sacrificial foods 
sold over the counter, there was non-sacrificial food available. 
The Corinthians are encouraged to buy and eat, asking no questions 
about the origin or prior use of the foods sold in the market. On this 
point their consciences were to be free. What is the basis of such 
fi-eedom? Knowing that 'the earth and its fullness are the LORD'S' 
"see Ps.96.5, 'For all the gods of the peoples are idols,' which the LXX (95.5) 
renders with SoHlÓVia, 'are demons'; Ps.106.37 (LXX 105.37); Isa.653 (LXX); 65.11 
(LXX). Cf. Fee, 472, n. 49. 
^ u s the explanation of |llXK£AXoV by J. Schneider is far too restrictive; see 
'MoiceXXov,' TDNT, 4:370-372. We agree with L. Batelaan, De sterken en zwakken, 15-18; 
and his De kerk van Korinthe, 23-28. 
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(v.26; Ps.24.1; cf. 1 Cor.8.6). Food sold in the macellum belonged not 
to the demons, but to the Lord. Its possible sacrificial use would not 
have altered its created nature}^ 
In 10.27 we meet the third dilemma associated with eating sacrificial 
foods: May a believer accept an invitation to share a meal with an 
unbeliever, eating food that may have been sacrificed to an idol? The 
occasion may have been a birthday, a wedding, the safe return after a 
profitable voyage, or another festive celebration. It was customary to 
offer a sacrifice to the deity on these occasions, and part of the food 
dedicated at the idol-temple would be used for the meal.'* Now, if the 
believer was minded to accept the invitation, he was to eat the food 
given to him without asking questions about its possible religious use. 
But if 'someone' identifies the food as sacrificial food (v.28), the 
believer-guest must not eat it. 
Within 10.28-29, at least three important exegetical points have 
occasioned debate among interpreters. 
First, the identity of this informant, this 'someone,' is not easily 
determined. Possible identities include (1) the pagan host, (2) a pagan 
fellow-guest, and (3) a weak Christian fellow-guest. Many commenta-
tors choose (2) on the principal ground that Paul's hypothetical inter-
locutor must be speaking from a pagan perspective, since according to 
some manuscripts he employs a term referring to 'sacrificial meat' 
((epóöurov) rather than the standard Jewish-Christian designation 'idol-
meat' (clSoAoöÓTov), used earlier in these chapters. But others identify 
the informant as a weak Christian, insisting that the thread of Paul's 
argument in this context is to spare the brother moral injury." 
Coupled with the question of the informant's identity is that of his 
motive for informing the believer. If the informant was a pagan, he may 
This in contrast to the Didache 6:3, 'And in the matter of food, do what you can; 
but be scrupulously on your guard against meat offered to idols, for that is a worship of 
dead gods.' See The Didache, The Epistle of Barnabas, et aL, 19. 
Y. Batelaan, De sterken en zwakken (86-87), and De kerk van Kormthe (130) 
TTie former view is defended by Fee (484) and Batelaan {De sterken en zwakken, 87). 
The latter is championed by Calvin {Commentary on the Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the 
Connthians, MS), F.W. Grosheide {De eerste brief van den apostel Paulus aan de kerk te 
Kormthe, 'iSl') and Alfred Plummer {A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First 
Epistle of St Paul to the Connthians, 221-222). 
Another solution is to leave xi^ unspecified, so that the warning of w.28-29 covers 
both situations, namely, to avoid (1) causing a weak brother to stumble, and (2) giving the 
unbehever an occasion for cnticizing the Chnstian (so H.A.W. Meyer, Cntisch exegetisches 
Handbuch uber den ersten Brief an die Konnther, 275-276). 
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have viewed Christianity as a Jewish sect with Jewish scruples about 
food, and may be trying to help the believer out. Or he may be testing 
the believer to see what he would do, intentionally creating a predica-
ment.^ " On the other hand, if the informant was a weak Christian, his 
motive may be to warn his co-believer of something violating his own 
scruples. 
If one views the informant as a pagan, a third question arises. 
What then does it mean to speak of the pagan's conscience in 10.28b 
and 10.29b? One commentator suggests that here croveiStioii; means 
'moral consciousness' rather than 'moral arbiter.' Christian abstinence 
is advisable, therefore, to avoid offending pagan 'moral expectations of 
Christians.'^ ^ 
Our reason for pausing here lies in the application or conclusion, 
drawn by some, that the weak believer's conscience may not restrict the 
actions of others, nor may the weak prevail over the strong. Rather, 
some would argue that the weak must be instructed in the knowledge 
of the strong, so that their consciences too may possess the freedom of 
the strong.^ ^ 
But this line of interpretation encounters difficulties in two areas, 
one textual, the other exegetical. 
Establishing the informant's identity with appeal to the use of the 
term tepóöuxov (v.28) is textually uncertain, since that reading appears 
in a few Alexandrian manuscripts (P''*, n. A, B), whereas the majority of 
n'hilipp Bachmann, Der erste Bnefdes Paulus an die Konnther, 342. 
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Fee argues that the informant acts out of a sense of moral obhgation to the 
Christian, thinking that Christians usually wouldn't eat such food. So as not to offend that 
person or his 'moral expectations of Christians,' one should forbear under these 
circumstances (485); similarly Batelaan, De sterken en zwakken (87). But precisely this 
difficulty of understanding what Paul could possibly mean by speaking of a pagan's 
conscience leads Grosheide to identify the informant as a fellow-believer (358). 
Already pnor to his discussion of this point, Fee has made an important exegetical 
choice (477) by insisting that in 10.23-11.1 Paul is not returning to the issue handled m 
chapter 8, concerning the relation between strong and weak, because several key words are 
absent ('idols,' 'knowledge,' 'the weak,' etc). But what must we make of the appeal (twice 
m these w.) to Ps.24 1, recalling the argument of 8 4ff? And what of the repeated concern 
for the other's conscience (8.7, 10 25,27-29)? 
^ e e , Corinthians, argues that Paul nowhere permits the believer's conscience to 
restnct the action of another, because the use of idol-food is not a matter of conscience 
at all (485); Carl F.H. Heniy, Christian Personal Ethics, intimates that the weak should 
eventually outgrow their weakness (422), and Philip Edgcumbe Hughes, Christian Ethics 
in a Secular Society, strongly insists that since weakness is ignorance, this may be only a 
temporary condition (40). 
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manuscripts has the reading ei&aXo&uxov, 'idol­food' (or as we have been 
rendering it: 'sacrincial food'). 
There is a better solution to the exegetical puzzles in these verses, 
which might be arranged schematically as follows:^ 
GENERAL RULES (23­24) 
SPECIFIC CASE *1 
SPECIFIC CASE # 2 
EXCEPTION 
All things are lawful for me, but not all things are 
helpful. All things are lawful for me, but not all 
things edify. Let nobody seek his own, but let 
each seek the other's well­being. 
(2.5) Eat whatever is being sold m the market, 
investigating nothing on account of con­
science. 
­ (26) For 'the earth and its fullness are the 
LORD'S.' 
(27) And if one of the unbelievers invites you, 
and you want to go, eat whatever is being 
set before you, investigating nothing on 
account of conscience. 
RATIONALE 
(28­29a) But should someone tell you, 'This is food sacri­
ficed to an idol,' do not eat it, on account of the 
one who disclosed it and on account of con­
science—for 'the earth and its fullness are the 
LORD'S'^''—conscience, I say, not of yourself, 
but rather of the other. 
(29b­30) For why is my freedom condemned by another 
conscience' If I partake with thanks, why am I 
blasphemed on behalf of that for which I give 
thanks? 
GENERAL RULES (31­33) Therefore, whether you eat or dnnk or do any­
thing, do all things to the glory of God Be 
without offense for Jews and for Gentiles and for 
the church of God, just as I too please all people 
m regard to all things, not seeking my advantage 
T '^or a similar view, see G.G. Findlay, The Ejqpositor's Greek New Testament, 2:867­
868, by means of this schematic outline we wish to illustrate that the exception and 
rationale apply to both 'cases' where behevers might encounter sacnflcial food outside the 
pagan temple The translation is our own 
■^"We follow here the majority of manuscnpts, contra Metzger, TCGNT (561), one 
good reason for the omission of this repeated citation of Ps.24.1 in some manuscripts may 
\x that It IS a genuine lectio cUfficihor. 
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but that of the many, in order that they may be 
saved. 
The strong has been warned in 10.14-22 to stay away from feasts in 
idol-temples. This is followed in 10.23-24 with a general apostolic 
summary, stipulating that expedience, edification and the other's welfare 
ought to guide conduct. Then in 10.25-27 the apostle introduces two 
specific cases, both of them modified by the exception explained in 
10.28-29a. The rationale for this exception is supplied in 10.29b-30, and 
followed by concluding general rules in 10.31-33. 
Notice that the same advice is given for both moral cases: 'Eat 
without investigating anything on account of conscience.'" But, if any 
Corinthian believer learns, either at the market or in the unbeliever's 
presence, that the food has been consecrated to an idol, he must abstain 
for the sake of his informant's conscience. Notice the use of 'eat' in 
these verses: eat anything in the market (v.25), eat anything provided by 
the unbelieving host (v.27), but don't eat if in either case someone 
discloses the food's sacrificial use (w.28-29a).^ 
Twice the apostle roots his advice in the confession of Ps.24.1 that 
'the earth and its fullness are the LORD'S' (W.26 and 28). If we may 
understand 10.26 as a 'swing verse' between 10.25 and 10.27, then this 
first use of the Ps.24.1 covers both specific cases. Moreover, its second 
use in 10.28 also covers both specific cases as warrant for the exception. 
But how can the confession that 'the earth and its fullness are the 
LORD'S' undergird advice both to eat and to abstain from eating?! It's 
rather common to relate the confession to eating, as the history of 
debate about Christian liberty illustrates. However, using this confes-
sion to defend not eating takes us by surprise. Its second use (v.28) 
seems to suggest that one can abstain from eating idol-food in these 
instances, and choose other food, in order to avoid injuring the weak 
brother, because everything in the world belongs to the LORD, and can 
be enjoyed. The strong is not dependent on idol-food for his physical 
existence, but has at his disposal an abundance of food other than what 
Note the parallelisms between w.25 and 27: 
v.25a: nov TO èv jioocéXXcp TOuXotntvov èoStexe v.25b: ^T)5èv óivocKpivovxe^ 
bva xfiv ovveiSt^cnv 
v.27b: n a v XÓ nc(p«xiOÉ(ievov'6^tv èoeiexc v.27c: nn5èv dvoticplvovie^ 
Sua Tf|v croveiSrjoiv 
^Ve disagree, therefore, with the RSV translators, Gordon Fee (486), and Brunt 
(Paul'sAttitude, 114-115), who interpret w.28-29b as parenthetical to the apostle's purpose. 
Instead, w.28-30 lie very close to the heart of 1 Cor.8.1-11.1! See our outline above. 
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has been dedicated to idols. 
It isn't necessary, then, to decide whether this informant is a 
believer or unbeliever. Although their consciences possess different 
orientations and content, for both believer and unbeliever conscience 
functions in the same manner (though not with the same effect!) as 
moral critic, judge and arbitrator.^ The believer is to be so sensitive 
to others, whether pagan or Christian, that he is willing not to eat 
sacrificial food in order to avoid arousing questions of conscience. 
The rationale for this exception to both cases we find in 10.29b-30. 
To understand this properly, let's ask: How does eating sacrificial food 
in spite of an informant's disclosure affect the believer's freedom? 
When I abuse liberty without regard for my neighbor, he will not only 
condemn my freedom (v.29b), but will also despise me for enjoying with 
gratitude what freedom permits (v.30).^ * 
We have seen why it is both difficult and unnecessary to identiiy the 
informant of 10.28. Further, whether he be pagan or Christian, 
whatever his motive (enforcing the scruples of his own weak conscience 
or sparing the believer potential embarrassment), the effects of liberty 
carelessly used are the same. Both the pagan and the weak believer 
would condemn this liberty and despise its practitioner for acting in a 
way inconsistent with his profession. 
Does this passage, then, ban the weak from 'prevailing over' the 
strong, as some allege? If they mean that this passage nowhere exhorts 
the strong to modify his behavior for the sake of others, that view seems 
mistaken. In fact, the apostle emphasizes quite the opposite: the whole 
thrust of his teaching is found exactly in those verses thought to be 
parenthetical, in the exception to the specific cases (w.28-29a). That 
thrust is this: For the sake of the person who, in this case, out of 
'consciousness of the idol' (cf. 8.7) raises the point, the strong believer 
is to forego the permissible use of liberty in enjoying what is, after all, 
only ordinary food. Rather than speaking pejoratively of the weak 
believer or unbeliever 'prevailing over' the strong, why not echo the 
apostle in speaking of the strong serving the weak or unbelieving 
S. Greijdanus, Schnftbegmselen ter schriftverklaring en historisch overzicht over 
theorieën en wijzen van schnftuitleggmg, 94, 135. 
28 
Contra Fee and Batelaan, it isn't necessary to assign pagan conscience a function 
different from Chnstian conscience; see note 21. 
29 
Calvin, Commentary on the Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians, 346-347. 
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neighbor? The accommodation that Paul recommends is not because 
the weak object to eating idol-food, but because the weak (and 
unbelievers) are in danger of being injured by it. They risk possible 
spiritual injury by 'participating in acts not wrong in themselves but 
which violate the convictions of one's conscience and create associations 
with acts that are wrong.'^ 
In w.30-33 the apostle summarizes the character of living together 
as strong and weak. The cardinal principle for Christian conduct is to 
glorify God in everything. Such conduct will glorify God if performed 
according to knowledge that serves love. Negatively this is attained 
when our actions are devoid of offense or stumbling, when they do not 
occasion the fall of a Jew, Gentile or fellow believer. And if we must 
avoid occasioning their fall, that implies that we must determine to 
assist their progress unto God in holiness and obedience. Of this the 
apostle Paul is an example, as he had explained in 9.19-25, wanting to 
please everybody, enslaving himself to all, seeking their redemption. 
This apostolic example is the basis for one final exhortation (11.1). 
Just as Christ did not seek His own advantage, but that of others whom 
He came to serve, so Paul sought the salvation of all to whom he 
proclaimed Christ's gospel. And so should all believers! If for some 
Corinthian believers, eating at the idol-temple was a matter of 'rights' 
and 'knowledge,' for Paul it was a matter of love and freedom. 
'Knowledge and rights lead to pride; they are ultimately non-Christian 
because the bottom line is selfishness—freedom to do as I please when 
I please. Love and freedom lead to edification; they are ultimately 
Christian because the bottom line is the benefit of someone else—that 
they may be saved.'^ ' 
Summary: The 'strong' and the 'weak' in the Corinthian congregation 
are defined in terms of the moral permissions of their faith-knowledge 
concerning concerning idols and idol-food. Three distinct problems, or 
encounters with sacrificial food, are addressed by the apostle: 
John C. Brunt, 'Love, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility: The Contribution of I 
Cor. 8-10 to an Understanding of Paul's Ethical Thinking,' 25. This instruction is con-
firmed by the apostle's own example: though he agrees with the strong that an idol is 
nothing, yet he doesn't berate the weak for their convictions. 
^Vee, 477-478. 
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(1) May a believer eat sacrificial food as part of a temple meal? 
(2) May a believer eat sacrificial food bought at the market? 
(3) May a believer eat sacrificial food as a guest in an unbeliever's 
home? 
In terms of the last two cases, Paul discusses appropriate conduct if 
someone should identify the food as having been sacrificed to idols. 
While clearly agreeing with the position of the 'strong' that idols 
are nothing and idol-food is permissible in itself, the apostle neverthe-
less turns his attention to a problem deeper than the question of food. 
The question whether it was right or wrong to enjoy idol-food was to be 
settled, finally, with reference to the co-believer and not to divine 
permissions.^ ^ Paul is concerned about the effects of actions on 
fellow-believers (and possibly unbelievers) and on the church as a 
whole. All claims to knowledge and freedom must be placed in service 
to love. The 'weak' are in danger of sinning by acting against their 
settled moral convictions, and the 'strong' by misusing Christian liberty 
in disregard for the effects of his action on others. 
1.2.2 Romans 14.1-15.13 
The historical situation being addressed by this passage is quite 
different than the one we've been discussing. Some interpreters have 
identified five elements thought to indicate the specific contours of the 
problem: references to (1) clean/unclean foods; (2) vegetables; (3) absti-
nence from wine; (4) observance of 'days'; and (5) problems between 
believing Jews and Gentiles. Since evidence can be found suggesting the 
first four of these generated questions among both Jews and Gentiles, 
precise identification of the 'strong* and 'weak' tends to be rather 
speculative." What can be said with certainty is that the apostle here 
addresses a situation in the missionary congregation in Rome involving 
a rancorous debate over the issue of food. The fight was between those 
more scrupulous (the weak) and those less scrupulous (the strong), the 
former despising and judging the latter, the latter scorning the former. 
In the preceding context the apostle has been urging upon his 
readers the duty of love as fulfillment of the law (Rom. 13.8-10). In 
^liis IS in basic agreement with Wolfgang Schrage, EÜucs of the New Testament, 196; 
but he goes too far in saying that the question was to be settled finally with reference to 
the brother and not to God. 
^^Brunt, Paul's Attitude, 143-161. 
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addition, because salvation is near, believers must be aroused to holiness 
and repelled by the works of the flesh (13.11-14). These exhortations 
undergird his discussion in chapter 14 of mutual acceptance instead of 
recrimination. 
Our analysis of Rom.14.1-12 begins with our earlier observation that 
the precise identity of the weak is very difficult to determine; to defend 
our conclusion by replying to the many suggestions would be divert-
ing.^ We would rather examine, on the basis of the passage, both the 
origin and the character of their weakness, as being 'weak in the faith' 
(14.1). 
Here the term TÓOTI^  is capable of two interpretations: objective 
content (fides quae creditur) or subjective confidence (fides qua creditur). 
Some commentators choose the latter, and hear Paul saying, 'Receive 
one who is weak in confidence, in conviction concerning faith's permis-
sions.''^ Further light is shed by 14.2, literally, 'One believes to eat 
everything, he who is weak eats vegetables,' and by the contrast to this 
provided by Paul himself in 14.14: 'I know and am persuaded in the 
Lord Jesus that nothing is unclean in itself except to the one who thinks 
it unclean—to that one it is unclean.' Knowledge and persuasion, faith's 
content and confidence, combine to render one 'weak' or 'strong.' 
'Faith' is here a synecdoche for 'faith-life' or even 'the obedience of 
faith' (cf. Rom. 16.26). And the one who is here spoken of as weak is 
then weak in reference to the application of faith's content and 
confidence to life's choices.^ 
The weakness of the weak has, therefore, a religious origin and 
character. It is part of devotion to God.'^  This is clear also from the 
last part of 14.6: 'And the one who does not eat, to the Lord he does 
not eat, and he gives thanks to God.' This point deserves emphasis in 
view of various identifications of weakness as timidity or over-scrupu-
losity, even ignorance.'* 
See C E B. Cranfield, A Cruical and Exegeacal Commentary on the Epistle to the 
Romans, 2:690-698. See also J van Bruggen, De oorsprong van de kerk te Rome, 34-35. 
H.A.W. Meyer, Kntisch exegetischer Komtnemar uber das Neue Testament - Romer-
bnef, 461 
ror a similar use of nioTl^ as a dative of relation with verbs of status, cf. 
Rom.4.19-20, Tit 2.2; 1 Pet 5 9 
John Murray, 'The Weak and the Strong,' in Collected fVntin^ of John Murray, 
4:145-146. 
^ o r the first, see R.C.H. Lenski, The Interpretation of St Paul's Epistle to the 
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The mam exhortation of this passage is 'receive' (7tpooX«npdveoee), 
containing the notion of 'accept,' 'embrace,' 'bring toward oneself.' 
Obviously addressed to the non­weak, the word calls for an on­going 
acceptance and fellowship between weak and strong (cf. Ps.64.4, 17.26 
LXX). 
This counsel is further qualified by what follows. 
The first qualification is a negative one, literally, 'not unto disputes 
over discussable things.' This clause functions modally, i.e., to explain 
how the weak believer is to be embraced, heartily, fully and equally.^ * 
It seems a bit prejudicial to insist that the word for 'discussable things' 
(5iaXoYUTjiöv) IS used in the NT with reference to wrong or mistaken 
ideas;'" a more neutral sense of 'opinion' is preferable (cf. Lk.2.35; 
5.22; 6.8, Phil.2.14, 1 Tim.2.8) Not the stating of personal convictions, 
but the attempt to convince the weak thereby, is being warned against. 
Further characterization of the 'strong' person and the 'weak' 
believer is provided by 14.2. The strong person is one who, literally, 
'believes to eat all things,' whose convictions and confidence permit such 
action. The weak person, on the other hand, eats (only) vegetables 
CKaxava, vegetables, herbs, cf. Gen 9.3 LXX; Prov.15.17 LXX). 
As V.3 indicates, the real problem here is not that one ate every­
thing and another ate only vegetables, but that believers were involved 
in mutual recrimination. Notice how the apostle pares back his 
description of the occasion for disputes: simply 'eating' and 'not eating,' 
without further qualification. In other words, not the differences of 
either conviction or practice, but their relationship as believers is coming 
under scrutiny. 'Receiving' the weak entails not despising (lit., view as 
nothing) him (and his convictions). And the weak being received 
without the strong adjudicating his opinions requires that the weak in 
turn not (ad)judicate the strong. These are the characteristic injuries 
being committed by the strong and the weak, in violation of brotherly 
love. 
The basis for receiving the weak is that 'God has received [jcpoo­
eXópexo] him.' The proper relationship between believers roots in their 
prior relation to God. 
Romans, 816, tor the second, see John Calvin, Coinmentary on the Epistle of Paul the 
Apostle to the Romans, 491 492 
39 
Herman Ridderbos, Aan de Romeinen, 303, so too A F N Lekkerkerker, De brief 
van Paulus aan de Romeinen, 2 156 
■""Lenski, 815 
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The weak believer who has been forbidden to judge the strong 
behever (v 3, \ii[ Kpivéwo) is reminded in 14.4 that he is not the boss of 
the strong, the God who has accepted the strong is his Boss. The weak 
stands alongside of, not over, the strong. The strong stands or falls first 
of all not before the weak, but before his divine Master (of. the dative 
of relation, x^ tóup Kupüp). 
Opinions diverge about the precise origin and character of the 
practice of honoring select days (14.5-6), leading in turn to divergent 
identifications of the weak and the strong. That this was probably not 
the residue of Jewish adherence to Mosaic law is evident by contrasting 
Paul's manner here with his harsh warnings in Gal.4.10-11 and 
Col.2 16-17.'" Nor does it seem likely that this refers to the Sab-
bath/Sunday conflict, for in that case both groups would have esteemed 
a day, but simply a different day! This difference in conviction and 
practice is not elucidated any further in the text. Rather, both groups 
esteem the day(s) to the Lord (v 6) 
Whether strong or weak, each is further exhorted to 'be fully 
convinced in his own mind.' Here vovx; refers to the capacity of the 
inner man for moral self-determination (Ridderbos), the power of moral 
willing (Meyer). Earlier in the epistle believers had been urged to be 
renewed by the transforming of their vo'öq, in order to prove what is the 
good and acceptable and perfect will of God (Rom 12.2). Here in 14.5b 
two things are being emphasized: 
(1) each (biaazoq) is responsible (before the Lord, cf. w.4,6,8, 
10-12) for his own convictions and practice, and 
(2) each is responsible, i.e., must be fully convinced (cf Rom.4.21). 
Cranfield insists that 'this is not an injunction to cultivate a closed 
mind, which refuses all further discussion, but an injunction to resist the 
temptation (to which those whom Paul calls "weak' were no doubt 
particularly liable) to luxuriate in indecision and vacillation. . .quite 
incapacitated for resolute and courageous action.' The apostle's 
objective is thought to be the inculcation of an obedience that is 'firm, 
decisive, resolute, courageous, joyful.""^  Moving in a similar direction, 
Ridderbos concludes that 'thus the apostle indirectly exhorts the strong 
Contra Meyer (Romerbnef, 465) and Charles Hodge, A Commenuuy on the Epistle 
to the Romans, 661 
"•^ Cranfield, 705, 706 
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as well as the weak to further reflection. This must compel the strong 
to seek their freedom exclusively in the faith, and the weak to reconsid-
er seriously the reasons for which they think they must act."" 
While we can agree that Paul is urging a decisive and resolute 
obedience, we would argue that the passage lacks any indictment of the 
weak on that score. Nowhere does the apostle chastise those weak in 
the faith as if they had ipso facto fallen into error or tended to 
vacillate.'^ Rather, their tendency to judge the strong (w.3,4,10-12) 
suggests anything but vacillation and indecision! Moreover, any implicit 
criticism of the weak by the apostle here in 14.5b would vitiate his own 
earlier exhortation to receive them (v.l). The weak are not being told, 
'You must rethink your position.' No, whatever one's conviction, he 
must hold it fully and responsibly.'" 
It is crucial to observe that one can be both weak in the faith (v.l) 
and yet 'fully convinced in his own mind' (v.5b). Weakness in the faith 
excludes neither conviction nor being persuaded and being happy (v.22). 
Recalling the servant/master image (v.4) the apostle declares (note 
the indicative mood!) that both weak and strong are bound in their 
divergent convictions and practices 'to the Lord' (v.6, icupitp, four times; 
de^ twice). Both groups act from a religious motive! In spite of their 
differences, they both 'give thanks to God' (cf. Mt. 15.36; 26.27; Acts 
27.35; 1 Cor. 11.24), a thanksgiving that would be injured drastically if 
the strong refuse to receive those weak in the faith and if despis-
ing/judging (v.3) were to continue in the church. Note here, as in 1 
Tim.4.3-5, the connection between created things and the believer's 
thanksgiving.''* 
In 14.7-9 we receive further explanation of 14.6 in particular, but 
also of 14.1-6 in general. The governing contrast is between a Christian 
existing 'to himself or 'to the Lord.' To live to oneself is to consider 
Ridderbos, Aon de Romeinen, 306. 
""^Inlike his chastisement of errors identified in Gal.4 10, Col.2.6,21, and 1 Tim.4.3. 
So too G. Bomkamm, 'AdxotVOV,' TDNT, 4 67. 
S. Greijdanus, De Brief van den Apostel Paulus aan de Gemeente te Rome, 2:592-593. 
'^Tiis seems to confirm our previous judgment that the weak are not being censured 
for their convictions and practice We think, therefore, that Calvin is unclear when he 
insists that the 'notion' of observing days is condemned by calling it 'an infirmity,' whereas 
the actual practice thereof is approved by God because the observer stays within the 
permissions of his conscience (Commentary on the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the 
Romans,497-498). How can a practice be legitimate that proceeds from an illegitimate 
conviction? 
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only one's own interests and aims. Not just living—consisting of eating 
and drinking and observing days and so much more—but even dying is 
a moral act, either for oneself or to the glory of the Lord (cf. Phil. 1.20). 
What 14.7 says negatively 14.8 states positively, reaching a climax in the 
last words, Sve are the Lord's.' The totality of human existence (life and 
death) is brought under the totalitarian ownership of Christ Jesus. This 
new mode of existence is the express goal of divine redemption aimed 
at restoring creation's purpose, a purpose whose ethical implications for 
believers' relationships are elucidated in the following verses, where 
Paul applies Christ's totalitarian ownership to the attitudes of the strong 
and the weak. 
Because in life and in death every believer belongs to the Lord, this 
establishes at least two new relationships. The first is triadic, between 
the believer, his fellow-believer, and their Lord. The second is fourfold, 
with this additional component: the thing/action about which opinions 
diverge among the strong and the weak. (Paul is clarifying the first in 
14.1-13, and will clarify the second in 14.14-23.) 
The weak is prone to judge and the strong inclined to despise. But 
if both act to the Lord (v.6), if both belong to the Lord (w.6c,8b), then 
both will be evaluated by the Lord (v.9b), the certainty whereof is estab-
lished by the Lord's oath formula ('as I live,' cf. Isa.49.18). 
As Paul moves from the first person plural in 14.7-8 to the second 
person singular in 14.10, for the first time in this passage he employs 
the term 'brother' {ib&tk^ix^. To the weak he says, 'The strong one is 
your brother,' (not merely 'the servant of another,' v.4), and to the 
strong, 'the weak one is your brother.' But the second singular quickly 
gives way again to the first plural in 14.10b: 'for we all will stand before 
the judgment seat of Christ.' This prospective unified status among 
believers surprisingly becomes the justification (v. 12) for tolerating a 
presently differentiated actus among believers. We who have died 
together in Christ and have been raised together with Christ 
(Rom.6.3-11), will also stand together before Christ. 
In summary of 14.1-11, the application to 'each of us' in 14.12 con-
trasts with the 'all' of 14.10-11.'" Note the progression of emphasis: 
(1) each will give account; 
(2) each will give account about himself; and 
(3) each will give an account of himself to Godf^ 
Greijdanus, Aan de gemeente te Rome, 599. 
'Cranfield, 711. 
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Each of these has a corresponding implication for believers' relation­
ships: 
(1) because each of you will give account, be fully convinced in 
your own mind (v.5b); 
(2) because each will account for himself, quit despising or judging 
a fellow­believer (w.3,10; cf. v. 13); and 
(3) since you will stand before God, do what you do to the Lord 
(w.6­8). 
As Rom.14.13 shows, the immediate context places (2) at the center 
of Paul's exhortation here: 'Therefore let us no longer judge each other. 
But let us rather 'judge' this: not to place a stumbling­block or an 
offense before the brother.' 
Up to this point only the weak, and not the strong, had been warned 
against;udgrrtg. But in v. 13 we read the warning against judging 'each 
other,' suggesting the presence of mutual recrimination rather than 
one­sided censuring. In our opinion, v. 13a addresses both weak and 
strong, and serves to summarize w.1­12.'" 
But if v. 13a addresses both strong and weak, does v. 13b as well? 
Some might argue that since the subject of the imperative 'rather 
judge this' is the same as that of the hortatory subjunctive 'let us no 
longer judge,' 14.13b is addressed to both strong and weak. 
If so, why then does Paul warn both strong and weak against placing 
'a stumbling­block or an offense before the brother'? How can the 
■weak' believer put a stumbling­block before a 'strong' one? It is true 
that both were culpable, the one for despising his weak brother, the 
other for judging his strong brother. But the more natural explanation, 
supported by the following verses, is that by his eating practices, the 
strong was placing before the weak a stumbling­block and offense.'" 
The apostle discusses, in Rom.14.14-18, the fourfold relationship 
between the believer, his fellow­believer, their Lord, and the things of 
creation. Paul is fully convinced that nothing—no food, no day, no wine 
Greijdanus, Aan de gemeente ie Rome, 600. 
Is there a significant difference between 7ipÓ(TK0|X^ a and OKavSaX.oV Most 
likely not, according to John Murray {The Epistle to the Romans. The English Text with 
Introduction, Exposition and Notes, 187­188) While the former refers to an impediment 
in the pathway, over which someone could stumble, the latter refers literally to a trap, both 
words, used metaphoncally, point to moral and spintual injury. 
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(v.21)—is unclean, polluted, common, unholy, to which he adds: 'in 
itself,' which could also be translated, 'through Him' (i.e., Christ). 
Instead, all things are 'pure' (cf. v.20). 
Many understand that Paul is speaking in 14.14 of the OT food laws 
as being invalidated through Jesus Christ (cf. Rom. 10.4; Mk.7.15-20; esp. 
Mt. 15.10-20 and Acts 10 3,9-16). Some understand the term 'unclean' 
in a cultic sense, denoting something that does not correspond with 
God's holiness.'' But seen in terms of redemptive history, the decisive 
feature is not cult, but corruption. Greijdanus states it most clearly: 
'Through sin everything has become unclean, unholy, the whole world 
with everything in it. But through the work of His reconciliation and 
redemption our Savior has sanctified everything once again. This 
holiness rests in Him. . . .This purity or holiness of things is connected 
to Him and His saving work. And therefore everything must be viewed 
in connection with Him. It is by doing this that the apostle possesses 
this knowledge and firm certainty, èv points to a ground or foundation 
upon which this knowledge and conviction rest, and thus describes a 
close fellowship.' Later he summarizes: 'To be KOIVÓV means that 
something does not exist in service to God, and since its fellowship with 
God is being broken, it is unclean and unholy.'*^ ^ 
At this point the apostle may be repeating, and adding his agree-
ment to, a slogan of the strong. Only to him who considers it so, is 
something unclean. But this seems to suggest that a thing's uncleanness 
is a matter of subjective consciousness. Its use then requires, in 
addition to objective divine permission, the subjective permission 
provided by a firm conscience as well (cf. w.5,23). 
At this juncture some might wish to appeal to Tit.1.15: 'To the pure 
all things are pure, but to those who are defiled and unbelieving nothing 
is pure; but even their mind and conscience are defiled.' Calvin, for 
example, believes Rom. 14.14 teaches that 'there is nothing so pure but 
what may be contaminated by a corrupt conscience; for it is faith alone 
and godliness which sanctify all things to us. The unbelieving, being 
polluted within, defile all things by their very touch. (Tit.i.15).'" 
Some of Calvin's assertions at this point are true. But we doubt 
that in Rom. 14 Paul is speaking of the weak's corrupt conscience. 
Moreover, as the context of Tit.1.15 makes clear, Paul is not there 
speaking at all of believers; quite to the contrary. Tit. 1.16 charges that 
Ridderbos, y4an de Romeinen, 311. 
52 
Greijdanus, ^an </e gemeente te Rome, 601 -602. 
"Calvin, Romans, 505. 
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those whose consciences are corrupt 'profess to know God, but in works 
they deny him, being abominable, disobedient, and disqualified for every 
good work.' 
In V.15 the apostle explains further what he meant earlier (v. 13) by 
not putting a stumbling-block or offense in front of the brother: 'Yet if 
your brother is grieved because of food, you are no longer walking in 
love. Do not destroy with your food the one for whom Christ died.' 
The verb rendered 'grieve' (XtMievioa) is used elsewhere in the NT to 
mean 'be sorrowful, sad' (Mt.14.9; 17.23; 18.31; 19.22; etc.), but is also 
an action that can be committed against the Holy Spirit (Eph.4.30). 
The interpretation of moral injury seems to us a bit too strong, but the 
verb certainly describes the effect upon the conscientious scruples of the 
weak. The passive rendering here suggests culpability on the part of the 
strong. 
This culpability is for more than causing sadness, however; the 
strong destroys his brother, i.e., causes his spiritual, moral, eternal ruin 
(v. 15b). How this ruin is effected the text does not say. But this 
nevertheless marks progress in the apostle's argument, since up to this 
point he has simply characterized the actions of strong and weak toward 
one another. Now he identifies the result of the strong's disregard for 
the weak: grieving and destruction. 
Two criteria are introduced in 14.15 as motives or grounds for the 
apostolic prohibitions: the standard of love and the status of salvation. 
The weak brother, because Christ died for him, is the Lord's possession 
(v.9), and thus his injury and ruin touch the Lord Himself. Notice the 
presence here in 14.15b of all the components of that fourfold relation-
ship—the believer, his fellow Christian, the Lord and creation. 
From 14.17 the context of the apostle's discussion expands beyond 
merely the personal salvation of strong and weak believers, to include 
'the kingdom of God.' This kingdom consists of Christ's lordship 
(w.6-9) through the application of the benefits of His redemptive work 
(v.9) within the life of believers.''' It does not consist of food and 
drink (we might say, 'bread and butter'), but of 'righteousness and peace 
and joy.' Because these three are benefits of salvation, they are also 
Christian virtues generated by the Holy Spirit for exercise among the 
saints.'' In this context they describe mutual relationships that should 
obtain among believers: righteousness, mutual peace (cf. v. 19), and joy 
Cf. Greijdanus, who distinguishes these three components, and undei^ stands this text 
to refer to the second. 
Greijdanus, Aan de gemeente ie Rome, 608. 
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in contrast to grief (v.l5). These terms reappear in Paul's concluding 
benediction, 'Now may the God of hope fill you with all joy and peace 
in believing, that you may abound in hope by the power of the Holy 
Spirit' (15.13). 
But what is the precise nature of the contrast in v. 17? Is Paul 
comparing the external (food/drink) with the internal (righteousness, 
peace and joy)?'* Or creation with redemption? The natural with the 
spiritual? We must be careful here not to sow a separation between 
these two classes, only to harvest a dualism that is both ontological and 
therefore ethical. That contradicts Scripture at other points. 
Perhaps a better translation will help us. The Greek words ppwov; 
Koci jtóoi^ could be rendered 'eating and drinking' (actus edendi) rather 
than 'food and drink' (cf. v. 15, ppw a^ twice)." We might summarize 
the apostle's point this way: The believer enjoys not simply a threefold 
relationship—with himself, his Lord, and the creation—which is sufficient 
for evaluating 'eating and drinking.' Rather, in these activities he is also 
bound to his fellow-Christian, and must live with him in righteousness, 
peace and joy. 
Such a believer 'serves Christ in these things.' We understand 'these 
things' to refer not to 'righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy 
Spirit,' which by definition involve serving Christ. If, as Greijdanus 
asserts, the preposition 'in' has here a locative rather than instrumental 
sense, and if we may not view the triad of v. 17b simply as human virtues 
instead of redemptive benefits,'* it makes good sense to understand the 
progress of the apostle's argument something like this: Remember that 
God's kingdom is not eating and drinking, but living together in the 
righteousness, peace and joy in the Holy Spirit; so serve Christ, not 
yourselves, with your eating and drinking. Once again that fourfold 
relationship is in view, between the believer, God/Christ, creation and 
other people. Using his food and drink in love for his brother (v. 15), 
for God's glory (v. 16) and in service to Christ (v. 18a), the believer can 
stand before God (w.4,10-12) and before others (w.3-4,10). 
Following Paul's instruction will yield the behavior exhorted in 
Rom.14.19-23. All members of the congregation must pursue, strive for, 
exert effort on behalf of things that advance the peace spoken of in v. 17 
(cf. Ps.34.14 [LXX 33.15]; Heb.12.14; 1 Pet.3.11). Harmony among 
'So Hodge, 668. 
Meyer, Romerbnef, 473. 
Greijdanus, Aan de gemeente te Rome, 609. 
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believers, in the sense of the absence of conflict, is not enough, for this 
ideal could presumably be reached even if each believer went his own 
way. But the Lord asks of us the positive, neighbor-loving pursuit of 
things that serve mutual edification. 
We are now at the intersection between Christian liberty and 
neighbor love. The apostle has been dealing with its negative side m 
warning believers not to place stumbling-blocks or offenses before one 
another (v. 13), not to despise (w.3,10,13) or grieve (v. 15a) or destroy 
(v. 15b) one another. Now he specifies its positive dimension rather 
than destroy, build up, instead of tearing down the fellow-believer, make 
him stand. 
By moving from the first person plural in v. 19 to the second person 
singular in w.20-21, the apostle's attention narrows to the strong 
believer. The prohibition of v. 15 ('do not destroy that one for whom 
Christ died') is matched here in v.20 ('do not destroy. . .the work of 
God'), both supplying the motive: the brother belongs to Christ, he is 
the work of God! 
In this context, 'all things are pure' refers to food. We must avoid 
the impulse to expand this illegitimately to include all products of 
human culture and activity, as if such were by definition neutral. 
The man who eats 'with a stumbling-block' refers to one whose 
eating is an occasion of stumbling, to the weak brother who eats to his 
own hurt (ci. v. 14). It thus means something like 'eating with a bad 
conscience.' So strong is the apostle's aversion to occasioning another's 
fall that he recommends avoiding doing anything by which a fellow-
believer stumbles, is made to fall or is weak (v.21)'' The verbs used 
in 14.21 (jipooKóittev, cncocvSoXi^ Toa, and lioöeveï) cover both offenses 
given and taken, both active and passive involvement m a brother's fall, 
indeed, his very condition of weakness. 
With vocabulary reminiscent of his earlier d scussion, Paul once 
more addresses in v.22 the individual strong believer who possesses 
precisely that in which the other is weak, namely, faith (cf. w.1-2). Not 
that the weak behever has no faith, but he lacks the content and 
conHdence of faith held by the strong. 
When the apostle commands the strong to 'hold' or keep his faith 
to himself before God, is he recommending that one may act according 
TTie translation 'or is offended or is weak follows the reading found in the majonty 
of NT manuscripts Some modem cntics suggest that this reading is an expansion by 
copyisU who recalled 1 Cor 8 11 13 (see Metzger, TCGNT, 532) 
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to his faith-permissions privately but not publicly?'* Doesn't that yield, 
in effect, a double morality? 
The function of v.22a is simply to forbid public display of the 
convictions of the strong. We must be careful not to expand, beyond 
the text, on presumed private permissions. In any case, a situational 
morality that takes into account the presence of weaker believers is not 
the same as a double morality that operates with two conflicting 
standards. 
The beatitude of v.22b contrasts with the warning of v.23. 'The one 
who does not judge himself (v.22b) is better off than 'the doubtful one' 
who eats (v.23.).''* Intellectual doubt questions whether something is 
true, while moral doubt wonders whether something is nght. Here the 
apostle warns against acting out of moral doubt. A doubting eater is 
not a believing eater; his action proceeds from an emptiness, a lack of 
confidence, rather than from certainty of conviction. Such certainty is 
required for an action to please God; without it, eating falls under the 
sentence of conscience, which pronounces the deed sinful. 
Then follows the doxology or benediction which applies to both 
strong and weak.*^  Instead of looking at each other, the strong and 
weak need to look at God. Their attention is drawn to the power of 
God as the One who establishes both strong and weak. His tool is 
Paul's gospel and the proclamation of Jesus Christ, which come in the 
Greijdanus, Aan de gemeente ie Rome, 614, Ridderbos, Aan de Romemen, 317 
*'Some insist that 'the doubtful one' (ó 8uXKplVÓ(ieV0(;) refers to someone who 
vacillates about his convictions, someone who is at odds with himself (see Calvin, Romans, 
511-512; F. Buchsel, 'AUMCpivw,' TDNT, 4 947-948, and in agreement with Buchsel, 
Ridderbos [Aan de Romemen, 318]) It is tempting to adopt the doubter-as-vacillator 
interpretation on the strength of Rom 4 20 (Abraham 'did not waver [SlCKpiOri] at the 
promise of God through unbelief) where, however, the verb appears in the passive voice. 
But surely Buchsel goes beyond the text when he identifies the subject of v 23 as 'the one 
who has no certainty as regards either his judgment or his action, who does with a bad 
conscience what he cannot refrain from doing' (947). The quality of this doubt, as v.23 
indicates, is a faith deficient in confidence 
Again, we are following the text found in the majority of NT manuscripts For 
argumentation defending the placement of these verses at the end of chapter 16, see 
Metzger, TCGNT, 533-536 It seems to us, however, that both external and internal 
evidence pleads for the majonty reading The manuscnpt evidence favonng placement in 
chapter 16 is (1) of narrow regional scope; (2) of limited strength (codex Bezae is 
decisive!); and (3) internally divided Moving these verses from chapter 14 to chapter 16 
can be explained with the hypothesis that after Marcion's amputation of the text, copyists 
attempted a restorative reconstruction which placed these verses at the end. 
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prophetic writings, or the Scriptures. The divine purpose, for both weak 
and strong, is the obedience of faith, because 'everything not of faith is 
sin' (v.23). Wisdom for this obedience is found in God alone, by whom 
the path in which the strong and weak in the church should walk 
together has been made manifest in Christ Jesus. 
In Rom.15.1-13 all specific talk about foods recedes into the back-
ground. To the foreground comes the matter of believers' relationship 
to one another. If chapter 14 directed both strong and weak to focus in 
faith on God, chapter 15 explains what strong and weak must be and do 
for one another. Resuming his exhortation, Paul now identifies with the 
strong (v.l, oiöDvaxot) and places himself with them under obligation to 
the weak. That duty is to bear them up, something more than simply 
tolerating or enduring them (cf. Gal.6.2)." 
Rather than pursuing his self-interest, the strong must seek the 
interests of his weaker brother, not simply as a people-pleaser, but with 
the aim of building him up. 
This exhortation rests on two pillars: the power of Christ Himself, 
who bore for the sake of others hostile reproach and rejection, and the 
encouragement of Scripture, whose purpose is the church's instruction. 
These writings effect endurance and encouraging, which in turn generate 
hope. Because they are from God, the Scriptures bear the character of 
God Himself; He is the God of patience and enduring, that is, their 
source and origin. 
The ideal of being 'like-minded' (v.5, lit., to value [(t>poveï, cf. 14.5] 
the same thing) was expressed earlier in Rom. 12.16, 'Being of the same 
mind toward one another, not setting your mind on high things but 
associating with the humble, do not be wise in your own conceit.' We 
must ask whether the design of this prayer, addressed to God on behalf 
of the whole congregation, is that believers come to agreement about 
those matters over which the weak and strong disagree. Rom. 14.14a 
and 15.1 indicate Paul's enjoyment of the confidence of the strong, so 
that this prayer might seem to desire the convincing of the weak, toward 
their growth in confidence. But the context militates against this 
explanation, for the apostle has urged forbearance and solicitude of the 
weak, not their re-education. Moreover, the norm for this like-minded-
ness is Christ Himself (Kotd Xpurtóv l^aow). Its character is explained 
elsewhere as looking to one another's interests in humble service 
(Phil.2.1-11). Not an identity of conviction, but unanimity of commit-
P.H.R. van Houwelingen, 'Samen sterk," 601, n. 1. 
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ment to follow the Lord Jesus together, is the content of the apostle's 
prayer. 
And for what purpose? Unanimity of mind and sameness of spirit 
yield a coordinated confession. Paul prays that, rather than judging or 
despising the brother, believers thus like-minded may praise and magnify 
Him who is the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. Turning 
toward Him rather that turning on each other is the direction and fruit 
of faith. 
The exhortation of 14.1 ('Receive the one who is weak in the faith') 
extends now to the whole congregation in 15.7-13; both strong and weak 
are to embrace one another. As he has done repeatedly throughout this 
passage, once again the apostle appeals to the example of Jesus Christ 
and to His redemptive work. The basis of his exhortation here is 
Christ's reception not of strong and weak, but of Jew and of Gentile. 
Christ became a servant of the Jews ('of circumcision') for the sake of 
truth, so the Gentiles might be received for the sake of mercy. Truth 
and mercy harmonize in Christ Jesus to the glory of God the Father; 
Jew and Gentile believers have become one in Christ Jesus 
(Eph.2.19-22). Likewise, strong and weak must live harmoniously in the 
congregation, to the glory of God the Father who grants by His Word 
patient endurance for mutual forbearance. 
Summary: The 'strong' and the 'weak' in the missionary congregation in 
Rome are defined in terms of their attitude toward the use of foods and 
abstinence from meat. This attitude arises from the content and con-
fidence of faith: the weak one is weak 'in the faith,' unable to exercise 
the freedom born of the faith which knows that nothing is unclean of 
itself. Clearly, weakness has a religious origin and character, since the 
one who abstains from meat does so 'to the Lord' (14.6) and is to be 
fully persuaded in his own mind (14.5). 
Both weak and strong are called to act on the basis of firm con-
viction (14.5,22-23). Each is answerable to his Master and Lord 
(14.4,12). Yet, both positions must be tolerated in the church. This 
diversity must be practiced without mutual recrimination or scorn, each 
welcoming the other for the building up of the church. For the strong 
to impose their convictions upon the weak would lead the latter astray, 
perhaps even to their eternal, spiritual and moral destruction. And to 
impose the view of the weak on the strong would be to destroy the 
latter's Christian liberty. 
But where the practice of the strong might provide a negative 
example to the weak, love requires from the strong a voluntary 
'accommodation' and renunciation of 'rights' for the sake of the weak. 
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1.3 Scandalum infirmorum in the history of Christian ethics 
1.3.1 Introduction 
By now the trail has taken us deep into the woods, perhaps further 
than we first expected. As we pause to catch our breath, a glance 
around tells us that we're not the first ones to have come this far. Over 
the years others have hiked through these parts, leaving behind evidence 
of their own search and study. We're going to spend some time now 
examining some of what they've left us. 
Among the things we shall see is that, although our focus is on 
scandalum infirmorum, moralists have defined and evaluated a variety of 
scandala or offenses, depending on the victim or on the culpability of 
the agent. Another feature of interest will be the various contexts 
within which moralists discuss offense of the weak. 
Virtually every period of church history has witnessed some dis-
cussion of the terms, distinctions and judgments relating to scandalum 
infirmorum and arising from the Scripture passages just considered. 
Although we don't intend to narrate every reference or allusion to 
'offense of the weak' scattered throughout the exegetical, homiletical 
and pastoral writings of Christian thinkers, we may profit initially from 
observing that the church's early writers paved the way for subsequent 
reflection with their classifications. 
Basil the Great (d. 379), for example, distinguishes three kinds of 
things that induce departure from the truth or disobedience to God's 
commandments. A thing or an act which is by nature good, which serves 
the building up of faith, can still cause damage among those who 
wrongly take offense, but the agent is not culpable (cf. Jn.6.56,65, where 
Jesus' words cause some to withdraw from Him). On the other hand, 
if someone does something which is by nature evil, the agent is guilty of 
being a stumbling-block, whether or not someone stumbles (cf. 
Mt. 16.23a, where Peter was a stumbling-block to Christ). Finally, a 
permissible action may nevertheless be an occasion of stumbling for 
those weak in faith or in knowledge. Such an agent is guilty of being 
a stumbling-block (cf. 1 Cor.8.12, where those who ate in idol-temples 
were careless about weaker brothers).*^ 
De baptismo, Liber II, Quaestio X (PG 31:1617-1621); Eng. trans., Saint Basil, 
Ascetical fVorlcs, vol. 9 of TTie Fathers of the Church: A New Translation. See also Basil's 
Regulae brevius tractatus, Interrogatio LXIV (PG 31:1125-1129). 
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We find a slightly different emphasis in Chrysostom (d. 407), who 
insists that offense results from not having our brother's salvation in 
view. Something is better left undone if no benefit accrues to our 
neighbor from our action.*^ 
Yet a third early church father, Peter Chrysologos (d. 450), arranges 
offenses according to their origin, as from either (1) the devil (cf. 
Satan's temptation of Adam and Eve, and Peter's temptation of Christ), 
(2) people (cf. Balaam, Jeroboam, the Corinthian believer), or (3) our 
senses (cf. Eve desiring the fruit, and Jesus warning against being led 
into sin through our sensual desires, Mt.5.29f. and 18.8).'^  
Understandably, later discussions of scandalum infirmorum, while 
drawmg upon these initial analyses, became more complex as writers 
placed the subject within broader systems of theology and ethics. In the 
remainder of this chapter we shall present four treatments of 'offense 
of the weak' that possess unique elements or accents. These four repre-
sentatives are Thomas Aquinas, John Calvin, Gisbert Voetius, and Carl 
Henry. Each provides an extensive discussion of our subject, and each 
is relatively well-known within the discipline of theological ethics. 
Although we shall find many similarities among their treatments, each 
offers a somewhat distinct emphasis that deserves to be isolated and 
evaluated. 
1.3.2 Thomas Aquinas 
In the second part of his Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas 
(1225-1274) discusses the theological virtues of faith, hope and love, 
along with respective vices contrary to them. It is in the section on 
1129). 
See his Homily XXVon Romjaw.l,! and Homily XXVI on Romjav.l4 m Nicene and 
Post Nicene Fathers Chrysostom touches on these matters also in Quod regulares feminae 
vins cohabitare non debeant and m Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt (PG 52.479-528). 
**'De scandalo tollendo,' Sermo XXVII (PL 52 275-278) See also 'Seu de eo quod 
dicit Impossibile est ut non veniant scandala," Senno XXVII (Corpus Chnstianorum Series 
Latina 24 155). For a German translation, see 'Vom Argernisses' m Bibliothek der 
Kirchenvater, Des Heiligen Petrus Chrysologus Erzbischofs von Ravenna ausgewahlte 
Predigten 
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vices against the virtue of love that Aquinas treats the matter of 
scandal,*^ introducing distinctions and definitions which have continued 
to shape viewpoints about offense in subsequent Catholic moral 
theology. 
Aquinas relates the definition of scandal to the meaning of 
OKÓvöaXov itself. The Greek word may mean 'offense,' 'downfall,' or 
'stumblmg against something.' Thus it can happen that "while going 
along the spiritual way, a man may be disposed to a spiritual downfall 
by another's word or deed, in so far, that is, as one man by his 
injunction, inducement or example, moves another to sin; and this is 
scandal properly so called."* 
Since nothing by its own nature disposes someone to spiritual down-
fall, but only something deficient in rectitude (that is, minus rectum), 
scandal is fittingly defined as 'something less rightly done or said, that 
occasions another's spiritual downfall.'** An act is deficient in 
rectitude either by being evil in itself and therefore sinful, or through 
having an appearance of evil (cf. 1 Thess.5.22). According to Aquinas, 
eating food in an idol's temple, mentioned by Paul in 1 Cor.8.10, 
although not sinful in itself, nevertheless gives an appearance of evil 
(worshiping an idol) and is therefore minus rectum and a potential 
occasion for scandal. 
Scandal occurs, Aquinas says, when an act deficient in rectitude 
occasions another's spiritual downfall. This terminology generates the 
important question: How must we understand the factor of causality in 
scandal? Who is to blame if someone falls? 
Aquinas devotes careful attention to this causality factor. The only 
'sufficient cause' {sufficiens causa) of a man's sin is his own will; 
therefore, another persons's act can only be an 'imperfect cause' of my 
downfall. For this reason Aquinas would rather speak of such an act as 
the occasion rather than the cause for another's fall.™ 
This 'imperfect cause' is identified further as either direct cause or 
Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ila Ilae, Q. 43, for the Latin text, see S Thomas 
Aquinatis, Summa Theologiae, Pars IIa,IIae, Quaestio XLIII, our Enghsh excerpts are 
taken from TTie Summa Tkeologica of Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 20 of Great Books of the 
Western World A similar treatment may be found in Aquinas' commentary on 
Rom.14.1-15 13, see Des Hethgen Thomas vonAqum Kommentar zum Romerbnef sub loc. 
% 43, Art. 1 
^ 'Q. 43, Art. 1. 
Q 43, Art.l, Reply Obj 3 'Et propter hoc non dicitur, dans causam rumae sed, 
dans occasionem, quod significat causam imperfectam, et non semper causam per accidens' 
(emphasis added). 
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accidental cause. The former occurs 'when a man either intends, by his 
evil word or deed, to lead another man into sin, or, if he does not so 
intend, when his deed is of such a character as to lead another into 
sin.. . .''* This combination of factors constitutes an offense as an 
active scandal (scandalum activum). Such an offense is direct when one 
intends to draw another into sin; it is accidental when, contrary to the 
agent's intention, the act draws another into sin. Responsibility for 
leading another into sin lies with the agent. 
On the other hand, the cause of another's fall is accidental when 
neither the agent intends to lead him into sin nor the act is of such a 
nature as to lead another into sin, but the one stumbling, 'through being 
ill-disposed, is led into sin,' as when one, for example, envies another's 
goods.^ This is then termed passive scandal (scandalum passivum), 
and 'implies that the mind of the person who takes scandal is unsettled 
in its adherence to good.'" 
With characteristic logical completeness, Aquinas concludes his 
discussion of the causality factor by identifying possible relationships 
between active and passive scandal. Both can exist simultaneously (on 
the part of both the agent and the one who falls). Or, there can be 
active without passive scandal. We might find an example of this in 
Peter's attempt to hinder Christ from going to the cross (Mt. 16.21-23); 
Peter was committing active scandal, but since Christ did not fall, there 
was no passive scandal. Finally, there can be passive without active 
scandal. This is illustrated by the Pharisees taking offense at Christ 
(Mt. 15.12-14); without cause they stumbled at His teaching.^ " 
Culpability for scandal depends in turn on whether it is active or 
passive, direct or accidental. Although active scandal may not always 
result in another's fall, yet its agent is always guilty of sin. But in 
passive scandal, the agent is not culpable. Though passive scandal may 
be occasioned by another's act, the one who falls is guilty of sin.'' 
Further clarification is provided by differentiating "weakness' from 
'offense,' and these from 'scandal.' According to Aquinas, 'Weakness 
denotes proneness to scandal; while offense signifies resentment against 
the person who commits a sin, which resentment may be sometimes 
'Q. 43, Art. 1, Reply Obj. 4. 
" Q . 43, Art. 1, Reply Obj. 4. 
73 
Q. 43, Art. 5: '. . .scandalum passivum importat quandam commotionem animi a 
bono in eo qui scandalum patitur.' 
These relationships are outlined in Q. 43, Art. 1, Reply Obj. 4. 
^ 'Q. 43, Art. 1, Reply Obj. 4. 
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without spiritual downfall; and scandal is the stumbling that results in 
downfall.'^ * 
In connection with avoiding passive scandal Aquinas considers the 
issue of abstaining from certain acts. He distinguishes between 
abstaining from 'spiritual goods' and from 'temporal goods.' 
Excommunication is an example of a 'spiritual good,' one which 
Augustine argued should be avoided if it might occasion schism in the 
church. Similarly, doctrine, fraternal correction and works of mercy are 
'spiritual goods' that may need to be temporarily withheld if their 
teaching or doing might cause the weak or ignorant to stumble. 
Spiritual goods are really of two kinds: those necessary and those 
unnecessary for salvation. Naturally, something necessary for salvation 
should never be withheld. But with regard to spiritual goods unneces-
sary for salvation, everything depends on the attitude of the one taking 
offense. If passive scandal arises from malice, as with the Pharisees 
against Christ (hence, scandalum Pharisaeorum), abstinence is not 
required. But if passive scandal arises from weakness or ignorance 
{scandalum pusillorum, 'scandal of the little ones,' cf. Mt.18.6), absti-
nence is a temporary duty. 
But here we come to a matter that will become very important in 
our subsequent analysis. Earlier we saw that "weakness denotes 
proneness to scandal,' in which case a spiritual good not necessary to 
salvation ought to be concealed or deferred until the matter can be 
explained and the scandal thus terminated. After the explanation, 
however, any continuing passive scandal is to be considered as arising 
from malice, and the spiritual good need not then be renounced." 
Scandalum pusillorum can become scandalum Pharisaeorum! 
Giving up 'temporal goods' may be necessary in relation to the weak 
and ignorant. As Aquinas illustrates, we may need to abstain from 
certain kinds of food. Or, the church may need to refrain from 
demanding tithes from people unaccustomed to paying them. In such 
cases we must either give give up these goods altogether, or abstain 
from them temporarily while we instruct or admonish the weak and 
Q. 43, Art. 1, Reply Obj. 5: 'Ad quintum dicendum quod infirmuas nominal 
promptitudinem ad scandalum; offensio autera nommat mdignationem alicums contra eum 
qui peccat, quae potest esse quandoque sine ruina, scandalum autem importat ipsam 
impactionem ad ruinam.' 
Q. 43, Art. 7: 'Si autem post redditam rationem huiusmodi scandalum duret, lam 
videtur ex malitia esse: et sic propter ipsum non sunt huiusmodt spintualia opera 
dimmittenda.' 
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ignorant. If scandal in connection with temporal goods arises from 
malice, however, they need not be given up at all.™ 
EXCURSUS: Scandalum ir^imwrum in modern Catholic theology 
Bernhard HSring is a modern Catholic theologian who discusses offense very 
much m the lines laid down by Aquinas, in his The Law of ChnstJ^ He suggests 
that the degree of intention qualifies culpability for offense, with the least serious 
being scandalum mdvectum, the most serious being outright seduction. 
Concluding his overview of Rom.14-15 and 1 Cor.8-10, he insists that the 
Christian must be prepared to limit the freedom of his action if he sees that an 
action which is right in itself may become an occasion for the spiritual ruin of his 
neighbor. We learn from 1 Cor. 10.24 that no action is really right that does not 
consider in love its effects upon the neighbor. The sin of giving offense roots in 
an attitude of self-interested inconsiderateness with regard to the salvation of the 
neighbor. 
Three points of difference are worth noting. First, Haring seems to remove 
himself somewhat from Aquinas by insisting that it is too simple to say that the 
weak must be educated, after which their taking offense arises from malice. Paul 
surely didn't solve matters this way. Second, a permissible 'redemptive offense' 
IS given when the intention is to 'shake up' one who is undecided with regard to 
the Lord; a crisis is precipitated whereby such a person is placed squarely before 
the demand of faith. But caution must be exercised that where 'redemptive 
offense' is given, it focuses on a central, priority command of Christian living. 
Finally, in contrast to Aquinas, Haring devotes attention to the duty of making 
reparation for offense. Those guilty of giving offense (he has in mind writers, 
artists, actors, theater owners and politicians) must do all within their power to 
reverse the consequences of their sin. 
In his more recent volume. The Truth Will Set You Free (vol. 2 of the trilogy 
Free and Faithful m Chnst Moral Theology for Priests and Laity), Haring indicates 
that scandal is quite simply a lack of responsibility for the salvation of one's 
neighbor. This being the case, we can easily understand how both individuals and 
the church can give offense by accommodating themselves to the evil spirit of this 
world. 
"Q. 43, Art. 8. 
79 
The Law of Chnst, vol 2, subtitled Special Moral JheoloQi Life m Fellowship with 
God and Fellow Man, 471-494, this translation was made from the sixth edition olDas 
Gesetz Chnsa (1960) 
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1.3.3 John Calvin 
What Aquinas meant for the development of Catholic moral 
theology, John Calvin (1509-1564) has meant and still means for 
Protestant ethics. His theological discernment and pastoral sensitivity 
have yielded a treasury of writings rich in both biblical and ecclesial 
orientation. God's Word and God's people were fountain and field for 
the labors of Calvin the reformer and preacher. 
Two rich sources for his views on the matter of offense are his 
Institutes of the Christian Rehgion and a lesser known tract, Concerning 
Scandals. Because the latter relates to our subject only incidentally, we 
shall offer a summary of its contents in an excursus below. We turn 
now to Calvin's extended discussion of offense in the Institutes. 
It is very instructive to observe where in his Institutes Calvin treats 
the subject of offense. In the third of his four 'books,' Calvin considers 
subjects often included in Dogmatics (also called Systematic Theology) 
under Soteriology or Pneumatology. His explanation of such matters as 
faith, regeneration, repentance, the Christian life, justification, the 
relation between the Law and the Gospel, and the place of works in 
Christian living serve as the prelude to his pastoral application, in 
Chapter XIX, regarding 'Christian freedom.'** 
Indeed, it was Calvin's pastoral heart that motivated his consider-
ation of Christian liberty as a subject of prime importance, for 'apart 
from a knowledge of it consciences dare undertake almost nothmg 
without doubting; they hesitate and recoil from many things; they 
constantly waver and are afraid. But freedom is especially an appendage 
of justification and is of no little avail in understanding its power.'*' 
To avoid the errors of unbridled license and fearful enslavement, proper 
understanding of fi^eedom is necessary for rightly knowing Christ, gospel 
truth and inner peace of soul. 
Christian freedom, says Calvin, consists of three parts. 
First, it enables believers' consciences to 'advance beyond the law, 
forgetting all law righteousness,' to 'embrace God's mercy alone, turn 
our attention from ourselves, and look only to Christ.' The law of God 
does not cease urging obedience, but it no longer possesses the power 
^ o r a similar presentation of Chnstian liberty by Calvin, see his French sermons on 
Galatians (according to P Lobstein, Die Ethik Calvms m thren Grundzugen entworfen Em 
Beitrag zur Geschichte der chnstlichen Ethik, 38). 
**IIIjax.l. 
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of condemnation before God's judgment seat. Christ is the source of 
our confidence before God; He has set our consciences free. 
Second, these liberated consciences now obey the law, 'not as if 
constrained by the necessity of the law, but that freed from the law's 
yoke they willingly obey God's will.' In assurance of the Lord's approval 
for Christ's sake, believers live no longer as servants who fulfill 
assignments in fear of their master, but as children who please their 
Father with readiness and cheer. 
Third, Christian liberty is useful for granting repose to consciences 
and for ending superstition in regard to outward things which in them-
selves are indifferent, for "we are not bound before God by any religious, 
obligation preventing us from sometimes using them and other times 
not using them, indifferently.' Discussions about eating meat, honoring 
holidays, and wearing vestments are not unimportant, since through 
these practices consciences are often ensnared, confused and guilty. But 
all outward things are subjected to our freedom (cf. Rom. 14.14). 
However, when 'superstitious opinion' stands in our way of using 
something, then that thing which in itself is pure is for us impure and 
corrupt (cf. Rom. 14.22-23). Freedom of conscience requires a hearty 
thanksgiving in using or not using outward things, a thanksgiving that 
recognizes in God's gifts His kindness and goodness (cf. 1 Tim.4.4-5). 
This confidence grants peace of mind and confession of divine liberality. 
Having identified its constituent parts, Calvin significantly qualifies 
Christian freedom as being 'in all its parts, a spiritual thing. Its whole 
force consists in quieting frightened consciences before God—that are 
perhaps disturbed and troubled over forgiveness of sins,. . .unfinished 
works. . .the use of things indifferent.'*^ They misunderstand Christian 
liberty who see it as an excuse for gratifying their desires, and who see 
it as something necessarily employed publicly. Such people use freedom 
without regard for weaker brothers. 'Away, then,' says Calvin, 'with 
uncontrolled desire, away with immoderate prodigality, away with vanity 
and arrogance—in order that men may with a clean conscience cleanly 
use God's gifts. Where the heart is tempered to this soberness they will 
have a rule for lawful use of such blessings And let them regard this 
as the law of Christian freedom; to have learned. . .to be content; to 
know how to be humble and exalted. . .to be filled and to hunger, to 
abound and to suffer want (cf. Phil.4.11-12).'*' 
That men may with a clean conscience cleanly use God's gifts—that 
'IIIjdx.9. 
'llljdx.9. 
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is the blessed fruit, and the high calling, of Christian freedom! 
This, then, is the context within which Calvin talks about causing 
others to stumble and fall. Weaker people are made to stumble by 
people who use their Christ-given freedom in an indiscriminate, unwise 
and heedless manner. Such 'stronger' believers forget that Christian 
liberty, because it is freedom of conscience, consists as much in 
abstaining from something as in using it. Carefully echoing the apostle 
Paul, Calvin insists that freedom and its use are two quite different 
things.^ This distinction enables the believer to be free while abstain-
ing from something. Those who abstain from eating meat, for example, 
are not thereby less free; rather, because they are free, they abstain with 
a free conscience. We should act with such forbearance of our brothers' 
weakness 'that we do not heedlessly allow what would do them the 
slightest harm.'*' 
So much for the context of Calvin's discussion of offense. He enters 
into the matter itself by accepting what he calls the common distinction 
between an offense given (scandalum datum) and an offense taken 
(scandalum acceptum), and this for two reasons: it has the clear support 
of Scripture and properly expresses what is meant. The former corre-
sponds to Aquinas' scandalum activum, the latter to his scandalum 
passivum. 
Someone gives offense by doing anything 'with unseemly levity, or 
wantonness, or rashness, out of its proper order or place, so as to cause 
the ignorant and the simple to stumble.'** On the other hand, 
someone takes offense when any deed 'not wickedly or unseasonably 
committed, is by ill will or malicious intent of mind wrenched into 
occasion for offense.'*' The first kind of offense makes the weak to 
stumble (hence, the offense of the weak, scandalum infirmorum), while 
the second kind affects 'persons of bitter disposition and pharisaical 
pride' (hence, the offense of the Pharisees, scandalum Pharisaeorum). 
'We shall so temper the use of our freedom,' writes Calvin, 'as to allow 
for the ignorance of our weak brothers, but for the rigor of the 
Pharisees, not at all!' Such solicitude for the weaker brother was taught 
So P. Lobstem, Die Ethik Calvms, 40: 'When Calvin remarks that freedom in and 
of itself, and the use of freedom, are two different things, he identifies in pnnciple with the 
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by Paul in Rom.14-15, 1 Cor.8-10 and Gal.5.13. Our feeble neighbors 
must be served by our freedom, a freedom given so that, 'having peace 
with God in our hearts, we may also live at peace with men.' But 
Christ's word and example teach us to ignore and disregard the offense 
of the Pharisees, those blind leaders of the blind (Mt. 15.12,14). 
But who are the weak and who are the Pharisees? Lacking clarity 
regarding this, our liberty remains useless. For this Calvin turns to the 
example of the apostle Paul.** 
It was the same Paul who both circumcised Timothy (Acts 16.3) and 
refused to circumcise Titus (Gal.2.3). 'Here was a diversity of acts but 
no change of purpose or mind,' Calvin insists. He continues: 'We have 
due control over our freedom if it makes no difference to us to restrict 
it when it is fruitful to do so.'*' The mark of maturity is the ability to 
mix freedom with self-control, to exercise freedom in either foregoing 
or enjoying something with equal satisfaction, depending on the 
situation. In a real sense, the use of Christian freedom is situational. 
Not only the restriction of freedom, but the assertion of it may be 
demanded by the situation. Again, it was the same Paul who became a 
Jew to the Jews, so that they might be saved (1 Cor.9.19-20,22), and 
who also asserted and insisted upon his freedom when that liberty was 
brought into danger by the demands of judaizing teachers (Gal.2.3-5). 
To summarize with Calvin's own words: 'Nothing is plainer than this 
rule: that we should use our freedom if it results in the edification of 
our neighbor, but if it does not help our neighbor, then we should forgo 
it.' There are those who imagine abstinence to be more prudent, but 
they are not interested in the duties of love (cf. the Judaizers). In the 
presence of such it may be necessary to employ Christian freedom for 
their edification and salvation. Such is the nature of Christian liberty, 
that the believer has received freedom in order to be the more ready for 
the duties of love.^ 
Proper use of freedom in either abstinence or enjoyment applies 
especially to 'things indifferent.'*" These are things or actions about 
which God has given neither prescription nor proscription. (One may 





III X1X.13, 'ad res medias et indifferentes' For a discussion of Calvin's tenninology 
and thought with regard to 'adiaphora,' see Thomas Watson Street, John Calvin on 
Adiaphora. An Exposition and Appraisal of His Theory and Practice 
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offense.) The permissibility of 'adiaphora' is determined instead by 
considerations other than specific divine mandate. With elegance born 
of biblical reflection, Calvin insists that our freedom must be subordi-
nate to love, and love must be subordinate in turn to faith.*^  He 
berated the papists who pretended that their perversions were necessary 
to avoid giving offense to the weak and ignorant. Instead, believers are 
summoned to let nothing stand in their way of doing what God 
commands, not turning aside 'even a fingernail's breadth' from divine 
authority, and not attempting anything except what God allows. 
EXCURSUS: Calvin's De scandaUs 
In his dedicatory letter to Laurent de Normandie of Noyon, Calvin's 
birthplace, Calvin prefaces his treatise by explaining the general character of 
'scandal.'*' He praises his friend for 'relying on the unconquerable power of the 
Spint of God' in proving 'to everybody else that there is no obstacle [obstaculum] 
so troublesome and difficult that it may not be surmounted with that same 
help.'** This metaphor reappears when in the tract he defines scandals to be 
'obstacles [impedimenta] of all kinds, whether they divert us from the nght 
direction, or keep us back by being in the way, or provide the means for making 
us fall.' 
IIljax.13, 'Quemadmodum enim chantati subiicienda est nostra libertas ita sub fldei 
puntate subsidere vncissim chantas ipsa debet' This contradicts I^bstein's assertion that 
Calvin 'reduces freedom, in a purely negative sense, to liberation from sin and from the 
law For those three constitutive elements of Christian hberty compose nothing else 
than the negative freedom from the domination of the law over temfied and enslaved 
consciences' (Die Ethik Calvms, 39) In Calvin's statement we hear the opposite of 
Lobstein's conclusion that 'because for Cahnn the positive definitions of the concept of 
Chnstian liberty got lost, the ethical profit of this teaching had to remain insignificant and 
ineffectual' (44) Rather, it appears that Lobstein's view of law and freedom inclines him 
to allege that 'due to his interpretation of the law and the practical outworking of the 
Chnstian life, it follows unambiguously that with [Calvin], Christian liberty fails to attain 
Its full evangelical nght, but is instead reduced in a peculiar way' (44) For a penetratmg 
analysis of Calvin's development of treedom's positive side, see J Bohatec, 'Autont^t und 
Freiheit in der Gedankenwelt Calvms' 
^Ve are relying for our English citations on Concerning Scandals, trans by John W. 
Fraser, the translator informs us that his translation is based on the text in Johanms 
Calvini, Opera Selecta, edited by P Barth and W Niesel, vol. 2, edited by P Banh and 
Dora Scheuner, 159-240 (indicated in subsequent notes as B-tf) This treatise, entitled De 
scandalu quibus hodte plenque absterrentur nonnulh etiam ahenantur a pura evangelu 
doctrtna, appears also in Johannes Calvmi, C^>era quae supersimt omnia, edited by 
Guilielamus Baum, Eduardus Cunitz and Eduardus Reuss, vol. 8. 
^B-N, 162; Concerning Scandals, 2. 
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Before classifying these general 'obstacles,' Calvin identifies four kinds of 
people who are turned away from Christ by scandals. Those who are naturally 
(and somewhat fearfully) modest are put off by the prospect of the gospel's 
offense. Still others are hindered from coming to Christ by stupidity rather than 
ill-wiU. These two kinds deserve more mild treatment, whereas harsher handling 
IS reserved for those who stumble because of their own arrogance and for those 
who hate the gospel outright. Calvin is especially solicitous toward those of the 
first two kinds, and desires by this little tract to enable 'the weak and the ignorant' 
{mfinm ac rudes) to overcome scandals. 'My concern,' writes Calvin, 'is for the 
weak, for when their faith is shaky then it is our place to support it as with a 
sustaining hand.'" 
The obstacles to faith Calvin distinguishes into three classes.** 
First, there are intrinsic scandals, which arise from the gospel itself. This class 
includes the doctrines and demands of the gospel. The incarnation of the Son of 
God, predestination, the language and style of some Bible writers, the demands 
of discipleship are among obstacles intrinsic to Christianity. 
A second class embraces scandals connected with the gospel, but originating 
elsewhere. Here Calvin mentions the gospel's exposure of ungodliness, doctrinal 
and moral heresies, the tendency toward libertinism, and the dissolute lives of 
Christian pastors and teachers (another of the church's 'ulcers,' mourns Calvin). 
David brought rum on God's people through his adultery. Simeon and Levi, as 
well as Judah, brought disrepute upon the church by their wicked behavior. Even 
Paul's quarrels with Barnabas (Acts 15.39) and Peter (Gal.2.11) were nothing 
more than Satan's stratagem to undermine the gospel. 
Calvin refers in this context to the Supper controversy between Luther, on the 
one side, and Oecolampadius and Zwingli, on the other. 'Everywhere there is 
agreement about the teaching on all these points (concerning the object and 
efficacy of the Supper),' he insists; but he laments, 'Why then do proud men find 
such a stumbling block in this connection that it bars the way to the gospel?'*^ 
The third class of scandals encompasses those that flow from sources 
unrelated to the gospel, called extrinsic scandals. They include false accusations 
hurled at Christianity, intended to cause people to avoid the gospel. The insidious 
demands of the papists for auricular confession, celibacy and abstinence from 
certain foods belong to this class of offenses. And the self-serving claims of Rome 
against the church of the Reformation, accusing her of breaking with antiquity 
and of having no right to the name 'church,' are not related to the gospel at all, 
but arise from human pride and ambition. 
Everyone belonging to Christ Jesus will encounter obstacles, Calvin concludes. 
^B-N, 168, Concerning Scandals, 12. 
Calvin's bnef introductory description of these classes is found in B-N, 168-170, and 
Concerning Scandals, 12-14, he devotes the rest of the treatise to explaining and illustrating 
each kind of scandal 
^B-N, 215; Concerning Scandals, 82. 
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Although they are erected by Satan, these innumerable scandals must be 
overcome by retaining Christ as foundation. On the one hand, we must take care 
that no stumbling block occur through our fault; but on the other, we may 
remove no stumbling block imposed by the gospel itself. 
1.3.4 Gisbert Voetius 
Here is a Dutch theologian who, as a lifelong opponent of Armini-
anism, Roman Catholicism and Cartesianism, illumines an important 
dimension of our subject.* 
Gisbert Voetius (1589-1676) virtually echoes Aqumas in his 
terminology, tone and treatment of offense. Beginning with the 
definition formulated by Basil the Great and adopted by Aquinas, 
Voetius differentiates among active and passive scandal, among active 
scandal per se and active scandal per accidens, and so forth. 
But one dimension of Voetius' treatment of offense deserves special 
attention, since he emphasizes it in a variety of ways. That is his 
concern for causing not believers, but unbelievers to stumble. 
This concern is emphasized first by the context within which he 
treats offense, entitled 'Concerning the Good Example.'" But it is 
repeated when he classifies offenses according to their object. Appeal-
ing to 1 Cor. 10.32 ('Give no off^ ense, either to the Jews or to the Greeks 
or to the church of God'), Voetius distinguishes between injuring fellow 
believers and harming those outside of the faith and the church. 
But the most remarkable clue to this Voetian emphasis appears 
from the arrangement of his entire treatment. In thomistic style 
Voetius proceeds in eight sections (corresponding to Aquinas' eight 
articles!) to define scandal, its subjects and objects, it kinds and 
culpabilities, and to discuss whether spiritual and temporal goods should 
be omitted to avoid scandal. In his eighth section, however, Voetius 
diverges significantly from Aquinas' arrangement, when he asks "whether 
scandals are given to, or in reality taken by, those who formerly as 
pagans and nowadays as papists and others wander from the truth and 
T^or further information about Voetius' life and work, see A.C Duker, Gisbertus 
Voeaus, 3 volumes; S.D. van Veen, 'Gisbertus Voetius,' The New Schaff-Henog Encyclo-
pedia ofReliffom Knowkdge, 12:220-221; see also S. van der Linde, 'Voetius, Gisbertus,' 
Chnstehjke encyclopedie, 2nd ed., 6 506, and J. Moltmann, 'Voetius, Gisbert,' RGG, 3rd ed., 
6:1432-1433. 
99 Gisberti Voetu, Selectarum Disputaaonum Theologtcarum, Pars Quarta, 146-156, the 
Latin section is entitled 'De exemplo bono, ejusdemque imitatione, et opposito scandalo.' 
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are turned away from the profession of the Christian religion?'* 
His answer: Both occur. Scandalum acceptum occurs when, in 
rejection of divine revelation, unbelievers impute wrongdoing to the 
church and the Christian religion. 
But scandalum datum can also occur when the church causes those 
outside to fall, in four ways: (1) through quarrels in the Christian 
church about dogmas of faith; (2) through schisms, divisions and 
separations, whether of churches or of ministers; (3) through the 
degenerate and evil customs of many Christians, whereby the faith and 
the church are perverted in the presence of unbelievers, as people are 
led, under the name of Christ, to live against the faith and to deny 
Christ by their actions; and (4) through too much toleration of 
remaining customs in external matters, especially too many concessions 
to pagan rituals, and adaptations of them to the worship of the true 
God, whereby they will sooner instruct Christians to be pagans than 
pagans to be Christians.*"* 
1.3,5 Carl F.H. Henry 
For Carl Henry, spiritual liberty is the primary principle of Christian 
living, a liberty that is limited by several considerations, including 
concern for the weaker believer and the unbeliever. 
Few people have been as influential in transforming early 20th 
century fundamentalism into late 20th century evangelicalism as Carl 
F.H. Henry (b. 1913). Among the founding editors of the magazine 
Christianity Today, Henry has been a prodigious writer, a sharp thinker 
and an effective Christian leader and opinion shaper.***^  
His Christian Personal Ethics examines speculative philosophy and 
its moral quest in general, and then turns particularly to Christianity 
and the moral revelation it proclaims. In Chapter 18, 'New Testament 
Principles of Conduct,' Henry discusses seven chief principles which are 
the foundation of ethical maturity. 
Disputatiormm, 154: 'VIII. Quaest. An scandala sint data, an vera accepta, quibus 
olim Gentiles, et hodie Pontificii aliique errantes a veritate et professione religionis Christi-
anae avertuntur?' 
^^Disputationum, 154-156. 
For more information about the thought of Carl Henry, see J.D. Douglas, 'Carl 
F.H. Henry,' New Dictionary of Theology, 291. 
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The first NT principle is that of Christian liberty in grace, freedom 
from the Law as a means of salvation, freedom from a legalistic con-
science. In fact, the NT maxim that 'All things are lawful' (1 Cor.6.12; 
10.23) 'is the primary principle of Christian ethics. This is a summary 
of the disciple's morality (cf. 1 Cor.9.19).'^ "^ Christian living is 
essentially world affirming, because it roots in and presupposes creation 
and redemption. The creation is not evil in itself, but the world is evil 
only as fallen world. 
As one who wrote against the background of American fundamen-
talism with its strict code of behavior and rigid rules concerning 
abstinence from certain practices, Henry argues that believers don't 
always see the full implications of their liberty. Not all possess the 
same knowledge (1 Cor.8.7), and consequently another principle comes 
into play, namely, that the conscience of the weak must be honored. 
But caution is advised, for 'his conscientious objection does not in itself 
have final validity. Christian conscience is not infallible. It requires 
growth and education.' 1 Cor. 10.25 teaches not that one is to ask no 
questions in order to avoid knowing whether the food is sacrificed or 
not, but rather that 'the overscrupulous conscience of the weaker 
brother needs enlightenment Here the conscience is not to be stifled 
but to be educated.' Indeed, there is a proper burden to be placed upon 
the weak, namely, that they 'recognize the principle of Christian liberty, 
and not offend the strong.''*"^  But because the believer is a member 
of a community, his liberty may not become license. The guideline of 
'all things are lawful' is not a self-sufficient principle of Christian 
morality, but depends upon other circumstances for its validity and 
adequacy. In terms of eating idol-food, the action itself is, according to 
Henry, a matter of ethical indifference, while there may be situations in 
which it becomes wrong. ^ "^  
Using that which is lawful is further restricted by Henry's second 
principle of conduct: the purpose of Christian liberty is to glorify God, 
not to engage in sin. I Cor. 10.23 ('All things are lawful') is followed by 
10.31: 'Therefore, whether you eat or drink, or whatever you do, do all 
to the glory of God.' That which is lawful, then, is determined by the 
will and authority of God Himself. Liberty is not lawlessness. 
'""^ Heniy, Ethics, 420. 
'•"Henry, Ethics, 422. 
"''Heniy, Ethics, 423. 
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Taking care to avoid defiling one's own conscience is the third 
principle that Henry mentions. Something generally permitted may yet 
be wrong for a believer in a particular situation, if his conscience is 
thereby defiled. One's spiritual health is a major ethical consideration, 
so that 'the principle of inward intention and inner consequences 
becomes vital for ethical living.''"* This principle generates variety and 
individuality of moral action, since that which defiles conscience will not 
be the same for everyone. Personal ethical decisions are required in 
terms of spiritual consequences of doing or not doing a certain thing. 
This principle comes into play particularly with regard to the 'adia-
phora,' those things neither commanded nor prohibited in Scripture. 
Defilement of conscience can then result from excessive attachment, for 
example. 
A fourth NT principle of conduct is that the believer should avoid 
placing a stumbling-block before weaker believers. Our Christian liberty 
is limited, according to this rule, by expediency. The effects of our 
actions on ourselves and on others must be evaluated. Because we are 
not isolated Christians but members together of a redeemed community, 
we are not to employ our liberty 'for an occasion to the flesh, but by 
love [we are to] serve one another' (Gal.5.13). Appealing to Calvin, 
Henry insists that 'love smoothes out the path for the other person; it 
does not place stumbling-blocks before him.'"" Honoring the other's 
conscience may require that we suspend our Christian freedom for his 
sake. 
Still, the question arises: what if the weaker brother's opinion is 
mistaken, immature or wrong? How far must the stronger believer go 
in denying himself? Some issues, according to the apostle Paul, are not 
matters of conscience at all. When he withstood Peter for seeking to 
bring believers in bondage to the Jewish system, Paul clung firmly to the 
primacy of Christian liberty. But we must distinguish between the truly 
weaker brother who is offended, and the 'cavilling brother who uses an 
appeal to conscience as a tool to serve his own ends. Jesus sharply 
rebuked the religious hypocrite (Mt.15.14), and none can be more 
hypocritical than one who pleads 'conscience' to further his own cause.' 
But can one be faced here with a clash of choices? Indeed, says Henry, 
'Christian judgment faces one of its most demanding tasks when the 
performance of an act harms someone, while its omission would harm 
'"*Henry, Ethics, 427. 
""Henry, Ethics, 429. 
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someone else, as is sometimes the case in questions of Christian liber-
^ .108 Rather than looking down on the weaker brother, or baiting 
him by deliberately doing what violates his conscience, the stronger 
believer must enlighten the other's conscience, in order to lead the 
weaker one out of bondage to false scruples. 'A practice which is 
contrary to the dictates of a brother's conscience can be carried on only 
alongside of an enlightening of that brother's conscience.''*'' 
The dangers faced by the weaker believer are two: (1) viewing an 
innocent or indifferent act as intrinsically evil, and (2) shunning his duty 
to bear Christian witness in some cultural areas. Likewise, the stronger 
believer faces two dangers: (1) travelling into forbidden territory out of 
reaction to the weak conscience, and (2) by his use of liberty, leading 
the weaker one into sin or a defiled conscience. All of these dangers 
can be avoided by keeping together the freedom Christ gives and the 
claim Christ exercises. Neither legalism nor libertinism is the solution. 
Rather, 'conduct must be forged by spiritual decision before the fires of 
motive and judge by conscience. May I as a believer partake in this 
activity or that pleasure? If my conscience will allow me to do it 'to the 
Lord' and give thanks for it, then most assuredly I may. If my con-
science does not give me liberty, than I may not. For it is to God and 
not to men that we must give account for our conduct.'"" 
Concern for the effect of one's actions on unbelievers is the fifth NT 
principle of conduct. The Scripture is concerned that believers walk 
without reproach before the world (cf. 1 Pet.3.15f). Abstention for the 
sake of others broadens into a general principle here, one unique to 
Christianity and without parallel in non-Christian ethics.'" 
Henry identifies a sixth NT principle of conduct from 1 Cor.6.14 
('Do not be unequally yoked together with unbelievers. For what 
fellowship has righteousness with lawlessness? And what communion 
has light with darkness?'). A believer is not to be allied with the 
unbeliever, and 'is prohibited from an entrance into pagan life for a 
mutual effort and aim.''" This prohibition envisions any situation in 
which the unbeliever determines the course of action or directs the 
"*Heniy, Ethics, 430. 
"^Henry, Ethics, 431. 
""Henry, Ethics, 432-433. 
"'Henry, Ethics, 433. 
"^Heniy, Ethics, 433. 
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thought of the believer. 
A final and seventh NT principle requires that in certain times and 
places, the Christian may be answerable to an 'interim code' as a 
temporary or local expedient. This 'interim code' is characterized as 
temporary not on account of eschatological considerations (as, for 
example, with Albert Schweitzer, who defended an 'interim ethic'), but 
on account of 'the particular direction which godlessness and sin take 
in a particular place and time.'"' According to Henry, this is what 1 
Cor.11.1-16 illustrates (where women who appear in public with 
uncovered head are criticized). The basic principles are modesty, 
propriety and order, which may find expression in different ways in 
various cultures, depending on the social customs. Church history 
provides many fine examples of the application of 'interim codes' in the 
so-called church manuals. These collections of 'counsels' and case laws 
provided advice for conduct in the light of current customs in the 
surrounding culture. 
In this connection Henry discusses the place and dimensions of 
'Christian separation.' The call to separation can be an excuse for both 
unholy divisiveness and unhealthy withdrawal from the world. But the 
ideal of toleration can also be an excuse for fleshly indulgence and fluid 
broadmindedness. Biblical morality recognizes, in distinction from both 
'separationists' and 'tolerationists,' that separation is unto God and His 
purpose (cf. the separation of Abraham and of Israel; Gen. 12.Iff; 
Dt.7.1ff; 14.2). The suggestion of separation from evil is only implicit 
here. In terms of Christian separation, then, from what areas of culture 
must the believer withdraw? 
That this is not the real question Henry makes clear by pointing to 
the function of common grace in restraining sin and making possible 
legitimate expressions of culture.'" The real question is: How must 
the Christian enter the cultural arena? Here all the previous NT 
principles of conduct come into view once again: the believer must 
beware of defiling his conscience, must scrupulously examine his 
motives, and must exercise liberty with care. Such a believer recognizes, 
then, that he has a mission. In Henry's words, 'One who has a concern 
to find in cultural expression the best achievements of common grace 
'""Henry, Ethics, 434. 
Heniy neither defines nor discusses this concept any further. 'Common grace' is 
often differentiated from 'special grace,' the latter refemng to the regenerating work of the 
Holy Spint through the gospel. 
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and who has a desire to infuse into the general life of humanity the 
higher motif of redemption can walk in the midst of what may defile a 
weaker conscience. And he can be an ambassador. . . .All things are 
pure to the pure.' The only warning is that one never become enslaved 
to any cultural practice."^ 
EXCURSUS: Scandalum infirmorum and scandalum pusiUorum 
The history of Christian reflection on the subject of 'offense' compels us to 
distinguish scandalum infirmorum from scandalumpusillorum (offense of the little 
ones). 
The latter term derives from Mt.18.6, where Christ warns His disciples, in 
reference to a child He had placed in their midst, about leading little ones into 
sin: 'But whoever causes one of these little ones who believe in me to sin, it would 
be better for him if a millstone were hung around his neck, and he were drowned 
in the depth of the sea. Woe to the world because of offenses! For offenses 
must come, but woe to that man by whom the offense comes!' (Mt. 18.6-7). 
It IS worth observing that when, in his treatment of offense, Aquinas sorts 
passive scandal into two kinds, the scandal of the Pharisees and that of the little 
ones, he nowhere employs the term scandalum infirmorum, and appears to 
designate the matter of offending the weak entirely by the term scandalum 
pusillorum. As we have seen, Aquinas treats also the possibility that passive 
scandal arising from weakness or ignorance (scandal of the little ones) can turn 
into scandal arising from malice (scandal of the Pharisees), if enlightenment is 
rejected. Similarly, when Voetius sorts passive scandal into two kinds {scandalum 
acceptum, or offense taken, and scandalum datum, or offense given), he identifies 
scandalum datum as 'scandal of the weak ones or little ones.'^ ^* These two 
classifications he combines elsewhere: \X)lh pusilli ('little ones') and mfirmi mfide 
('the ones weak in faith') are those inadequately established in New Testament 
Christian liberty,"' and the objects of scandalum datum can include the weak 
and infants in Christ."* 
In our judgment, scandalum infirmorum and scandalum pusillorum have in 
common the potential for inducing someone to err by imitating another's 
"'Henry, Ethics, 436 
voetius, Disputationum, 147 '[Scandalum] Datum est, quod vere ontur ex activo 
scandalo altenus, quod etiam scandalum infirmorum seu pusillorum dici solet.' 
VoeUus, Disputationum, 148 'Pusilli & infirmi in fide stncte dicuntur illi, qui circa 
hbertatem Chnstianam in N.T sufficienter instituU non sunt, 1 Connth 8vT 
Voetius, Disputationum, 148 'Dividitur scandalum datum secundum objecta ut 
aliud scandalizet a fide & ecclesia extraneos, aliud domesticos fidei, eosque aut sapientes 
& viros (quod tamen non ita frequens), aut infirmos & infantes m Chnsto' 
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behavior. This similarity explains Voetius' treatment of offense as the opposite 
of the good example. But the most relevant difference between them appears to 
be the victim's aptitude of conscience involved m the process of moral injury. We 
would suggest, in light of 1 Cor.8.7, that offense of the 'weak' necessarily results 
from the violation of his formed conscience functioning restnctively in a given 
situation, whereas offense of the 'little ones' injures someone whose conscience 
IS (yet) neither formed nor functioning concerning the error into which he is led. 
1.4 A description of the issues 
Our survey of these four representatives has provided an orientation 
to the terminology, the various contexts and Scripture passages related 
to scandalum infirmorum. In order to evaluate these positions, we must 
collate and organize their conclusions in an effort to establish parame-
ters for our further reflection and to describe the contours of this moral 
problem. 
The material presented above yields the following dimensions which 
can serve as suitable headings for our analysis of scandalum infirmorum: 
1. What is the nature of weakness? 
2. What is the process of scandalum infirmorum? 
3. What is the arena of scandalum infirmorum? 
4. What is the theological context of scandalum infirmorum? 
Two more preliminary comments need to be made. First, from the 
four questions it becomes clear that we are narrowing our focus to one 
of several kinds of offense. Aquinas speaks of active and passive 
offenses, dividing the latter into scandal arising from (1) malice and (2) 
weakness and ignorance. Calvin simplifies matters by identifying offense 
given {scandalum datum) as offense of the weak, and offense taken 
(scandalum acceptum) as the offense of bitter and proud persons. But 
because Christians need not concern themselves with offense arising 
from malice, or delay over those who take offense, that aspect comes 
now to lie outside of our focus. 
Second, we must recognize that modern word usage diverges signifi-
cantly from historical terminology. Today one frequently hears people 
say things like 'That offends me!' or 'We must be careful that others 
don't take offense.' But as we shall see, the burden ought to be shifted 
terminologically by warning against giving others offense. Put another 
way: the person given offense is not to be confused with the person who 
takes offense! 
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1.4.1 The nature of weakness 
In order to identify precisely the moral nature of offense of the 
weak, we will want to know what it means to be "weak.' Is it true, as 
Aquinas states, that weakness denotes proneness to scandal? Is Calvin 
correct in insisting that without clarity about the identity of the weak, 
our freedom remains useless? 
The weakness in view here is not moral weakness in the sense of 
'inclination to sin.' All of our spokesmen agree that the weak are not 
initially culpable for their weakness. Moreover, the weak are not those 
who take offense out of malice, as the Pharisees did with Christ. Nor 
are they persons of bitter disposition or pharisaical pride, or hypocrites. 
Further, weakness has some connection with conscience, a knowledge 
deficient in its ability to apply biblical teaching to life. 
Clearly, our description of weakness will determine our recommen-
dations for dealing with the offense of the weak. 
Interestingly, our representative spokesmen diverge at this point. 
Although all three agree that the weak are not initially culpable for their 
weakness, they disagree on the matter of subsequent culpability. Both 
Aquinas and Henry advise conditional forbearance of the weak, that is, 
making concessions to the weak while educating and cultivating his 
moral opinion. If, after such education, he continues to object, his 
weakness is no longer innocent, but culpable, and the situation changes 
from someone giving him offense to his (illicit) taking offense. By 
contrast, Calvin nowhere speaks of trying to change the opinion of the 
weak by seeking to develop his moral insights or his convictions of 
conscience. Calvin's tone urges instead the continued forbearance of the 
weak, so tempering 'the use of our freedom as to allow for the 
ignorance of our weak brothers.' 
It is also at this point that Henry issues the warning about domina-
tion of the strong by the weak. It seems that unless the opinions of the 
weak are changed, the strong risks being governed by those opinions in 
that he must subordinate his liberty to the scruples of the weak. 
Perhaps, then, the most weighty question facing us is this: Is 
educating and enlightening the weak unto fuller knowledge and a more 
liberated conscience an appropriate response? 
1.4.2 The process of scandalum it^umorum 
In the previous section we outlined questions about the nature of 
the infirmi; here we are interested in the character of scandalum itself. 
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What is the nature of the offense of the weak? Are there discernible 
stages or moments that can be isolated for further examination? 
Aquinas discusses the matter of offense in the context of vices 
against the virtue of love. Scandalum infirmorum is thus a violation of 
neighbor love. In language borrowed from Aquinas, we might say that 
it is any action—any word or deed either inherently evil or appearing to 
be evil— which could or does occasion, lead or otherwise cause, inten-
tionally or unintentionally, another to fall into sin. One falls into sin 
by violating either a divine command or prohibition (to which Calvin 
adds: his own conscience). 
Implicit withm this definition is the fact that offense of the weak 
occurs not between a believer and the creation, or between a believer 
and himself, but between a believer and another person (whether 
believer or unbeliever). In other words, scandalum infirmorum is an 
inherently social conflict."' 
Two questions arise with this definition. First, who decides whether 
an act appears to be evil—the agent, the one given offense, or someone 
else? And second, how does one measure the possibility of his action 
leading another to sin? We're not at all suggesting that these questions 
cannot be answered; but for Aquinas' discussion to be useful, they will 
need to be. 
Calvin and Henry handle the matter in the context of Christian 
fi"eedom; offense of the weak occurs through the abuse of Christian 
liberty. 
This freedom is preeminently a soteriological matter, the fruit of 
Christ's redeeming work, produced within the believer by the Spirit of 
Christ. Christian liberty is by definition freedom of conscience, whereby 
the believer is freed to embrace God's mercy, to obey Him willingly, and 
to live before Him confidently. Conscience is a human capacity that is 
continually active; activated at creation, it functions apart from regen-
So also Werner SchoUgen, Soaologte und Ethik des religiosen Argemisses. Mit 
besonder Berucksichngung des §166 RSLG.B und der Strafrechtsreform, 32,37-38; he 
summarizes 'In conclusion, the concept of offense can be summarized as follows, an 
offense occurs when, in forming an increasingly more effective We-1 sociological value, a 
threat to its validity releases a qualitatively unique character response which is typified by 
a tension-filled agitation and impels toward an act of protection and retaliation' (38; 
'Abschliessend kann also der Begnff des Argemisses folgendermassen gefasst werden: Ein 
Argemis liegt dann vor, wenn ein soziologisch in der Formung eines Wir-Ich wirksam 
gewordener hoherer Wert bei einer Bedrohung seiner Geltung eine qualitativ eigenartige 
WiUensantwort auslost, die von einer spannungsvoUen Erregung getragen ist und zu einer 
Schutz- und Vergeltungshandlung drangt') 
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eration, but requires faith to function properly, that is, freely—free from 
servility and superstition. 
For Calvin and Henry, then, offense is both possible and problem-
atic in terms of this freedom of conscience. Recall Calvin's dictum, 'in 
order that men may with a clean conscience cleanly use God's gifts.' 
Without freedom there is neither proper employment nor prudent 
enjoyment of these gifts. But here is the problem: believers' consciences 
are not equally free with respect to the use of God's gifts. Though they 
may unitedly embrace divine mercy and obey the divine will as part of 
their freedom of conscience, yet believers might not share the same 
confidence concerning what Calvin called 'indifferent things.' 
Since offense of the weak occurs in the context of a freedom of con-
science produced of faith, it is an inherently ecdesial conflict, that is, it 
occurs between believers, within the church. 
But their descriptions generate questions similar to those we raised 
with Aquinas' analysis. Calvin's positive characterization of offense was 
that it is given to the ignorant and simple by doing anything with unsea-
sonable, rude or violent lightness, levity, fickleness or inconstancy; by 
doing anything licentiously, lasciviously or insolently; or by doing some-
thing with rashness, inconsiderateness or temerity. Negatively, its defi-
ciencies include doing anything without order or disorderly, or not in its 
own place. To these negative characteristics he adds actions twisted by 
malevolence which nonetheless are not done in a morally bad, wicked, 
depraved, reprobate manner, nor unseasonably, rudely or violently. 
Although we observe here Calvin's pronounced focus on the manner of 
action in place of Aquinas' focus on the nature of the action, we will 
need to ask: By what measure and by whom is an act determined to be 
committed with unseasonable levity or without order? 
1.4.3 The arena of scandalum infimwrum 
We turn next to the scene or arena of conflict between the strong 
and the weak, that world of practices, ceremonies, customs and all sorts 
of things belonging to human cultural activity. 
This arena within which the weak can be offended or made to 
stumble is, properly speaking, where convictions differ as to what is 
permissible. The nature of these differing convictions, we saw above, 
entails knowledge of divine permissions. And since permissions are 
those things neither prescribed nor proscribed, their identity and extent 
become the subject of debate and the source of disagreement. 
This arena is often denoted by a variety of terms: 'adiaphora,' 'indif-
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ferent things,' and 'the permissible,' for example. 
These terms are conspicuously absent from Aquinas' discussion of 
scandalum infirmorum. He speaks instead of temporal and spiritual 
goods, distinguishing among the latter between things necessary and 
things unnecessary to salvation. 
Calvin by contrast describes three kinds of adiaphora: doctrinal, 
ceremonial and ethical. For ethical adiaphora he employs terms like 
'outward things,' 'indifferent things,' 'God's gifts,' and 'middle things.' 
Several theological premises serve to ground his view of adiaphora, 
among them that God's creation is good and to be enjoyed, that His 
sovereign will is revealed in Scripture, that justification is by faith, that 
the Christian has a new relationship to the law, and that conscience is 
the realm of Christian liberty.'^ 
But 'adiaphora' have limits, according to Calvin. There are no 
indifferent acts, since every act is to be for God's glory, and therefore 
good. Every act has a moral quality. ^ ^^  Nevertheless, things can be 
indifferent or neutral, their use neither commanded nor prohibited. 
Any moral quality involved inheres not in the thing itself but in its use. 
Moreover, abuse doesn't warrant disuse, though disuse may be tempo-
rarily desirable because of dangers and corruption accompanyinc; the use 
of a thing. Somewhere Calvin offers the conclusion that no abuse or 
evil can abolish those things which God has instituted, whereas if the 
use of human traditions and ceremonies contaminated by human sin 
gives harm or produces offense to fellow-believers, they are to be 
avoided.'^ Right use entails moderation in the employment of 
outward things; moderation, the doctrine of the mean, directs propriety 
at this point. Such moderation is to be pursued in proper relation to 
God (thanksgiving and confidence), to the neighbor (loving accommoda-
tion), to self (motive, vocation and progress in righteousness), and to 
the thing itself (using it for its intended purpose).'^ 
Clearly this matter of 'adiaphora' is central to the conflict known 
as scandalum infirmorum. Important decisions determining whether the 
encounter between liberty and love will result in their collision or their 
communion are registered at this juncture. Do 'indifferent things' and 
'neutral territories' really exist? How helpful is the distinction between 
"°For a discussion of these see Street, 105-120, 127-139. 
^^^Street, 120-121. 
Mentioned by Street, 137. 
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Street summarizes Calvin's remarks in these four areas under the headmg 'The 
Tests of Things Indifferent' (174-208). 
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a thing and its use? We shall return below to diagnose the adequacy of 
these concepts. 
1.4.4 The theological context of scandahim infimwrum 
Our evaluation reaches its widest expanse as we consider the 
broader context within which to diagnose and resolve the conflict 
between the strong and the weak. The four theologians surveyed treat 
scandalum infirmonim within one of three larger contexts. Offense of 
the weak is either (1) a vice contradicting love for neighbor (Aquinas); 
(2) the abuse of Christian liberty (Calvin and Henry); or (3) the failure 
to provide a good example (Voetius). 
Which of these is preferable? Should we choose one context or for-
mulation over another? Are these mutually exclusive? Do the contexts 
themselves involve assumptions and contain components that prevent 
a biblically adequate understanding of the relationship between Chris-
tian liberty and neighbor love, between the strong and the weak? 
1.5 Some examples 
Until now we've not illustrated the conflict between the strong and 
the weak with specific examples, in order first to consider its biblical 
dynamic and theological dimensions. But now we want to make our dis-
cussion more concrete and lively. 
Understandably, the range of possible examples is as wide as Chris-
tian living itself. To serve our subsequent analysis we offer three kinds 
of examples that people may be inclined to use in a discussion about 
offending others. The following examples are distinguished as to the 
conflict's point of origin. 
We urge two cautions, however. First, we must yet determine 
whether or not each of these examples properly involves scandalum 
infirmonim; and second, this study is not about any of these examples 
in particular. The discerning reader will therefore understand that we 
do not intend discussion of these illustrations to dominate or displace 
attention to the broader problems just sketched. 
Type A: Conflicts arising from a believer's pre-Christian past 
Example 1. Many converts to Christianity have led lives steeped in 
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superstition, lives held captive to belief in demonic powers and unlucky 
forces. Many primitive cultures are held in the grip of religious fear by 
practices of witchcraft and sorcery, while many 'civilized' lands entertain 
superstitions about unlucky numbers (13), days (Friday the 13th) and 
encounters (a black cat crossing one's path). In both kinds of cultures 
these convictions often induce people to alter their plans. Among 
believers convictions about these practices vary; conflict can arise in the 
church about the permissibility of maintaining these superstitious 
practices. 
Example 2. Many cultures contain practices that have evolved from 
social and national traditions, customs that often decorate even religious 
celebrations with the imaginations of folklore. Think of Halloween, 
Santa Claus, the Christmas tree, Easter eggs and Easter bunnies. Here 
too convictions about the tightness or wrongness of these customs vary 
among believers. 
Type B: Conflicts arising from potential transgression of God's law 
Example 3. Among heirs of the Puritan Calvinist tradition one of the 
most warmly debated questions of Christian lifestyle is Sunday-obser-
vance. Here too change in customs accompanies change in convictions; 
people say, 'When we were growing up, we couldn't do this or that on 
Sunday, but now nobody sees anything wrong with it.' Physical recrea-
tion, hobbies, school homework—if these were permitted on Sunday in 
the past, they were private permissions; today, many believers engage in 
these activities openly. But precisely that process of change generates 
moral conflict among believers, a clash bearing all the marks of a con-
test between 'strong' and 'weak' Christians. 
Example 4. Many consistories (church boards) decide, in deference to 
the alcoholic, to use grape juice instead of fermented wine for the 
sacrament of the Lord's Supper. Is this an example of 'the weak' 
dominating 'the strong'? 
Type C: Conflicts arising from the contact between believers and their 
culture 
Example 5. In every age the church wrestles with the moral permissibili-
ty of what is abused by unbelievers. These contests are settled, at least 
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temporarily, when communal judgments are registered against specific 
occupations, styles of personal fashion (clothing, hair length, etc.), forms 
of entertainment, business associations, social practices, and so on. As 
time goes on, believers change their evaluation of once-prohibited prac-
tices, often because the grounds for prohibition are rendered meaning-
less by social change. The intellectual elite in any age often prefer to 
snicker at the church's attempt thereby to define Nvorldliness' for its day 
and age. We all may disagree with some of those judgments; neverthe-
less, this entire history of moral discourse is characterized by the 
inescapably ecclesial dilemma of contradictory moral convictions in the 
context of united religious allegiance. 
CHAPTER 2 
SYNTHESIS AND CRITIQUE 
2.0 Introduction 
In our first chapter, we set forth the biblical discussion of two cases 
involving offense of the weak, and sampled moral reflection on that 
material. In addition, we framed questions and offered examples that 
will now be useful as we further analyze and evaluate the nature and 
dynamics of scandalum infirmorum. 
According to the topics isolated in our earlier description of the 
issues, we will look first at the nature of weakness, and then consider 
the process, arena, and theological context of scandalum infirmorum. 
We conclude Chapter 2 with our evaluation of the examples provided 
earlier, to see whether, in fact, any of them really involves offense of the 
weak. 
2.1 The nature of weakness 
Is it true that the criteria by which Paul employs the terms Sveak' 
and 'strong' are not easily discernible?'^" Yet, identifying, resolving 
and avoiding offense requires that we be able to identify weakness; the 
relationship between the strong and the weak is determined to a large 
degree by the character of weakness. 
Clarity may be served best if, at this point, in the light of 1 Cor.8-10 
and Rom. 14-15, we summarize the weakness involved in scandalum 
infirmorum as consisting olan incapacity for a particular moral undertak-
ing caused by a knowledge deficient in applying certain elements of the 
Christian faith to life. Two questions about this 'deficient knowledge' 
will occupy our attention: (1) Is it culpable or blameworthy? and (2) 
Must it be removed? 
So E W. Schaeffer-de Wal, 'De weg naar menselijke vnjheid,' Wat is chnsielijke 
vnjhetd?, 107-108. 
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2.1.1 Is weakness culpable? 
We wish to consider in the first place the suggestion that a 
behever's Sveakness' is a blameworthy or culpable condition.'" 
According to Gustav Stahlin, for example, the reference in 1 Corin-
thians and Romans is to a 'weakness which must be overcome,' charac-
terized as a 'religious and moral condition.''^ 
Our previous study has shown 1 Cor.8.7 to be very important here 
'But not among everyone is that knowledge, for some with the con-
sciousness of the idol up until now eat it as food sacrificed to an idol, 
and their conscience, because it is weak, is polluted.' Weakness entails 
both a deficiency and an excess the weak are deficient in applying 
knowledge about the nothingness of idols and the singular uniqueness 
of God (8.4,6); on the other hand, they abound in 'knowledge,' born of 
custom, of idols and idolatry Their weakness qualifies their conduct, 
for the weak 'eat it as food sacrificed to an idol' 
Similarly, Rom. 14.1 speaks of one whose faith lacks both sufficient 
content and confidence to permit certain activities (or omissions). This 
faith, weak though it may be, nevertheless guides behavior, the one who 
is weak eats vegetables only (14.2). In addition, we observed that it is 
possible to be both weak m the faith (14.1) and yet 'fully convinced m 
one's own mind' (14.5), so that weakness is not vacillation or irresolute-
ness. Nor is this weakness deficient in devotion to God, but is full of 
religious direction, for 'the one who does not eat, to the Lord he does 
not eat, and he gives thanks to God' (14 6) Recall also our judgment 
that transporting the idea of a corrupt conscience from Tit.l 15 into 
Rom. 14-15 and imputing it to the weak (Calvin) violates both the argu-
ment of Rom. 14-15 and the context of Tit. 1.15, since the latter speaks 
of the defiled conscience of unbelievers The weak believer is fully 
'brother' (therefore, not 'corrupt') because he is ^ ne for whom Christ 
died (14.15), because he is the work of God (14 20), and because he too 
is considered to be serving Christ rather than himself 'in these things' 
(14.18). Moreover, weakness is a condition that can be exacerbated if 
the strong believer violates the scruples of the weak (14 21). Finally, 
not only are the weak in the faith to be received, but the strong are to 
carry on their shoulders the weaknesses of the weak: 'We who are the 
By this time it should have become dear that the weakness and strength in view are 
not emoaonal, but spiritual, conditions, the emotional conditions are discussed by Paul 
Tournier in his work entitled 77te Strong and the Weak 
^^Uhlm, ''Aoeevf|5, [K.TA.],' TDNT, l 492 
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strong ought to bear with the weaknesses of the weak and ought not to 
please ourselves' (15.1). 
In both Corinth and Rome, then, the condition of weakness affected 
the functioning of conscience. The weak believer was weak in con-
science, that capacity serving as arbiter between belief and action.'" 
The mere presence of a moral conviction means that an arbitration has 
already occurred, a 'judgment' has already been made. The defendant 
(past or future action) has been tried in terms of the 'law' (faith) and 
sentence has been pronounced by conscience. This description can help 
us define conscience as 'that authority within a person which places him 
before his own decisions, past or future, and judges them either approv-
ingly or disapprovingly.'^ ^ Even the weak conscience judges, in spite 
of deficient knowledge and excessive sensitivities. But it is the kind of 
conscience that others can 'build up'—prop up, really—to violate itself 
(8.10), the kind that can thus be wounded (8.12). But more about that 
in a moment. 
We pause first to evaluate Stahlin's claim that the ethical connota-
tion of 'weakness' in the NT refers to something that must be overcome, 
a weakness of religious and moral condition. Doesn't this formulation 
presume culpability (i.e., moral blameworthiness) for one's weakness if, 
after all, it must be overcome? 
This seems also to be the presumption behind Aquinas' insistence 
that we must temporarily avoid certain behaviors that offend the weak 
while we instruct and admonish them. Similarly, Carl Henry argues that 
Christian conscience 'requires growth and education' and 'the overscru-
pulous conscience of the weaker brother needs enlightenment.' Henry 
goes so far as to warn the weak against offending the strong! Aquinas 
and Henry both seem to presume that such weakness is culpable. 
In vernacular English, to 'have a weakness for' somethmg often 
means 'to be inclined to the excessive enjoyment of that thing, an 
enjoyment usually reduced by the warnings of conscience. Consider 
these conditions of weakness: 
1. A husband with 'a weakness for' other women has, we could say, an 
appetite for adultery. His is therefore a culpable weakness because 
For a fuller discussion of conscience, see Christian Maurer, 'ZwotSo, 
CTüVetóriau;,' TDNT, 7:898-919; W J. Aalders, Het geweten, J. Douma, Christian Morals 
and Ethics (66-67) distinguishes between a clear conscience (cf. 1 Cor.4.4), a weak 
conscience (cf. 1 Cor.8.7,10,12) and a bad conscience (cf. 1 Tim.4.2). 
128 
Cf. J. Douma, Christian Morals and Ethics, 66. 
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the behavior needed to satisfy his appetite is always blameworthy. 
His is indeed a Sveakness that must be overcome' and his conscience 
should always say, 'No, because God says it's always wrong!' 
2 But there is another type of weakness that needs only to be regu-
lated. Someone with 'a weakness for' beautiful clothes, who there-
fore spends too much money and attention on external appearance, 
comes into conflict with divine warnings about covetousness, idola-
try, etc. Because clothes are permissible and necessary, this person's 
conscience must be trained to say, 'This much and no more!' 
3. There is yet a third condition of weakness: someone with 'a weak-
ness for' alcohol (probably the most common example of 'weakness' 
in fundamentalist ethical discussions!) fears that any enjoyment, any 
taste, of alcohol will lead to enslavement and decides therefore 
never to use it. His conscience must say, 'No, because I may not.' 
Each of these is a different condition of weakness, and in each case that 
properly functioning arbiter between faith and action called 'conscience' 
renders a different service. The believer traveling the first path is 
heading toward moral suicide, and his conscience must function as a 
moral roadblock preventing any further travel. The Christian on the 
second path travels with an eye on his own hand-drawn map, and con-
science ought to serve as a moral stop sign, permitting him to check his 
location before either proceeding in the same direction or turning onto 
another road. But on the third route, conscience signals the need for 
a moral detour to assist the believer who has a moral handicap, a detour 
making travel easier and less hazardous, diverging only minutely and 
perhaps temporarily from the main route. 
Only the first moral condition of weakness is clearly culpable per se. 
The second requires accompanying circumstances to become culpable 
weakness, and the third becomes culpable when the private judgment of 
the weak's conscience is contradicted by his own action contrary to that 
judgment. 
Which of these moral conditions of weakness correspond(s) to the 
situations of 1 Corinthians and Romans? Five specific issues can be 
identiHed in these passages: 
In Corinth, 
(1) eating/abstaining from sacrificial food offered in the market; 
(2) eating/abstaining from sacrificial food offered by a pagan host; 
and 
(3) eating sacrificial food/meals in idol-temples. 
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In Rome, 
(4) eating/abstaining from meal; and 
(5) observing special days or ignoring their observance. 
In order to apply correctly these passages to contemporary church life, 
we must understand that these five issues arose within the missionary 
context of the Corinthian and Roman congregations. Although, as we 
have said in Chapter 1, it is both difficult and unnecessary to identify 
the weak and the strong precisely (as being Jewish or Gentile Christians, 
for example), it seems clear that the disputed practices contradicted 
convictions which the weak retained from their pre-Christian Jewish or 
Gentile past (corresponding thus to the examples classified in Chapter 
1 as Type A). But the disputes in Corinth and Rome involved neither 
ungoverned appetites (too much of a good thing; thus: condition #2), 
nor fear of moral enslavement due to a moral handicap (condition #3), 
but the moral suicide of the strong (according to the judgment of the 
weak; thus: condition #1) and the moral injury of the weak by the 
strong. 
Of these five behaviors, the only one absolutely forbidden by the 
apostle was eating sacrificial food/meals in idol-temples, because that 
involved the moral suicide of communing with demons (1 Cor. 10.20-21). 
Both strong and weak consciences were to say, 'No, because God says 
it's always wrong!' Concerning the other four issues, the apostle had a 
word for both parties. To those whose consciences were strong he said: 
'If your brother, because of his faith, cannot travel with you, help him 
walk the easier path. Don't make him stumble!' And to those with 
weak consciences he says: 'If you, because of your faith, cannot travel 
with the strong, don't condemn him—the Lord didn't put a roadblock 
there—but move over to the less hazardous path.' Both the careless one 
and the censorious one were wrong in their relationship to the other before 
God. The strong risked wounding the weak by careless moral permis-
sions, while the weak was in danger of shackling the strong with his own 
moral disability. Only that censorious domination would render the weak 
culpable. 
Returning to our point, then, it seems to us that the biblical teach-
ing in 1 Cor.8-10 and Rom. 14-15, where 'weakness' describes a 'religious 
and moral condition,' does not warrant the view that weakness itself is 
a culpable condition. In our judgment Stahlin's interpretation here of 
weakness as a moral condition that must be overcome suffers from exag-
geration. Although the weak are warned not to judge the strong, 
nothing in these passages suggests that the weak believer is in error, and 
therefore needs to repent, because of his weakness. 
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2.1>2 Weakness as ignorance 
But even if weakness is not culpable, must it nevertheless be over-
come through education, enlightenment or moral growth? As we have 
seen. Christian moralists through the centuries have answered in the 
affirmative. Let's consider their arguments. 
We spoke above of the weak believer as someone who has a tempo-
rary moral disability, a term that implies absence of culpability. And yet, 
isn't that term prejudicial if, as so many writers agree, weakness is 
defined as ignorance? 
A review of the positions of Aquinas, Calvin and Henry shows that 
all of them spoke of weakness as ignorance, an undesirable (if not 
culpable) condition. Though Calvin is less explicit than Aquinas and 
Henry, the recommendations of each for dealing with the weak include 
reference to his education and enlightenment. 
Calvin's advice, for example, combines solicitude for the weaker 
brother with a vague expectation of his instruction. In connection with 
giving offense we find in two places his discussion of eating meat on 
Fridays. Upbraiding those who disallow any use of 'things indifferent,' 
as if Friday meat-eating necessarily gave offense, Calvin in his commen-
tary reminds us that 'Paul here [1 Cor.8.13] inveighs against those who 
impudently abuse their knowledge in the presence of the weak, whom 
they take no pains to instruct. Hence there will be no occasion for 
reproof, if instruction has been previously given. Farther, Paul does not 
command us to calculate, whether there may be an occasion of offence 
in what we do, except when the danger is present to our view.'^ '^ 
Observe that instruction of the weak was needed to protect the strong 
from reproof, rather than to perfect the weak. The same example 
occasioned Calvin in his Institutes to recommend 'the care of the weak, 
whom the Lord has so strongly commended to us' (III.xix.lO), adding: 
'Thus we shall so temper the use of our freedom as to allow for the 
ignorance of our weak brothers, but for the rigor of the Pharisees, not at 
all!'™ Allowing for the ignorance of the weak seems to include 
permission of that ignorance. But Calvin nowhere echoes Aquinas in 
suggesting that scandalum pusillorum becomes malicious scandalum 
Pharisaeorum when the weak rejects instruction. 
Such pastoral sensitivity appears also in Calvin's remarks on 
John Calvin, Commentary on the Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians, 
285-286. 
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John Calvin, Institutes, IIIjux.ll; emphasis added. 
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Rom.14-15. Concerning the apostle's exhortation 'let each be fully 
convinced in his own mind' (Rom. 14.5b), Calvin remarks: 'If any object 
and say, that infirmity is ever perplexing, and that hence such certainty 
as Paul requires cannot exist in the weak: to this the plain answer 
is,—That such are to be pardoned, if they keep themselves within their 
own limits.'"^ Similarly, '. . .there is nothing unreasonable in the 
matter, if we say, that the modesty of the weak is approved by God, not 
on the ground of merit, but through indulgence.'"^ By contrast, 
Calvin says concernmg Rom. 14.22b, 'Here [Paul] means to teach us, 
first, how we may lawfully use the gifts of God; and, secondly, how great 
an impediment ignorance is; and he thus teaches us, lest we should urge 
the uninstructed beyond the limits of their infirmity.'"^ And Paul's 
instruction that the strong 'bear with the weaknesses of the weak' 
(Rom.15.1) summarizes the discussion, 'for as God has destined those 
to whom he has granted superior knowledge to convey instruction to the 
ignorant, so to those whom he makes strong he commits the duty of 
supporting the weak by their strength; thus ought all gifts to be com-
municated among all the members of Christ.'"'' 
More recently Philip Hughes has with vehemence argued the need 
for enlightening the conscience of the weak. Ignorance thwarts the con-
science, but knowledge sharpens and shapes conscience for its moral 
service, he says. The weaker brother should therefore not be 'left with 
his weak and misinformed conscience. On the contrary, he too can 
become a strong Christian with a well-informed conscience by being 
instructed. . . .Thus the person with a weak conscience should not pre-
vail over the person with a strong conscience, for it is impossible that 
the apostle would have sanctioned any Christian's continuing weakness 
through ignorance when the remedy is for him to become strong 
through knowledge. . . .'"' Hughes summarizes as a principle for 
application that in his actions, the knowledgeable Christian (i.e., the one 
with a strong conscience) must not only be considerate toward the ill-
informed Christian, but also instruct him toward moral maturity.'^ 
Recall also that Aquinas, among others, identifies especially children 
John Calvin, Commentary on Romans, 497. 
'John Calvin, Commentary on Romans, 498. 
John Calvin, Commentary on Romans, 511. 
John Calvin, Commentary on Romans, 514 
Philip Edgcumbe Hughes, Christian Ethics in a Secular Society, 40. 
hughes , 40, cf Kenneth L. Gentry, Jr., The Christian and Alcohohc Beverages: A 
Biblical Perspective, 93. 
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as being weak due to moral ignorance, immaturity and inexperience—a 
condition of moral innocence, thus. The term itseU-^candalum 
pusillorum, or offense of the little ones—comes from Christ's teaching 
about kingdom greatness, when He insisted that His disciples be con-
verted and become as little children to enter the kingdom. 'But who-
ever causes one of these little ones who believe in me to sin,' Jesus 
continues, 'it would be better for him if a millstone were hung around 
his neck, and he were drowned in the depth of the sea' (Mt.18.6). 
Moral immaturity appears to be rather innocent when Paul, though 
agreeing that 'we all possess knowledge,' returns a few verses later with 
this qualification: 'But not among everyone is that knowledge' (1 
Cor.8.7). Knowledge and conviction differed in Rome also, but whether 
one was strong or weak, Paul exhorts, 'Let each one be fully convinced 
in his own mind' (Rom. 14.5b). 
Is it true, then, that though native moral ignorance is not blamewor-
thy (in children, for example),/?ewwte«r weakness-through-ignorance is? 
Must the weak then be instructed in the knowledge of the strong (with 
its moral implications)? And does instruction rejected turn scandalum 
pusillorum into scandalum Pharisaeorum, as Aquinas seems to allege? 
Is Henry correct when he insists that a practice contrary to the dictates 
of another's conscience may be carried on only while the strong seeks 
to enlighten the other's conscience? 
The question here really concerns the process of moral growth. No 
one would deny that the Christian exercise of conscience is a capacity 
requiring development. As a universal human capacity, conscience did 
not originate with man's fall into sin, but with his creation in the image 
of God. The believer's sin-affected conscience is renewed by God's 
Spirit through faith. 
Just as in natural life, so too in spiritual and moral life there are 
stages of development to maturity. The first stage is one of newness 
and, therefore, of dependency and weakness. ^ '^  This image of infancy 
appears in 1 Pet.2.2: ' . . .as newborn babes, desire the pure milk of the 
word, that you may grow thereby,...." Believers need to grow beyond 
this stage. In fact, they are criticized for not doing so, as the writer to 
the Hebrews warns: 'For though by this time you ought to be teachers, 
you need someone to teach you again the first principles of the oracles 
of God; and you have come to need milk and not solid food. For 
everyone who partakes only of milk is unskilled in the word of 
righteousness, for he is a babe. But solid food belongs to those who are 
J. van Andel, De gemeenschap der heiligen, 1. 
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of full age, that is, those who by reason of use have their senses 
exercised to discern both good and evil' (Heb.5.12-14). 'Discerning 
good and evil' involves skill in 'the word of righteousness' characteristic 
of those who are 'of full age.' Moreover, the offices ordained and given 
by Christ for the church should be equipping the saints for the works 
of service and of building up the church 'till we all come to the unity of 
the faith and the knowledge of the Son of God, to a perfect man, to the 
measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ, that we should no 
longer be children, tossed to and fro and carried about with every wind 
of doctrine, by the trickery of men, in the cunning craftiness by which 
they lie in wait to deceive, but, speaking the truth in love, may grow up 
in all things into him who is the head—Christ—from whom the whole 
body, joined and knit together by what every joint supplies, according 
to the effective working by which every part does its share, causes 
growth of the body for the edifying of itself in love' (Eph.4.13-16). The 
doctrinal and moral instability, susceptibility and immaturity of these 
Ephesian 'children' are contrasted with the coming unity, perfection and 
fullness of adulthood in Christ. Paul's discussion of glossolalia includes 
this exhortation to the Corinthians: 'Brethren, do not be children in 
understanding; however, in malice be babes, but in understanding be 
mature' (1 Cor. 14.20). 
Nevertheless, even if we grant that growth in the capacity and con-
tent of conscience is the biblical pattern for believers, we must still 
insist that the apostle's discussion in both 1 Cor.8-10 and Rom. 14-15 of 
the conflict between strong and weak Christians nowhere urges that the 
weak be enlightened concerning the full dimension of Christian liberty 
with the aim of changing his convictions and behavior. 
It might be helpful to describe weakness as a temporary disability of 
conscience, a condition which one couW—but not necessarily should— 
outgrow. This is analogous to a temporary physical disability. When we 
were younger, many of us suffered from recurring bronchitis, a common 
childhood malady that people usually, but not always, outgrow. 
Our point is that Scripture seems to recognize a limit here to the 
development and exercise of conscience. It's the kind of limit we've 
described as a disability that is usually temporary. As with the human 
body, growth—not now of the individual member, but of the body—can 
still continue as the strong believers heed Scripture's exhortations to 
compensate for and protect the weak.''* 
Appealing to 1 Cor.8.13 ('Therefore, if food makes my brother stumble, I will never 
again eat meat, lest I make my brother stumble.'), James Durham points out that there can 
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Does this mean, then, that within the church differences of moral 
conviction may continue to live alongside one another? 
One recent discussion concludes with a negative answer to this ques-
tion."' It contends that Paul himself identifies with the strong 
(Rom. 15.1, Ve then who are strong ought to bear with the scruples of 
the weak'). The terms, tone and conclusion of Rom.14-15 would seem 
to aim toward dynamic growth rather than to settle for a static situation 
of continuing differences. The term Veak' would suggest incomplete-
ness and therefore contains an inducement to become 'strong.''''* 
Similarly, Paul's conviction that 'nothing is unclean of itself 
(Rom. 14.14) is thought to signal the direction for the necessary growth 
of the weak. Finally, the apostolic prayer would expect believers to 'be 
like-minded among one another, according to Christ Jesus,' glorifying 
God "with one mind and one mouth' (Rom. 15.5-6)."' In the church, 
differences of conviction should not be final or permanent. 
Another emphasis appears, however, when we consider the thread 
of the apostolic argument in these passages. To the Roman believers 
he writes, 'Receive one who is weak in the faith, but not to disputes 
over doubtful things' (Rom. 14.1). Moreover, although Paul and others 
'know' about idols and foods more fully than the weak (1 Cor.8.4,6; 
Rom. 14.14), the apostle settles for the recognition that 'however, there 
is not in everyone that knowledge' (1 Cor.8.7). 
Furthermore, the opinion that differences of conviction between the 
weak and strong may coexist in the church seems to be supported by the 
apostolic exhortation of Rom. 14.5b: 'Let each be fully convinced in his 
own mind.' In the exegetical part of our study we disagreed with the 
notion that this requires the weak to reconsider their position out of a 
posture of open-mindedness. Paul's emphasis is on 'being fully con-
be no preassigned terminus to abstaining from an action having the potential oiscandalum 
infirmorum {A Treatise Concerning Scandal, 25). 
139 
G. Gunnink, 'Vnj en verantwoordehjk,' Wat is christelijke vnjheid?, 26-27; also 
P.H.R. van Houwelmgen, 'Dat is sterk!' De Reformatie, 58/35; 'Hoe sterk sta ik?' De 
Reformats, 58/36, 'Steeds sterker worden,' De Reformatie, 58/37; and 'Samen sterk,' De 
Reformatie, 58/38. 
Gunnink, 26; van Houwelmgen, De Reformatie, 58:552, 'The apostle considers 
himself to be among the strong.. .and says of the others: they are still weak, they must still 
become stronger' (emphasis added). 
See van Houwelmgen, De Reformatie, where he compares the church's unity to a 
choir with vanous voices; but when it begins to sing, 'then all those voices blend together 
into one.' That is to say, 'In the communal praise the differences of opinion fall away' 
(58:600). 
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vinced.' Although we agree that this verse does not mean 'permit each 
his own opinion,' whereby each individual is left to find his own way, we 
are not persuaded that differing convictions and practices among the 
weak and strong—differences arising from moral disability—necessarily 
constitute a deviant pluriformity in the church."^ After all, at issue is 
not the foundation, but the lifestyle based on the commonly heli' 
foundation. ^ '^  
In other words, it would be painfully cruel to say of those in the 
church whose consciences were weak—those with a moral disability—that 
it would be nice if only they were strong. Recognizing that the 
covenant-society called the church always contains such members is not 
to adopt a static view of 'the' strong and 'the' weak. This rightly feared 
static view arises, in our opinion, when 'strong' and 'weak' become 
ecclesiological categories describing the status of groups within the 
church. But when we recall that 'weak' and 'strong' are metaphorical 
terms whose meaning should be determined per casum, or situationally, 
we need not accede to the claim that, in the church, 'the' weak must 
become strong. Though described as being weak 'in the faith' and 'in 
conscience,' such believers are not characterized as being weak in their 
entire faith-life experience. Their weakness lies in a particular area, in 
terms of a particular moral question. There could well be areas in 
which the weak are strong. 
But how then must we live in the church with differences of moral 
conviction and practice among believers? Though we intend to answer 
that question more fully in Chapter 3, we are prepared to make at least 
this claim: the key to communion among such believers lies not in (1) 
urging those with weaker consciences to grow toward the moral permis-
sions of stronger consciences, nor in (2) permitting believers with such 
differences to live in moral isolation, but rather in improving the moral 
quality of their conduct and relationship. Not the existence of weaker 
and stronger in the church, but their relationship—the fraternal 
carelessness of the strong (Corinth) and the mutual recrimination of 
both parties (Rome)—drew the criticism of the apostle. 
In summary, the weakness involved in scandalum inftrmorum consists 
of an incapacity for a particular moral undertaking caused by a knowledge 
deficient in applying certain elements of the Christian faith to life. This 
weakness is not inherently culpable, although someone who is weak may 
'Contra van Houwelingen, De Reformatie, 58:567. 
Cum van Houwelingen, De Reformatie, 58:567. 
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be inclined wrongly to condemn the strong for the permissions of his 
conscience. And this deficiency is usually only temporary, removed by 
acquiring a broader understanding of the Christian faith and its applica-
tion to life. 
EXCURSUS: Can scandalum infirmorum occur outside the church? 
Up to this point our investigation oi scandalum infirmorum has argued that 
(1) the role of conscience lies at the heart of offense of the weak, and (2) the 
consciences of believers and unbelievers are qualitatively different. If these are 
true, to what extent must Christians be concerned with what those outside the 
church think about their behavior? Are there biblical limits to modifying our 
behavior to avoid causing outsiders to stumble? 
The relevance of these questions appears when we analyze, for example, the 
cultural involvement of Christians or modern missionary activities. When people 
are turned away from Christ and His church because Christians engage in 
practices viewed by outsiders with suspicion, or because missionaries align 
themselves and their indigenous churches with a political ideology or movement, 
are these examples of scandalum infirmorum? In modern post-Chnstian 
civilizations and foreign cultures, will not the church's life and testimony be 
paralyzed if she must be concerned about giving offense to outsiders? 
Each of our representatives says a word about this. Aquinas seems to view 
unbelievers as those ignorant of the gospel, who must be treated with solicitude 
by temporarily avoiding those things not necessary to salvation. Calvin remarks 
that some are put off from the gospel by stupidity or timidity, others by the moral 
degeneracy of church leaders. Voetius is very explicit in distinguishing moral 
injury of co-believers from wounding those outside the faith. Of the four, Voetius 
provides the most explicit classification of offenses given to outsiders, which occur 
in four ways: 
(1) through quarrels about dogma; 
(2) through schism and division; 
(3) through the moral degeneracy of Christians; and 
(4) through accommodation to pagan rituals and blending them into 
Christian worship. 
For Carl Henry, walking without reproach before the world is a NT principle of 
conduct, something unique to Christian ethics. 
That believers can cause outsiders to stumble into sin is beyond question. 
David's adultery and murder gave occasion to the Lord's enemies to blaspheme 
(2 Sam. 12.14). And the ruthless severity of the armies of Israel, Judah and Edom 
incited Moab's king Mesha to the abominable sacrifice of his son to Chemosh (2 
Ki.3.13-27). 
But are these to be characterized as offense of the weak? 
A review of some terminology introduced in Chapter 1 discloses that, whereas 
Aquinas speaks of scandalum pusillorum (offense of the little ones), Calvin 
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describes scandcdum infirmorum (offense of the weak), which is identical to 
scandalum datum (offense given). But in contrasting this with the offense of the 
Pharisees (identical to scandalum acceptum, offense taken), Calvin insists, 'We 
shall so temper the use of our freedom as to allow for the ignorance of our weak 
brothers, but for the rigor of the Pharisees, not at alU'^ ''^  It seems, then, that 
Calvin, Voetius and Henry do indeed distinguish those outside the church from 
the weak. 
We believe that in the face of latent or explicit universalism in modem 
theology, it is worth pausing to ask whether the Scripture (especially the NT) 
recognizes or employs the categories of 'insiders' and 'outsiders,' upon which basis 
we may distinguish, with Calvin, Voetius and Henry, between injuring those inside 
and those outside the church. That the people of Israel were taught to employ 
these classifications is evident from OT legislation concerning the sojourner and 
alien. But does this continue m the NT? 
Well, the Lord Jesus Himself differentiates between those who are, and those 
who are not, among His disciples, when He says to His followers, 'To you it has 
been given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God; but to those who are 
outside, all things come in parables,. . .' (Mk.4.11). His apostles function with 
similar categories. Paul reminds believers in Colossae, 'Walk in wisdom toward 
those who are outside, redeeming the time. Let your speech always be with grace, 
seasoned with salt, that you may know how you ought to answer each one' 
(Col.4.5-6). Concern for the opinion of outsiders induces Paul to exhort the 
Thessaloman Christians, 'But we urge you, brothers, that you increase more and 
more; that you also aspire to lead a quiet life, to mind your own business, and to 
work with your own hands, as we commanded you, that you may walk properly 
toward those who are outside, and that you may lack nothing' (1 Thess.4.10b-12). 
And this distinction must operate in the practice of church discipline, as the 
apostle makes clear in 1 Cor.5.12-13: 'For what have I to do with judging those 
also who are outside? Do you not judge those who are inside? But those who 
are outside God judges. Therefore put away from yourselves that wicked person.' 
This concluding exhortation was one of God's repeated commands to Israel 
(Deut.17.7; 19.19; 22.21,24; 24.7). One's standing among unbelievers serves as 
a criterion for holding office in Christ's church, as we learn from 1 Tim.3.7: 
'Moreover, he [the bishop] must have a good testimony among those who are out-
side, lest he fall into reproach and the snare of the devil.'*'" 
We contend, in agreement with Calvin, Voetius, and Henry, that it is con-
fusing to view the offense of unbelievers in the same terms as the offense of the 
weak, since Scripture presumes that the weak have faith. Clarity is better served, 
however, by distinguishing scandalum datum into two kinds: 
John Calvin, Instuutes, IIIJOX U (emphasis ours):'. .ac sic libertatis nostrae usum 
temperabimus, ut fratrum infirmorum ignoranttae cedere debeat. Phansaeorum austentati 
nequaquam.' 
"'For more information on lolt/O, consult Johannes Behm, 'ë^ , ' TDNT, 2:575-576. 
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(1) scandalum infirmorum, offense of the weak; and 
(2) scandalum extemorum, offense of outsiders. 
Since each of these is a type of scandalum datum, in each case the agent is cul-
pable. But this classification preserves the qualitative distinction between causing 
a co-believer to fall and causing an outsider to stumble, and thereby protects three 
significant factors. First, unlike scandalum extemorum, offense of the weak 
involves the victim's conscience. Second, in distinction from scandalum 
extemorum, offense of the weak presumes that agent and victim are walking 
together in the same direction when the stumbling occurs. 
But what of the respective victims? Here we meet the third qualitative 
difference between offense of the weak and of outsiders. With scandalum 
infirmorum, the victim is not culpable for his weakness. By contrast, the victim 
of scandalum extemorum is surely culpable for his infidelity. The scarce biblical 
evidence for believers leading outsiders into sin presumes that those led into sin 
by the behavior of David and by the conduct of the kings of Israel, Judah and 
Edom were, in fact, enemies of the Lord and idolaters. Two implications arising 
from this discussion have echoed down the corridors of church history 
First, in spite of the outsider's culpability, the church of Jesus Christ and 
individual believers may never excuse their complicity in leading him into sin or 
obstructing him from the cross, arguing that he's an outsider anyway! The agent's 
culpability for scandalum extemorum is in no way diminished by that of the victim. 
Second, the church of Jesus Christ and individual believers are obligated to 
inquire whether their conduct impedes outsiders' coming to Christ. 
2.2 The process oï scandalum infirmorum 
The conflict between the strong and the weak in the church is much 
more than a clash between people. Because it involves the permissions 
of a conscience set free by Christ, and the responsibility toward fellow-
believers in Christ, we could describe offense of the weak as a collision 
between Christian liberty and neighbor love in the church. Within scan-
dalum infirmorum, love and liberty become competitors and antagonists, 
rather than partners and collaborators. Responsibility for others is 
viewed by many as freedom's limit. 
From our analysis of 1 Cor.8-10 and Rom.14-15, we can identify a 
sequence of five distinct stages in this collision between the strong and 
the weak. We might compare the following to the frozen-frame snap-
shots of a slow-motion film capturing the collision: 
Stage 1: There exist strong and weak believers who hold a basic 
confession in common but who differ about the gospel's 
life-applications or its moral permissions. 
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Stage 2: The strong believer acts contrary to the scruple(s) of the 
weak believer in the latter's absence. 
Stage 3: The strong believer acts in the presence of the weak 
believer. 
Stage 4: The strong believer's action generates a moral dissonance 
created by the contradiction of the weak believer's scru-
ple(s), which often results in the weak's condemnation of 
the strong. 
Stage 5: The strong believer's action induces the weak believer to 
imitate it while he himself lacks the justifying permissions, 
which constitutes his moral injury. 
Stage 1: Common confession, different permissions 
In Corinth and Rome the strong and the weak share a common 
bond to the Lord Jesus Christ. This is the important starting point. 
Both belong to Christ and each will give account to God (1 Cor. 8.11; 
Rom.14.4,9-10,12). But equally important is the fact that strong and 
weak applied the gospel's permissions differently. The weak eat with 
consciousness of the reality of the idol-god (1 Cor.8.7) or with convic-
tion that certain foods were unclean (Rom. 14.2,14). 
This fundamental unity exists in spite of the fact that in this phase 
both strong and weak often appeal to biblical teaching to justify or deny 
moral permissions. That was likely the case also among the believers 
in Corinth and Rome. Yet, it is important to observe that the need for 
apostolic exhortations in those instances arose precisely because there 
were no explicit Scriptural commands or prohibitions by which to settle 
these disputes}'^ With the benefit of the closed canon of Scripture we 
today might think that every Corinthian Christian ought to have known 
that enjoying sacrificial meals at the idol-temple was wrong, while 
enjoying sacrificial food in their own or their friends' homes was 
permissible, and that all believers in Rome ought to have known that 
eating meat and not observing select days were permissible. But we 
know these only from the progress of canonical revelation. 
"^Ve will return to this matter below when we inquire about 'adiaphora' as the arena 
of scandalum infirmorum. 
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How is it possible, one may ask, that believers enjoy a united 
allegiance without uniform moral convictions?"^ The seed of the 
gospel, planted in chosen hearts by the Spirit through preaching (1 
Pet. 1.23,25b) and bearing faith's fruit (Gal.5.22), does not grow within 
every believer at a uniform rate or in an identical arrangement of stem, 
leaves and fruit. This is due not to the gospel, but to the soil and 
climate conditions. What is more, believers are not thereby rendered 
culpable, except where these differences in growth develop into a difference 
of direction. To prevent exactly this development and to protect their 
common direction, Paul repeatedly emphasizes the duty of both strong 
and weak to live to the Lord (1 Cor.8.6,8; 10.31; Rom.14.4,6-12,18; 
15.5-7), and the obligation of the strong to succor the weak (1 
Cor.8.9,11-13,24,32,33; Rom.14.1,3,10,13,15,19-21; 15.1-2,7). And 
precisely because this development had not yet taken place in the 
Roman congregation, Paul emphatically warns the weak not to judge the 
strong as if they had abandoned that common allegiance and direction 
(Rom.14.3-4,10,13; 15.7). 
Stage 2: Acting without the weak's knowledge 
This second phase is not yet the moment of impact or moral injury, 
nor yet the collision between liberty and love, but can become the 
occasion for such. 
Although the apostle strictly forbade participation in idol-meals in 
the pagan temples of Corinth, he left the strong free to buy and eat 
idol-food privately, that is: as long as no one asked questions for the 
sake of conscience (1 Cor. 10.25-28). Convictions about disputed prac-
tices are to be kept to oneself (Rom. 14.22). 
Our reason for isolating this second stage is to suggest that it is not 
simply the action itself that injures, but the action perceived, and the 
resulting dissonance, that leads to injury of the weak believer. Just as 
the loss of steering does not necessarily result in an automobile 
accident, so the commission of a certain act does not necessarily result 
in moral injury, though it can become the occasion. 
This is seen still more clearly in the following stage. 
'Cf. Werner SchöUgen, Sozioloffe und Ethik des religiösen Argemisses, 64. 
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Stage 3: Acting in the presence of the weak believer 
'For if anyone sees you who have knowledge eating in an idol's 
temple, will not the conscience of him who is weak be emboldened to 
eat those things offered to idols?' asks the apostle in 1 Cor.8.10. 'Do 
you have faith? Have it to yourself before God. Happy is he who does 
not condemn himself in what he approves,' he urges in Rom. 14.22. 
Recall that we are considering how the conscience functions in the 
situation where the weak believer is injured, destroyed, or made to 
stumble and fall. We are looking, in other words, at a moral process or 
movement. It should be plain that the weak conscience is not (and 
should not feel itself to be) injured by the mere existence of differing 
ethical opinions concerning matters about which Scripture is not explicit 
(Stage 1). Nor does its discomfort begin at Stage 2. It begins at Stage 
3, when the strong believer acts in the presence of the weak. The old 
puzzle about whether or not a tree falling in a forest makes a sound if 
nobody hears its fall, is quite relevant to our discussion. Christian 
liberty can collide with neighbor love only where there is a neighbor! 
The action of the strong (Stage 2) does not create internal dissonance 
(Stage 4) unless the weak learns of it (Stage 3). Here begins the 
conflict between liberty and love in the church. 
Must stronger Christians, then, abstain from doing in public what 
they permits themselves to do in private, in order to avoid harming 
weaker brothers and sisters? And does this not result in moral 
hypocrisy? 
In our opinion, the distinction between public and private conduct 
must be maintained. Not everything that one performs privately is pub-
licly permissible. It is better occasionally to abstain from doing in 
public what one permits in private. 
Now, some might try to avoid conflict among believers with differing 
moral convictions by turning this occasional necessity into a general rule 
or moral style, keeping private as much of our morality as possible. 
Such privatized morality, like a quarantined virus, will likely help 
prevent infection, but it will effectively separate believers in unhealthy 
moral (and spiritual) isolation. 
For this distinction between private and public behavior to function 
properly in resolving (or avoiding) conflict among church members, 
rather than simply ensuring the privacy of their conduct, believers must 
always consider the moral competence of their fellow-believers before 
acting. Only if one has reason to assume that his conduct may occasion 
88 • Chapter 2 
the weak's moral injury must he abstain in the presence of the weak. 
And any appearance of moral hypocrisy, arising from an alleged double 
standard, disappears when intention or motive is understood as love for 
the weaker brother. This love requires a different use of Christian 
liberty at one time or another. 
Stage 4: Moral dissonance 
The weak believer, lacking knowledge about idols and idol-food 
(Corinth) or about meat (Rome), is confronted with the behavior of his 
knowledgeable brother. His weak conscience springs into action, evalu-
ating and judging this conduct. In Rome the weak's conscience was 
inclined to render the verdict of 'guilty,' condemning the strong, while 
in Corinth the judgment of the weak's conscience was more likely to be 
'not guilty,' inclining him to imitate the strong. 
In other words, at this stage the weak's conscience is being enlisted 
to render a verdict. Until this moment, no judgment was needed or 
even summoned. But in Stage 4 he suffers an internal moral dissonance 
created by the discrepancy between his scruple(s) and the action of his 
co-believer (Stage 3), a dissonance that must be resolved. 
If the conscience of the strong tends to universalize its permissions, 
that of the weak tends to universalize its restrictions. This impetus 
generates the weak's moral dissonance. He argues that if something is 
wrong for him, it's wrong for everybody. This in turn occasions the 
weak's condemnation of the strong, which the apostle Paul forbids 
(Rom. 14.3,10,13). 
Stage 5: Imitation and injury 
Notice: only at this stage can we speak of moral injury occurring. It 
happens when the weak's internal dissonance induces external disobedi-
ence to his conscience (1 Cor.8.7,10-13). He does what he believes to 
be wrong, or said another way: he fails to act 'from faith' (Rom. 14.23). 
Notice also that Scripture does not condemn the strong simply for 
acting contrary to the scruple(s) of the weak (Stage 2), nor merely for 
Calvin claims that 'Paul does not command us to calculate, whether there may be 
an occasion of offence m what we do, except when the danger is present to our view' 
(Romans, 286). 
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doing that in the presence of the weak (Stage 3), nor even because the 
weak suffers moral dissonance (Stage 4). That condemnation of the 
strong becomes appropriate only at Stage 5, where the weak's moral dis-
sonance leads to his own active disobedience. 
This move from internal dissonance to external disobedience is 
expressed clearly in 1 Cor.8.7: '. . .some with the consciousness of the 
idol up until now eat it as food sacrificed to an idol, and their con-
science, because it is weak, is polluted.' The weak. . .eat! A weak 
conscience acting in violation of its own judgment becomes a defiled 
conscience. 1 Cor.8.10 sheds more light: 'For if someone sees you—the 
one who has knowledge—reclining in an idol-temple, will not his con-
science—being weak—be built up for the eating of sacrificial foods?' 
Again, Paul's fear is that the weak will eat. A weak conscience that 
discovers a fellow believer's violation of its judgment can become 
'strong' enough to commit moral suicide! 
We might summarize the apostle's teaching in terms of these stages 
by saying that Paul exhorts strong believers in Corinth and Rome to 
avoid Stage 3 (acting in the presence of the weak) in order to prevent 
Stage 5 (the weak's violation of his own conscience). These snapshots 
of the stages in the process of moral injury help us recognize the pre-
vailing experience of 'offense' as no more than simply a difference of 
moral conviction. Often the 'weaker' Christian appears to be strongly 
disinclined to imitate his 'stronger' brother, so that the conflict between 
the strong and the weak need not and sometimes does not move beyond 
Stage 4 where the weaker conscience pronounces condemnation of the 
stronger. Within North American fundamentalism, for example, this has 
frequently involved the social and recreational use of alcohol. Oppo-
nents recognize its potential destructiveness, but appear (and declare 
themselves to be) immune to any temptation to use alcohol themselves. 
In other words, the risk of their moving from dissonance to disobedi-
ence appears minimal. The conflict never reaches Stage 5! 
This leads us to observe that a difference in moral judgment or 
verdict of conscience among believers does not thereby qualify as a 
conflict between weak and strong. 
Put another way: The moral injury which constitutes scandalum 
infirmorum occurs in a particular situation only when one believer's 
conduct (the 'strong'), although it contradicts another believer's convictions 
of conscience (the 'weak') and generates moral dissonance, induces the 
latter to violate the permissions or prohibitions of his conscience. 
This descriptive definition will become a very important tool for 
examining, at the end of this chapter, the examples presented in Chapter 
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1. We will need to pose questions like: Is there genuine moral disso-
nance in any of these illustrations? Is the weaker believer really being 
induced by the stronger believer's conduct to violate his conscience? Is 
there in these examples real potential for imitating conduct forbidden 
by one's conscience? 
2.3 The arena of scandalum infirmorum 
One essential feature characterizing disputes between the strong and 
the weak in the church is that they involve matters about which Scrip-
ture is not explicit, matters which God neither commands nor forbids. 
Throughout history this set of actions has been described with the term 
'adiaphora,' things indifferent or non-essential. 
Our interest in this section is to examine whether or not the 
concept of 'adiaphora' is useful in resolving disputes between the strong 
and the weak. Is there a better distinction? Is the distinction between 
a thing and its use suitable for our analysis, perhaps? 
2.3.1 The concept of 'adiaphora' 
Throughout history the notion of indifferent things, or adiaphora, 
has been employed in different ways. 
The Stoics, for example, understood adiaphora to include 'those 
things neither good nor evil, which bring about neither advantage nor 
disadvantage, such as life, health, pleasure, physical beauty, strength, 
wealth, a good name, good ancestry; also their opposites are neither 
good nor evil: death,sickness, pain, physical ugliness, weakness, poverty, 
a bad name, a humble ancestry and everything that fits with these.'*'" 
The only standard for good or evil is nature or reason. But this 
position is guilty of abstractionism in at least three ways. (1) Creation 
is abstracted from its Creator. Viewing the person as little more than 
ratio and as unaffected by external forces, the ethic of Stoicism falls into 
J. Douma, 'Zijn er adiaphora?,' Almanak v. h. corpus studiosorum m academia 
campensi 'Fides Quadrat Intellectum,' 102. The Erlauthaler Confession states. 'Adiaphora 
vocamus cum scnptura sacra et Patnbus actiones medias legibus et authontatibus sacns 
et obhgantibus non matidatas, quae per se nee bonae nee malae sunt' {Die Bekenntnis-
schriften der reformierten Kirche, 325). See also Article 25 of the Confessie helvetica prior 
of 1536 {Die Bekennmisschnften der reforrmerten Kirche, 108). 
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reductionism and individualism, because it fails to see the continuing, 
inherent and personal relationship between the creation and its Creator. 
(2) The present is abstracted from the past. The ethic of Stoicism is really 
an ahistorical ethic, since it knows no past perfection in Paradise, when 
sickness, death and poverty were not in principle equivalent to health, 
life and riches. (3) Finally, the person is abstracted from the rest of 
creation and culture. Because this ethic emphasizes the inner attitude 
toward the external world, it results in disengagement and disinterest in 
the world around us, whereas the Christian gospel seeks to engage that 
world unto repentance and conversion.^ ^" 
A different, but equally serious, kind of abstraction occurs among 
some heirs of the Reformation who have approved of the concept of 
'adiaphora' in terms of a supposed arena of 'common grace.' Contrary 
to the intentions of the best known expositor of 'common grace,' 
Abraham Kuyper, this arena has come to be understood as involving 
practices that are purely natural and ethically neutral. For example, in 
considering matters like art, film, literature, dancing and science, the 
moral reasoning of some moves from the idea of 'common grace' to the 
abstract notion of 'products of culture' that are 'in themselves' neither 
good nor bad, so that the only moral judgment allowed pertains to the 
use of these 'products.'^'' This abstract notion of 'products of culture' 
fails to acknowledge that moral values inhere in such practices and 
products. They are not neutral. The laxity this position yields is met, 
on the other hand, with a rigorous morality like that found in pietism, 
Puritanism and methodism, where these 'things' are seen as being, if not 
sinful in themselves, certainly temptations to sin.^" Nevertheless, one 
valid criticism of both of these positions is that by framing the problem 
in terms associated with 'adiaphora,' each operates with a legalistic, 
juridical view of moral living. The only proper context for speaking of 
'adiaphora' is jurisprudence, where the legal is bordered by the 
See J. Douma, 'Zijn er adiaphora',' 104-106; also Rousas John Rushdoony, 
Adiaphonsm and Totaluanamsm, Chalcedon Position Paper No 17, for a discussion of 
moral questions from a Lutheran viewpoint which takes as its starting point Article 10 of 
The Formula of Concord, which bears the title 'Of Church Rites, Which are Commonly 
Called Adiaphora, or Matters of Indifference,' see Theodore Graebner, The Borderland of 
Right and Wrong 
'"/lets of Synod 1966,318, 331-332,336, especially 339, for an evaluation of this view 
as applied to film and theater, see N.D. Kloosterman, The Christian Reformed Church and 
Theater Attendance: A Case Study m Calvuustic Ethics, especially 56-67 For the apphcation 
of this and related abstractions to dancing, see Acts of Synod 1982, 87-91, 556-575. 
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G. Bnllenburg-Wurth, De chnstehjke vnjheid, 76. 
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para-legal. Jurisprudence measures the moral minimum, whereas God's 
law requires (and Christian ethics describes) a full-time, total service to 
Him and our neighbor that never permits a vacation.^" 
Both Aquinas and Calvin avoid abstractionism of these kinds."" 
Unlike the Stoics, Aquinas speaks of indifferent actions rather than of 
indifferent things. Both Aquinas and Calvin insist that every action 
must be evaluated in terms of intention and accompanying circumstan-
ces, not simply in terms of itself. Although the Reformers insisted, 
against Rome, on the moral neutrality of practices like eating certain 
foods and keeping certain festivals, they nevertheless argued that the law 
of love toward God and neighbor removes any neutrality from such 
practices. 
We find one of the clearest descriptions of this ethical norm for 
indifferent things in the 1562 Erthauler Confession, which acknowledges 
that 'the norm of indifferent things is the freedom of the Spirit, so that 
the elect may do all things out of faith. Next is charity and edification, 
and avoiding scandal, as it says m 1 Cor.6, 8, 9 and 10.''" These are 
in fact three parallel modes of action: from faith {ex fide), with 
edification (cum aedificatione), and without offense (sine scandalo). 
Because the concept of 'adiaphora' has led to various kinds of moral 
abstractionism, we find it unuseful in resolving the conflict between 
strong and weak known as scandalum mfirmorum. While it is true that 
Scripture does not prescribe everything, the Bible nevertheless does 
teach that no human action or created thing is morally neutral. People 
stand, in the totality of their decisions, under the Word/law of God 
(Mt.22.37-40; 1 Cor.10.31); every decision is therefore inescapably 
moral. And created things are in themselves clean and good 
(Rom. 14.14; 1 Tim.4.4-5)—that is: they have a moral quality."* 
G. Bnllenburg-Wurth, De christelijke vnjheid, 77-79. 
"''See J. Douma, 'Zijn er adiaphora?,' 113-115, 117. 
'Norma Adiaphorum est libertas spiritus, ut omnia electi ex fide faciant Deinde 
chantas et aedificatio, et scandah devilatio, ut dicitur 1. Cor 6. 8. 9. 10,' Die Bekenntnis-
schnften der reformierten Kirche, 326. 
See also K. Schilder, Heidelbergsche Catechismus, 1 135ff, Schilder argues that from 
God's side, there are no adiaphora, and if from man's perspective they exist, that's 'only 
because people—also church people—are by no means always equipped for pure, and 
faithful, and spintual interpretation and concrete unfolding or analysts of the law of the 
Lord, that is to say for continually grasping the meaning of the Scriptures through the 
power of the Spint' (135) It is due to the limitations of the human interpreter that there 
are, unfortunately, adiaphora Schilder insists further that God 'has a particular, 
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But if the concept of 'adiaphora' is inadequate, there is another 
term we might choose, mentioned in the apostle's prayer in Phil.1.9-11: 
'And this I pray, that your love may abound still more and more with 
knowledge and all discernment, so that you may approve the excellent 
things [eli; TO ÖOKIHÓ^IV <)nd<; xd 8K)«|>épovTa], in order that you may be 
sincere and without offense till the day of Christ, filled with the fruits 
of righteousness which are through Jesus Christ to the glory and praise 
of God.' 
Before considering the phrase 8oianaCevv xd 8u)«|«povTo, we must 
pause to observe that this prayer is filled with terms associated with 
moral evaluation. The 'discernment' (ala9f|aei) for which Paul prays 
refers to insight and experience; it denotes moral understanding. The 
word for 'approve' (5oicmdCeiv) refers elsewhere to testing, examining 
(Lk.I4.19; 1 Cor. 11.28; 2 Cor. 13.5; Gal.6.4; etc.; for the entire phrase 
'approve the excellent things,' see also Rom.2.18). The aim of this 
knowledge, discernment and moral evaluation is sincerity (eiXiKpivei<;; cf. 
2 Pet.3.1), indicating the most sparkling purity seen from a rigid 
examination in the clearest light, and blamelessness (dnpóoKojioi;, used 
in Acts 24.16 to describe oweiStim?, and in 1 Cor.10.32!). 'Sincerity' is 
the internal quality of truthfulness, while 'blamelessness' is the outward 
manifestation in relation to others."' And this purity and perfection 
is evident in lives that correspond to God's will ('fruits of righteous-
ness'). All of these words, then, involve moral responsibilities flowing 
from abounding love! 
The opposite of 'adiaphora' is xd 8uw|>épovxa,''* an expression 
referring to things that 'differ,' 'excel,' 'distinguish themselves,' 'the 
things that really matter.' 'Here we have,' says Calvin, 'a definition of 
Christian wisdom—to know what is advantageous or expedient—not to 
torture the mind with empty subtleties and speculations.'"' The 
believer does not automatically know everything necessary to make 
well defined demand for you and me m every particular connection of life, thus mid no 
different' (136) 
We would suggest, however, that 'adiaphora' appear to exist not simply because of the 
limitations of human interpretation, but also because of the vanety of moral choices 
present in a situation Whether or not to marry, for example, is not specified by divine 
command, but the apparent neutrality of this choice is not due to interpretative limitations. 
See J. Douma, 'Zijn er adiaphora?,' 129-130. 
S Greijdanus, De brief van den Apostel Paulus aan de gemeente te Philippi, 100-103 
"^AGD, s.v 
159 
John Calvin, Commentaries on the Epistles to the Philippians, Colossians, and 
Thessalonians, 32. 
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moral evaluations. Moral experience and sensitivity are required for 
discernment, something that comes with Christian maturity. It is 
precisely this desire for moral maturity on the part of many who use the 
term 'adiaphora' that is retained and honored with the idea of 'approv-
ing what is excellent.' Although not all moral decisions are on the same 
level, the examination of 'the things that really matter' must proceed 
from love.'*" 
2.3.2 The distinction between a thing and its use 
We have seen that some who deal with the relationship between 
Christianity and culture appeal to the distinction between the creation 
or cultural products and their use. Their maxim is: 'The abuse of a 
thing does not disallow its proper use.' 
At issue is the moral permissibility of that which the world abuses. 
This includes matters like specific occupations, styles of personal fashion 
(clothing, hair length, etc.), forms of entertainment, business associa-
tions, and social practices. Throughout church history, guilt by associ-
ation has rendered some of these impermissible by virtue of their con-
nection with the lifestyle and abuse of unbelievers. Not just a 'thing,' 
but a thing-in-its-context must always be the object of moral evaluation. 
This distinction between a thing and its use clearly rests on 
Rom. 14-15 and 1 Cor.8-11. Both weak and strong believers in Rome 
hear Paul's confession that something which is clean of itself may well 
be unclean for some. If weak Corinthian believers need to learn that 
idol-food can be de-contextualized (from idolatry) and re-contextualized 
(in service to God), the strong must realize that idol-meals cannot. 
Additional biblical legitimacy for this distinction is provided by 1 
Tim.4.4-5: 'For every creature of God is good, and nothing is to be 
refused if it is received with thanksgiving; for it is sanctified by the word 
of God and prayer.' But how broadly may we interpret the phrase 
'every creature of God'? To be sure, everything is created (Acts 17.24; 
Eph.3.9; Col. 1.16; Rev.4.11), that is: everything in heaven, on earth and 
in the sea (Acts 4.24; 14.15; cf. Jam. 1.18; Rev.5.13; 8.9)."' But what 
does 'everything' include? 
Surely we must distinguish between creation and culture, between 
what God made and what we make. God made the sand, but people 
J. Douma, 'Zijn er adiaphora?,' 130-131. 
'Cf. Werner Foerster, 'Kxi^ O), [K.TA.],' TDNT, 3:1000-1035. 
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manufacture silicon chips. God made sexuality, but people make 
pornography. Celluloid comes from the creation, but movies come from 
people. God enables physical movement, but people organize dances. 
We must be very careful at this point to avoid speculative moral 
abstractions; for the danger exists that we will lump 'things' together 
which really ought to be differentiated. Employing the distinction 
between a thing and its use will require us, then, to mark off 'things' of 
creation from products of culture. 
Another necessary and related restriction is provided by 1 Tim.4.4-5 
itself, where the apostle assures us that 'nothing is to be refused if it is 
received with thanksgiving; for it is sanctified by the word of God and 
prayer.' This identifies the covenantal context for enjoying creation, and 
alerts us to the fact that 'things' can entail or exhibit a context of values 
both moral and religious. For this restriction implies that there may be 
'things' which cannot be received with thanksgiving! One reason for this 
impossibility may be weakness of conscience. 'The use of food must be 
judged, partly from its substance, and partly from the person of him who 
eats it,' Calvin advises, explaining the second criterion to mean that 'the 
goodness of the creatures, which he [Paul] mentions, has relation to 
men, and that not with regard to the body or to health, but to the 
consciences.'^ *^ Another reason why something cannot be received 
with thanksgiving may be the residual effects of its abuse by unbelievers. 
In other words, in terms of offense of the weak it matters greatly 
whether the 'thing' is a car or a movie, the ability to run or to dance. 
We must be careful, then, when using the valid distinction between 
a thing and its use, of the dangers of moral abstractionism, of normless-
ness and of ignoring the ecclesial context of moral activity. 
In summary, it is misdirected to try resolving the collision between 
Christian liberty and neighbor love by appealing to distinctions which 
imply a morally neutral creational realm ('adiaphora'). As we have 
seen, these appeals tend to yield either moral abstractionism or moral 
individualism. 
2.4 The theological context of scandalum infirmorum 
Back in Chapter 1 we observed that Aquinas, Calvin and Henry 
treat offense of the weak in quite different theological contexts. 
John Calvin, Commentaries on the Epistles to Timothy, Titus, and Philemon, 104. 
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For Aquinas, offense of the weak is one of several vices that 
contradict the virtue of love. Calvin handles the matter a bit differently, 
placing it in the context of the doctrine of faith, specifically justification 
by faith, of which Christian liberty is an appendage. For Calvin, then, 
offense is the abuse of Christian liberty. And for Carl Henry, Christian 
liberty enjoys the position of moral primacy, and is then qualified by 
other principles, among them God's glory, purity of conscience, and 
concern for one's co-believers (in terms of giving offense to the weak) 
and for unbelieving neighbors. Love for neighbor functions, then, as a 
negative limit to or restriction upon one's Christian liberty. 
On the basis of our study of Rom.14-15 and 1 Cor.8-10, our 
judgment is that both Calvin and Henry provide a significant advance 
over Aquinas when they discuss offense of the weak within the context 
of faith and conscience. In terms of biblical adequacy, locating this 
conflict within the context of faith and conscience clearly emphasizes 
that the conflict between strong and weak is a church conflict, involving 
believers' relationships. This benefit results from drawing attention, not 
to the nature of the offensive act and of causality within offense 
(Aquinas), but to that threefold relationship, created within the context 
of faith, between the believer, his fellow-believer, and their Lord. 
It is our view that, no matter what else it may be, offense of the 
weak is first of all an ecclesial conflict, a church matter.'*^ Obviously, 
the collision between Christian liberty and neighbor love as that comes 
to expression in the conflict between the strong and the weak is by 
definition a social conflict. But because offense of the weak involves 
matters of faith and conscience it is also an ecclesial conflict. This is its 
characteristic dynamic, its genius: offense of the weak involves not 
simply the believer's walk with God, not merely his walk in the creation 
and among the world, but his walk with his co-believer. In its broadest 
possible terms, scandalum infirmorum involves the manner and direction 
in which the church, restored to its original mandate, collaborates—i.e., 
works and walks together—in obedience among the people of the world. 
Perhaps some would suggest that, stripped of its abstract Aristote-
lian preoccupations, invigorated with ecclesiological imagery, Aquinas' 
^Tie term ecclesiastical connotes the church's organizational side, while the word 
ecclesiological descnbes either (1) that theological locus dealing comprehensively with the 
Bible's teaching about the church, or (2) that part of the theological cumculum concerned 
with the church's revelation-created form. We employ the term ecclesial to mean the 
relational dimension of life among church members. 
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placement of the problem in the context of love is closest to the biblical 
pattern. After all, the apostle does caution that 'love edifies' and love 
'does not seek its own' (1 Cor.8.1; 13.5). The strong may not demand 
his own way, but must receive and forbear with the weak. And likewise 
the weak may not insist upon having his own way, but should cut the 
strong some moral slack while adhering to his own conscience. 
There is no denying, of course, that both love and freedom are 
pivotal components in a biblical analysis of the offense of the weak. As 
the apostle John writes, 'He who loves his brother abides in the light, 
and there is no cause for stumbling in him' (1 Jn.2.10; cf. Rom.14.15; 1 
Cor.8.1). But we believe these must be combined within the locus de 
ecclesia, in order both to avoid and to resolve the conflict between the 
strong and the weak. This we hope to explain further in Chapter 3 
below. 
For if, as we shall argue presently, in this collision called scandalum 
infirmorum appealing just to freedom is not enough, neither is appealing 
only to love. 
One might compare love to a compass and God's revealed will to a 
map.**^  But because offense of the weak involves areas which God has 
not charted, we are traversing unmapped terrain, so to speak. For 
pilgrims traveling in uncharted moral territory, the compass of love may 
well provide direction, but it can gauge neither distance nor danger nor 
destination. Love is not enough. One must look up from the compass 
to the surroundings—a tree here, a rock there—in order to gauge 
distance. One must cast his eyes about for dangerous impediments that 
may cause him or his companion to fall. That is: love is useful only 
when one is aware of the surrounding terrain of travel, the inter-
personal context and intention of moral action. 
Love has a goal; it isn't satisfied with its own exercise. 'Love 
edifies,' Paul tells the Corinthians, suggesting hereby that love is 
penultimate. That is: love can tell us how, but not why (whereunto, with 
what goal). This 'why' is found in the relationship between believers 
and their common Lord; Christ is Master of both strong and weak, and 
both eat and drink 'to the Lord' (Rom.14.4,8-12,18; cf. 1 Cor.8.11-12). 
This destination is located in the motive of edifying one another 
(Rom.14.19; 1 Cor.8.1; 10.23). This 'why' is discovered in the goal of 
pleasing one another (Rom. 15.2; lCor.10.24; 10.32-11.1). Belonging to 
Christ and His church, and being related in faith to God and one 
another, provide ecclesiology with a significant ethical dimension. 
Cf. J. Douma, Christian Morals and Ethics, 60. 
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Unfortunately, by locating the entrance into the analysis of 
scandalum infirmorum within Christian liberty (Calvin and Henry) and 
soteriology or pneumatology (Calvin), the clash between liberty and love 
is threatened with moral individualism. This is so because, as Calvin 
says, Christian freedom is first of all freedom of conscience; and 
conscience is a private possession. 
But the exercise of conscience occurs within a community—in terms 
of our discussion, the faith-community or church. In 1 Cor.8-10 and 
Rom.14-15 the apostle's point of departure is the interrelation, under 
Christ, in the church, of believers who in certain situations may be 'weak' 
or 'strong,' more or less morally knowledgeable and skillful. It is 
especially this datum, this ecclesial component, that permits a proper 
definition (probleemstelling) and resolution of scandalum infirmorum, 
for it (1) exposes the communal character of faith, of the exercise of 
conscience, and therefore of offense of the weak; (2) diagnoses the 
universalizing (communalwr) impulse among both weak and strong 
which occasions their conflict; and (3) illuminates the church's itinerant, 
that is: eschatological, character. 
With ecclesiology as the doorway into our analysis of scandalum 
infirmorum, we have a clearer view of the nature of weakness. We 
willingly admit that weakness denotes incompleteness, but it describes 
an incompleteness that will reappear in the church until Christ returns. 
Far from legitimating a static situation by permitting differences of 
moral judgment to continue in the church, this admission assumes that 
travel will continue while within Christ's church believers with differing 
moral abilities collaborate x^Kupup, unto the Lord (Rom. 14.5-9). 
2.5 The examples 
Let's pause a moment to summarize our descriptions of weakness 
and of scandalum infirmorum. 
We have said that the weakness involved in scandalum infirmorum 
consists of an incapacity for a particular moral undertaking caused by 
a knowledge deficient in applying certain elements of the Christian faith 
to life. This weakness is not inherently culpable, although someone who 
is weak may be inclined wrongly to condemn the strong for the 
permissions of his conscience. And this deficiency is often only 
temporary, removed by acquiring a broader understanding of the 
Christian faith and its application to life. 
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The moral injury which constitutes scandalum infirmorum occurs in 
a particular situation only when one believer's conduct (the 'strong'), 
because it contradicts another believer's convictions of conscience (the 
Sveak') and generates moral dissonance, induces him to violate the 
permissions or prohibitions of his conscience. 
At this point one might well ask: After so much clearing away and 
clarifying of mistaken notions about things like weakness and adiaphora, 
moral injury and offense, what is left over to apply to Christian living 
today? Does scandalum infirmorum ever occur today? 
You will recall from Chapter 1 that we introduced the examples ex-
plained there with the caution that we must still determine whether any, 
some, or all of them properly involve scandalum infirmorum. Let's turn 
now to that analysis in light of our synthesis and critique. 
Example 1 involves conflicts arising from superstitious practices 
which are recognizable as such after conversion. This kind of conflict 
can occur in cultures steeped in primitive nature religions, where the 
powers of evil, sickness and death are personified. Church bells are 
rung during a funeral procession to scare away the evil spirits; travel 
plans are kept secret to prevent an enemy from 'witching' the vehicle 
and thereby causing certain death. 
In such situations, if the classifications of 'strong' and 'weak' apply, 
the 'strong' convert would be free of such fears and superstitions. He 
would be inclined not only to ignore such practices, but to view them 
as unnecessary and overcome by the Christian faith. The Holy Spirit is 
stronger than all other spirits, protecting God's child from injury and 
relieving him of fear. The 'weak' convert, by contrast, might 'know' 
biblical teaching about the Holy Spirit and evil spirits, but his know-
ledge is deficient in its life-application. That constitutes his weakness. 
It is generally true, however, that in such a situation, the weak one 
does not criticize the strong for ignoring fearful practices (unlike the 
situation in Rom. 14-15), nor is he inclined to imitate the strong (unlike 
the situation in 1 Cor.8-10). Rather, it is the strong who is more likely 
to criticize the weak for continuing to indulge his primitive supersti-
tions. This example illustrates, then, that there can be infirmi where 
there is no scandalum. 
Example 2 is an extension of this, in the sense that customs retained 
from non-Christian cultural folklore and combined with the celebration 
of events on the Christian calendar, can generate differences of moral 
judgment within the church. Should believers have a Christmas tree in 
their homes, or permit their children to enjoy Halloween festivities? 
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But here, the inclination to reject such practices does not arise from 
weakness, that is: from a knowledge deficient in applying certain ele-
ments of the Christian faith to life. In fact, it is quite doubtful that we 
should speak of weakness or of moral disability at all in this situation. 
Again, this illustration points up the truth that a difference of moral 
judgment does not thereby constitute scandalum. 
With Example 3 (Sunday-observance) and Example 5 (contact 
between believers and surrounding culture) we illustrate a process of 
change which includes revision of moral judgment. This process 
inevitably generates differences of opinion, whereby some believers 
permit themselves greater liberty than others. These examples differ, 
though, in that Example 3 moves from the commandment to the activity, 
while Example 5 proceeds from the activity to the biblical direction.'** 
Moving from ecclesial rejection to ecclesial acceptance of a cultural 
practice often involves ecclesial conflict, as individual believers begin to 
reevaluate the once-prohibited practice and arrive at a judgment 
differing from the communal consensus. This transition is characterized 
by the tendencies and tensions addressed in 1 Cor.8-10 and Rom.14-15, 
in at least three ways. 
First, the terms 'strong' and 'weak' can apply to believers who hold 
differing judgments about the moral permissibility of a given cultural 
activity. 
Second, this transition is frequently marked by the process of stum-
bling, with its stages, personal dynamics and consequent injury among 
co-believers. Especially young believers (either physically or spiritually 
young) face a higher risk of moral injury, being more likely to imitate 
the actions of others, contrary to the permissions of their own con-
sciences. It is more than mere coincidence, therefore, that disagree-
ments about matters of lifestyle usually involve the church's youth. In 
a real sense, the issue is the prevention of their moral suicide. 
And third, the biblical, pastoral resolution of the conflict illustrated 
The discerning student of church history reahzes, however, that the move from 
ecclesial rejection to ecclesial acceptance of a cultural practice was frequently occasioned 
by change surrounding the practice itself. The early church's prohibition of military service 
was replaced with approval when serving in the army no longer meant worshiping the 
emperor. Some Sunday activities formerly frowned upon became more acceptable as they 
became culturally prevalent. It is quite inaccurate, therefore, to characterize revisions of 
ecclesial moral judgment with statements attempting wry humor, like 'Our parents were not 
allowed to do such and such, but now we may.' Frequently these activities were not the 
same back then! 
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by Example 3 and Example 5 is found in the very passages we have 
investigated. Of all our examples, these two seem to correspond most 
closely to the cases treated in 1 Corinthians and Romans. 
What, then, of Example 4, where grape juice is substituted for wine 
at the Lord's Supper, in deference to the alcoholic? It seems clear to 
us that no one diagnoses an alcoholic as someone disabled for a parti-
cular moral undertaking because of his deficient moral knowledge. We 
observed earlier, when we distinguished various kinds of Sveakness,' that 
the situations in Corinth and Rome involved not the weak's fear of 
moral enslavement, but the danger of the weak's moral injury by 
violating his own conscience through imitating the permissions enjoyed 
by the strong In other words the alcoholic's condition doesn't fit 
Scripture's description of 'weakness.''** Although the alcoholic does 
indeed live with a moral disability, that handicap derives not from 
inadequate knowledge, but from inadequate self-control}^^ 
Whether or not grape juice ought to be substituted for wine at the 
Lord's Supper will have to be settled on grounds other than the pre-
sumed 'weakness' of the alcoholic. We chose this example precisely 
because people persistently—and in our opinion, incorrectly—attempt to 
resolve it in terms of scandalum infirmorum. 
2.6 Summarizing observations 
It would be a mistake to think that dismissing most of our examples, 
because they do not fall within the parameters otscandalum infirmorum, 
leaves us with nothing more to say about offense of the weak today. To 
the contrary, our evaluation of these examples yields two summarizing 
observations. 
First, among the most useful benefits of this study may be the 
realization that we must carefully avoid classifying all sorts of moral 
disagreements among believers by using the terms, categories and 
resolutions appropriate only to scandalum infirmorum Perhaps the 
greatest danger in such classification is that believers are inappropriately 
designated by the labels 'weak' and 'strong.' Our study has shown that 
^ o r a similar opinion, see John Murray, Romans, 260 261, and 'The Weak and the 
Strong, Collected Wntin^ of John Murray, 4 147 150 
For an excellent and provocative discussion of this point, see Heavy Dnnking The 
Myth of Alcoholism as a Disease, by Herbert Fingarette 
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'weakness' refers primarily to the condition of conscience whose 
deficiency of knowledge prevents guilt-free participation in a given 
practice. Appropriate usage requires that terms like Sveak' and 'strong,' 
'weakness' and 'strength,' along with phrases like 'giving offense' and 
'causing someone to stumble,' remain case-specific designations. 
Otherwise, such terms and phrases can be used to camouflage lack of 
self-control (cf. Example 5), or to eradicate every difference of moral 
conviction (cf. Example 2), or to assert the danger of scandalum merely 
because there are infirmi (cf. Example 1). 
Second, we have seen that scandalum inftrmorum arises especially in 
the church's missionary context, in that zone of transition from old 
habits and convictions to new teaching and life-applications. Contact 
between the church and the world, between faith and life, between new 
and mature believers, generates the kind of conflict we've been studying. 
Conversion to Christ, surprisingly enough, can arouse tensions not only 
in marriage (see 1 Cor.7.10-16), but in the church as well. 
Although the church should always retain her missionary character, 
she doesn't necessarily continue living in a missionary context. As 
people mature in the faith, and cultures come to be shaped by Chris-
tianity, instructions from Scripture that were given initially to new, 
young congregations often obtain broader application. In terms of our 
study, 1 Cor.8-10 and Rom.14-15 can be best applied per analogiam. 
This use of Scripture is illustrated by Voetius, when he apphes 1 
Cor.7.10-16 to cases of marital desertion on non-religious grounds. He 
argues that this passage permits, by analogy, releasing the deserted party 
from the marriage vow on the basis of any illegitimate desertion.'** 
In line with Voetius, J. Douma insists that in cases of desertion among 
^ o r a discussion of this passage, and of Voetius' argument, see J. E>ouma, Echt-
schetdmg, 74-77; Douma notes that with this hne of reasoning, 'Voetius works more 
indirectly [than Beza] Naturally, for him too the second ground for divorce [desertion] 
IS based on Scnpture But not eveiy wilful desertion needs to be a desertion on account 
of rehgion, in order to grant the abandoned party the right to enter a subsequent mamage. 
Voetius reasons by analogy if one who is (illegitimately) deserted on account of religion 
IS released from the mamage bond, then t^ analogy that applies to every deserted party, 
for whatever reason he or she may have been (illegitimately) deserted Voetius points m 
this connection to what he calls the 'absurd consequence,' should this not apply in that 
case a guilty husband could arbitrarily burden a young woman, or a guilty wife a young 
man, with the bfelong status of widow or widower, and could thus rob her or him of the 
use and fruits of mamage In this manner one could separate at will what God has joined 
together'' (76). 
Subsequent synods used this line of reasoning as well, often leaving it an open 
question precisely which conditions needed to obtain for there to be wilful desertion 
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two believing partners, the deserter behaves culpably, just like the 
unbelieving partner in 1 Cor.7, by abandoning his or her spouse. 'Isn't 
that to a similar degree an unchristian action which by analogy to 1 Cor. 
7 can lead to a complete break?' Douma asks. The deserter behaves 
like an unbeliever, and acts in opposition to true religion.'** 
If we applied this line of reasoning to our present study, we would 
then need to describe the conditions which ought to obtain, under which 
one could determine that the danger of scandalum infirmorum exists. 
Minimally, such a danger exists only where a difference of practice 
among believers has the potential for inducing someone who is con-
vinced of the inherent impermissibility of an act, to act contrary to the 
permissions or prohibitions of his conscience by imitating another's 
behavior. Without this potential, the danger of scandalum infirmorum 
does not exist, and the terms and appeals appropriate to 'offense of the 
weak' are unsuitable. 
It's one thing to identify the dangerous conditions surrounding 
potential moral injury, but quite another to specify how we must escape 
or avoid them. Where is the pathway that circumvents the danger of 
scandalum infirmorum? What does it look like? Why, and how, is it 
the only route to pursuing the other's moral well-being and preventing 
his moral injury? Our investigation would remain incomplete if we 
failed to describe, albeit briefly, this positive calling. 
Douma, Echtscheiding, 103-104. 
CHAPTER 3 
COMMUNIO SANCTORUM: 
CHRISTIAN LIBERTY serving NEIGHBOR LOVE 
3.1 Introduction: Love as limit to liberty? 
Our study oiscandalum infimtorum may have seemed finished at the 
end of Chapter 2, with our evaluation of supposed examples of offense 
of the weak. But we would like briefly in this final chapter to analyze 
this moral conflict in terms of the confession and practice of communio 
sanctorum, or the communion of the saints. 
Why should we look for some positive help in this part of the 
Apostolicum? 
Well, we have been describing scandalurn infirmorum as an ecclesias-
tical conflict, involving the manner and direction in which the church, 
restored to its original mandate, collaborates—i.e., works and walks 
together—in obedience among the people of the world. The obvious 
solution for any conflict in the church is for believers to love one 
another; the second great commandment, 'love your neighbor as 
yourself,' points both weak and strong to the norm for freedom. 
But the inadequacy of this formulation becomes evident when we 
pay attention to the language people use to describe the relationship 
between love and freedom. It is quite common for authors who discuss 
the exercise of Christian liberty to view obligations to fellow-believers 
as a restraint upon that freedom. 
One moralist maintains, for example, that Christian liberty is 
restricted by the duties of love."" Another argues that the command 
to love can suspend the right to use our freedom."^ Still others hear 
the apostle Paul teaching that the neighbor is an important limit upon 
™^W. Geesink, Gereformeerde Ethiek, 2:196,198, 204. 
" V . Trillhaas, Ethik, 80-82. 
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the freedoms of conscience.™ 
We learned already that for Carl Henry, Christian liberty is the 
primary principle of Christian living, and all other considerations serve 
to qualify that principle. Nevertheless, though he too argues that liberty 
is limited by expediency, his choice of words is quite sensitive to the 
relationship between freedom and these other qualifications. He speaks 
of the virtues of love and sacrifice 'taking their place alongside' liberty, 
of accompanying circumstances serving to 'condition the direction' of 
freedom, and of liberty 'conforming to' the higher law of love."^ 
Perhaps Henry has sensed the fundamental inadequacy of the 
negative formulation that uses words like 'limit' or 'restrict' to describe 
the relationship between Christian freedom and love for neighbor. For 
when viewed in this way, love and liberty come to exist in tension with 
each other. And in the conflict between the strong and the weak, 
obligations toward fellow-believers constitute a negative qualification of 
freedom. 
Is there, then, another approach to the question, a positive formula-
tion of the relationship between liberty and love? 
One helpful clue arises from the comparison of Christian liberty 
with its counterfeit, human autonomy. After noting how modern 
humanist freedom is essentially destructive, W.G. de Vries observes that, 
in line with the harmonizing unity of the fruit of the Spirit, Christian 
freedom consists of 'fellowship with God, but then also fellowship with 
one another, for since [believers] now live by the Spirit of freedom, they 
also travel together in tight formation. In contrast to the arrogant 
isolation of the Stoics, existentialists, and others who destroy fellowship, 
Christian liberty leads to genuine fellowship. For walking in liberty is 
Kurt Niederwimmer, Der Begnff der Freiheit an Neuen Testamau, 205, Wolfgang 
Schrage, Ethics of the New Testament, 196. Others who formulate the matter this way 
include P H.R van Houwelingen, 'Steeds sterker worden,'DeiJe/oTTncne 58/37 584, Edward 
T. Horn, 'Adiaphonsm,' Hastings Encyclopedia of Relipon and Ethics, 1 92; and Henry 
Stob, Ethical Reflections- Essays on Moral Themes, 161 
When he discusses the two values of freedom and love, Allen Verhey puts it this way: 
'If freedom is the most fundamental value, love is the most important They are related 
to each other because they are both related to God's eschatological action m the cross and 
resurrection. Chnst frees us from our bondage to the powers of the old age to an eschato-
logical existence whose distinguishing characteristic is love ..' (The Great Reversal Ethics 
and the New Testament, 108) According to Verhey, Chnstian ethics reflects on the 
situational applications of these eschatological values, which in his treatment seem never 
to intersect, but run alongside each other like the rails of a tram track 
^^eniy, Christian Personal Ethics, 428. 
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walking by the kind of love which seeks God and the neighbor.'"" 
Genuine freedom aims at fellowship! 
The same is true of neighbor love, of course. Such love is nothing 
less than 'a concern for the well-being and life of the neighbor, which 
moves us to put ourselves and our wherewithal in the service of his 
interest, of his happiness.'"' Love impels us toward union with our 
neighbor, an impulse fulfilled only among believers, only in the 
congregation of Jesus Christ, where people are moved by divine love to 
genuine neighbor love. 
Identifying fellowship with the co-believer as the goal of both 
freedom and love opens to us a world in which liberty and love dwell in 
communion rather than competition. 
Moreover, this notion of communion provides a helpful framework 
for resolving the ecclesiastical conflict between the strong and the weak. 
In fact, this context is furnished by the church's own confession, 'I 
believe a holy catholic church, the communion of saints.'^^^ The 
Heidelberg Catechism explains this confession to mean 'first, that 
believers, all and every one, as members of Christ, are partakers of Him 
and of all His treasures and gifts; second, that every one must know 
himself bound to employ his gifts readily and cheerfully for the 
advantage and salvation of other members.'^" 
Rather than conducting a doctrinal-historical survey of this dogma, 
we will summarize it by saying that Christian communio is twofold. Just 
as the Decalog structures vertical as well as horizontal relationships, 
love toward God and toward the neighbor, so communio sanctorum 
describes the quality and purpose of those Godward and manward 
^ G. de Vnes, De gereformeerde levenswandel Enkele aspecten van 'onze wandel m 
Christus,' 166-167; emphasis added. Unfortunately, de Vnes later says, 'That is the first 
Imut: love toward the brother' (168; emphasis added) For a similar description of 
freedom as fellowship, see G. Bnllenburg-Wurth, Het christelijk leven: Grondhjnen der 
ethiek, 233-234, 246. 
' j . van Andel, De gemeenschap der heiligen, 40. 
T'or the history of this confession, see Henry Barclay Swete, The Holy Catholic 
Church, the Commumon of Saints A Study in the Apostles' Creed; Paul Althaus, Communio 
Sanctorum. Die Gememde im luthenschen Kirchengedanken, vol. 1, Luther, W. Elert, 'Die 
Herkunft der Formel Sanctorum Communio,' Theologische Literaturzeitimg 78 (1949) 
577-586, F J. Badcock, 'Sanctorum Communio as an Article in the Creed,' The Journal of 
Theological Studies 21 (1920) 106-126; and E Kahler, 'Gemeinschaft der Heiligen,' RGG, 
2:1348-1349. 
Lord's Day 21, Question and Answer 55; this translation is found in the Doctrinal 
Standards of the Christian Reformed Church, found in The Psalter Hymnal (1959 edition). 
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relationships. This communio is a fellowship first with Christ Himself 
and, second, with other Christians. The first is origin and measure of 
the second,'™ while the second is the necessary fruit and demonstra-
tion of the first. 
Moreover, it should be evident that since faith issues in good works 
and is expressed in deeds of love, communio sanctorum possesses an 
inherently ethical dimension.'™ Since our interest at the moment is 
in the moral dimension of our relationship as believers, as sanctorum, 
we may distinguish two aspects of this moral communio: (1) that among 
the gifts bestowed are particular moral gifts (such as wisdom, discern-
ment, spiritual perception); and (2) that the use of any gift bestowed in 
Christ is subject to ethical review. 
A complete list of spiritual gifts whose employment constitutes 
communio sanctorum would be large.'^ But it would surely include 
a unique brother-love and correlative Christian freedom. Rather than 
regarding love as the hmit to liberty, we prefer to speak intentionally of 
freedom and love as correlative. The analogy of a family may be helpful: 
'parents' and 'children' are correlative, since one cannot exist without 
the other; and though some may be inclined to view parenting as 
'limiting' or 'restricting' children (an essentially negative formulation), 
Gijsbert Voetius, Voetius' Catechisatie over den Heuklbergschen Catechismus, 562. 
179 
Cf. Benno Gassmann's similar claim that 'The fellowship of faith necessanly 
externalizes itself in visible fellowship, which is the genuine expression of love' (Ecclesia 
Reformata Die Kirche in den Refomuerten Bekenntnisschnften, 68) 
W. Geesink treats this ethical dimension of communio sanctorum in his Gereformeerde 
Ethiek, where he explains the communion of the saints to require, negatively, not giving 
offense and a bad example and, positively, showing love through instructing, comforting 
and building up one another in word and deed (2 430-431) Later he identifies communio 
sanctorum as the pnmary duty of the ecclesia localis, in fact, ethics appraises the communal 
lite of the local church in terms of that aspect called exercitio sanctorum, whose duty is 
fulfilled in worship, edification, personal reformation, preserving unity, expanding the 
church and providing its matenal support (2 425-435). 
Concerning this ethical dimension of communio sanctorum, K. Schilder complains that 
'the communion of saints is. . .viewed simply as proceeding from themselves, the theme is 
dragged from the doctnnal to the ethical sphere. 'The saints' must construct a fellowship-
house on the empirical foundation of their own holiness, or on the presumption thereof' 
He rightly insists that one must begin with the sovereign, covenantal, gathenng work of 
God the Father through Jesus Chnst ('lets over de gemeenschap der heiligen,' De kerk, 
2:379; emphasis added) 
For a helpful biblical-theological study of communio sanctorum, consult Paul S. 
Minear, Images of the Church in the New Testament, especially Chapter 5, 'The Fellowship 
in Faith' (136-172) and Chapter 6, 'The Body of Chnst' (173-220). 
ror such a list, see Herman Bavinck, Gereformeerde Doginattek, 4.324. 
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nevertheless, God's purpose for family relationships is met when 
children submit to their parents, and parents guide and nurture their 
offspring. Similarly, love and liberty belong and function together, 
depend upon and are defined by one another.'" Regarding love as 
the limit to freedom will inevitably yield tension and competition 
between them. But if liberty is called to serve love, and love commis-
sioned to guide liberty, then God's purpose for both will be realized. 
How that should occur in the conflict between the strong and weak will 
occupy our attention for the rest of this chapter. 
3.2 Christian liberty as ecclesial gift 
The second great commandment teaches us that love is inherently 
other-directed, an obligation that has echoed from the very beginning, 
from Adam's creation onward. Even Cain's cynical question, 'Am I my 
brother's keeper?' provides a negative evidence of love's other-directed-
ness. 
But can the same be said of freedom, that it too is inherently other-
directed, essentially social? 
Today many define freedom as choice. Such freedom can be the 
property only of the sovereign individual. Even the phrase 'a free 
society' employs liberty as an individualized and individualizing concept, 
and identifies a collection of free individuals. 
In our judgment, this notion of freedom contributes significantly to 
any tension perceived between love and liberty in the church, and 
heightens the conflict between the strong and the weak. The correction 
of this defective understanding lies in recognizing that, like love, 
genuine freedom is inherently other-directed, that freedom aims at 
fellowship. 
Whenever people study the Scripture concerning the subject of 
Christian liberty, they customarily begin with those NT passages that 
have formed such an important part of our study already.'*^ But this 
overlooks the fact that Christian liberty is a recovered treasure. To 
An important but slightly different emphasis on the connection between divine love 
and human freedom is found m E.W. Schaeffer-de Wal, 'De weg naar menselijke vnjheid,' 
Wat IS christelijke vrijheid?, 70-73. 
For example, in his article on èA l^JdEpo^ , H. Schlier ignores the OT, to begin his 
discussion of freedom in Scripture with the NT teaching about freedom from sin, the law 
and death {TDNT, 2:487-502, esp. 496). 
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grasp its real character, we'll have to go back to the OT, to Paradise, to 
the creation of freedom.^" 
3.2.1 Freedom in fellowship at creation 
When God made people in Paradise, He created no sovereign 
individuals, but children-in-communion. 
God's act of creating man arose from, proceeded by, and resulted in 
communio: 'Let us make mankind [people!] in our image, according to 
our likeness,.. .male and female He created them' (Gen. 1.26-27). This 
was followed immediately by God's communion-creating dominion 
donation: after blessing them, God told Adam and Eve to 'be fruitful 
and multiply; fill the earth and subdue it; have dominion over the fish 
of the sea, over the birds of the air, and over every living thing that 
moves on the earth.' Also subject to man's dominion were every herb 
and tree (Gen. 1.28-29). The expression and consummation of human 
fellowship were to find form in fruitfulness and offspring; the goal and 
destiny of that fellowship were to be realized in dominion. 
At creation, then, human freedom was a freedom-m-fellowship, not 
a human achievement, but a divine donation. ^ *^  
But it was also a freedom-/or-fellowship. By virtue of creation, the 
existence of the other is a summons, an invitation, to fellowship. 
Rather than being restricted, freedom is conditioned by the relationships 
in which God placed humankind. Genuine freedom can exist and grow 
only in fellowship with God and neighbor. In Paradise, fellowship was 
nurtured by freedom serving the other according to love's direction. We 
may say that the love of God and neighbor is the path along which 
freedom is enjoyed.^" Love is the form of freedom's fellowship, the 
harnessing of its power. 
Another way of saying this is to observe that whereas fallen, 
'autonomous' freedom is essentially a negative concept (free 'from'), 
created liberty was positive: people were created free for, since in 
Paradise there was as yet nothing to be free from! Fallen fi'eedom is 
In what follows weVe made extensive use of material in J. Kamphuis, 'Goddelijke 
bevrijding en christelijke vrijheid,' Wat is christelijke vrijheid?, 33-67. 
184 
On freedom as divine gift, see also H.G. Geettsema, 'Vrijheid als antwoord. In de 
lijn van de Reformatie,' Vrijheid: Een onderzoek naar de betekenis van vrijheid voor de 
methodologie van de mensenwetenschappen, 261. 
Kamphuis, 'GoddeUjke bevrijding,' 36-37. See below for further expansion of this. 
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realized essentially as isolation, but creational liberty as participation. 
It is a freedom for others, for living in submission to others. Consistent 
with his identity as a relational being, man's freedom is essentially 
relational. 'Every concept of freedom which would describe man's 
essence ontologically, apart from his relation to God, must end with the 
'freedom' of autonomy and self-determination. Such an abstract 
ontology of essences can give no true perspective on freedom; it must 
always designate as the earmark of freedom, being 'free from'—however 
the concept is further elaborated. . . .This freedom leaves man to 
himself, and he chooses so to be, as over against the world of the other, 
which limits him and threatens him. . . .Freedom is thus formally 
qualified, and from this point of view any limit or responsibility will be 
seen as relativizing of absolute freedom.'^ ^ 
Such a relational, rather than ontological, description of freedom 
overcomes any tension between freedom and authority, autonomy and 
heteronomy, and between the individual and the community. According 
to this view, the self is realized in service to the other.'*^ Man's 
humanness 'reveals itself not in an obscure 'free from,' but in a 
love-filled 'free for' and fulfills also the following of the law of 
Christ.'i«» 
3.2.2 Freedom for fellowship through redemption 
As we said. Christian liberty is recovered treasure. When people in 
Paradise decided to use their freedom autonomously, they and their 
offspring became isolated together, unfree, slaves to sin, to hatred and 
to death. The entire purpose of divine redemption may be summarized 
as restoring people to that original pattern of freedom serving others in 
love. 
The clearest expression of this we find in Galatians 5.13-14. 
In his letter to the Galatians, the apostle Paul was contending 
against Judaizers who, out of fear of persecution (6.12), were compelling 
Gentile converts to adhere to Jewish ceremonies. At stake was the very 
G.C Berkouwer, Man The Image of God, 327 
187 
Geertsema, 'Vnjheid als antwoord,' 276, NiedetvnmmeT,DerBegriffder Freiheit, 84. 
188 
G.C Berkouwer, Man, 329 Another dilemma overcome is that of nomism/anti-
nomianism. Both are cut off by the recognition that living in freedom is living in love. 
Love rescues us from both despising the law and being enslaved to the law (Niederwimmer, 
Der Begnff der Freiheit, 211). 
112 • Chapter 3 
gospel of grace proclaimed by Paul and the other apostles, whose cen-
tral message was that the OT law served as Israel's custodian to tutor 
them unto Christ; but now that Christ has come, the reality behind 
those shadows has appeared, and believers are free from the ceremonies 
and rituals once required. But this freedom could be abused, so the 
apostle reminds the Galatians, 'For you, brothers, have been called to 
freedom; only do not apply freedom as an opportunity for the flesh, but 
through love serve one another. For all the law is fulfilled in one word, 
even in this: You shall love your neighbor as yourself (5.13-14). 
Here believers are called to employ their internal freedom of 
conscience in external relationships with God and neighbor, negatively, 
not as a beachhead for the old habits of sin, and positively, through love 
in service to others.**' Love is an instrument: Christians must be 
dominated and driven by love in all their conduct toward fellow-
believers.*'" 'The call to freedom, then, is a call to oneness in Christ 
and to loving service within the believing community. The liberty of the 
gospel is not to be exercised in isolated independence.'"* 
Genuine freedom (èX -^oeepia) is exercised in the servitude (SovXeia) 
of neighbor love arising from faith (Gal.5.13). Redemption moves 
believers, not from freedom into bondage, but from one bondage into 
another: from the bondage to sin and death into the service of Christ 
and others. The present question, Calvin insists, is not 'in what manner 
we are freed before God, but in what manner we may use our liberty in 
our intercourse with men.'**^  Freedom is real-ized (made real) only 
in love, and only freedom that serves love real-izes (fulfills) the law 
(5.14). This is what God intended by the law, as the goal of the law. 
Liberty serving love real-izes the law. This three-dimensional unity 
was fashioned at creation and restored through redemption: the law 
(moral structure) is real-ized in liberty (moral power) by love (moral 
direction). Significantly, this tri-unity proceeds from another, that of the 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and embraces still another, that of the 
Commenting on this passage, Calvin remarks that hberty is one thing, its use quite 
another 'Liberty hes in the conscience, and looks to God, the use of it lies in outward 
matters, and deals not with God only, but with men' (Commentanes on the Epistles of Paul 
to the Galatians and Ephesians, 158, cf Ronald Y K. Fung, The Epistle to the Galatians, 
244) If in Gal 5 1 Chnstian liberty is defended against legal bondage, here it is defended 
against libertinism (F F Bruce, The Epistle to the Galatians A Commentary on the Greek 
Text, 240). 
190 
S Greijdanus, De brief van den apostel Paulus aan de gemeenten in Galaue, 323. 
"*Bnice, Galatians, TAX. 
"^^ Calvin, Galatians, 159. 
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strong, the weak, and their God. If redemption through Jesus Christ 
aims at overcoming sin's perversions of creation, including perversions 
of freedom, then genuine human freedom is real-ized only as Christian 
liberty, which is well described as 'serving God as Father, from the 
heart, in Christ, with a good conscience, in fellowship with His people 
who are traveling toward complete deliverance.'^" 
EXCURSUS: Liberty 'conditioned' by love? 
The description of the relationship between Christian liberty and neighbor 
love is as difficult as it is important. Negative formulations suggesting that love 
'limits' or 'restricts' freedom are inadequate. We've heard Carl Henry suggest, 
almost cautiously, that love 'conditions the direction' of liberty. 
But such vocabulary is used by others as well. 
In his book, Paul, Apostle of Liberty The Ongm and Nature of Paul's 
Christianity, Richard N. Longenecker offers a treatment of the 'law-freedom 
dialectic' so prominent in the writings of the apostle. Three kinds of freedom can 
be distinguished: forensic, personal and social liberty. It is the third that interests 
us here. 
Perhaps because of its mistaken assumption that of all three, social liberty 'is 
least spoken of m the letters of Paul' (173), Longenecker's investigation proves 
less helpful to our study than its title suggests. 
Our hopes are raised specifically by his section entitled, 'The Conditioning of 
Liberty' (202-208). Earlier he identified the external and internal aspects of 
guidance in the Christian hfe as the Law of Christ (Gal.6.2; 1 Cor.9.21) and the 
Mind of Christ (1 Cor 2.16), respectively. These consutute the objective and 
subjective factors in the direction of Christian liberty (191,195-196), which factors 
Longenecker equates with 'the will of God' and 'the love of God' (203). 
Concerning the integration of law, liberty and love, he offers the following: 'He 
[i.e., Paul] does not speak of love so much as directing the Christian's ht)erty as 
of conditioning it. It is not that love is primary in giving guidance to the believer, 
for actions stemming ft-om the best of motives and intentions can at times result 
in turmoil, harm, and anything but the will of God. Rather, love stands as the 
qualifying factor to that ethic which has received its guidance from Christ... .As 
the will of God, expressed through the interaction of the Law of Christ and the 
Mind of Christ, is central in the guidance of liberty, so the love of God, both His 
love to us and our response, is central in its conditioning. It is this conditioning 
factor of love together with the pneumatic guidance of the Mind of Chnst that 
Kamphuis, 'Goddelijke bevnjding,' 47 'Onder christelijke vnjhetd verstaan we. m 
Christus met een goed geweten God als Vader van harte dienen m gemeenschap met ajn volk, 
dat op weg is naar de volkomen verlossing.' Each of these phrases is explained further in 
the rest of his essay (47-62) 
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makes operative in the particular situation the principles and example of the Law 
of Christ, and it is the union of these factors that results in the will of God being 
done in specific and differing situations' (203). He concludes by saying, 'That 
same love which motivated God to give the gift of freedom in Jesus Christ must 
likewise motivate the Christian to waive his given rights of liberty wherever 
necessary for the sake of the corporate ideal' (206). Appealing to 1 Cor.9.12-23, 
he writes: 'In spiritual matters, one way m which this love is manifested to the 
world is in a willingness to restrict one's personal liberty in matters which are of 
secondary importance for the sake of the Gospel' (206). 
Several things disappoint us. (1) Throughout his discussion of freedom and 
love, Longenecker seems to equate the love which conditions liberty with love/or 
God. He seems unaware that the neighbor love of Gal.5.14 explains liberty's 
service to love, exhorted in 5.13. As Calvin puts it, because love of God (pietas) 
IS invisible, 'God therefore chooses to make trial of our love to himself by that 
love of our brother, which he enjoins us to cultivate.''*^ (2) Speaking of the 
believer 'waiving his given rights of liberty' seems to suggest that 'conditioning' 
means 'limiting,' a suspicion confirmed when Longenecker identifies liberty's 
restriction as one of love's manifestations. (3) Liberty appears, after all, to be an 
individual possession, to be suspended on occasion for the corporate ideal. 
Having said this, we wish neither to equate Henry's view that love 'conditions' 
liberty with Longenecker's, nor to suffice with Henry's description. Far better, we 
think, IS the phrase 'liberty serving love.' 
Liberty serves love in fellowship with God's people. When we call 
Christian liberty an ecclesial gift, we understand that each of Christ's 
spiritual gifts is ecclesial in the sense that each is given to the church 
and each is to be used for the church. But liberty is uniquely ecclesial 
in that it constitutes the power, the authority or è^ooxria by which all 
other gifts are employed. 
The notion of Christian liberty as authority or power derives from 
Paul's statement in 1 Cor.6.12, which we might paraphrase this way: 'I 
have moral power'*' in regard to all things, but all things are not 
helpful. I have moral power in regard to all things, but I will not be 
overpowered'" by anything.' This freedom-as-power employed in 
Corinth by the strong believers for enjoying temple meals is described 
'^ Calvin, Galattans, 160. 
The word used here is è^ OTxrtlX, related to ë^eoxiv, it is pennitted, it is possible, 
proper. 
^-lere Paul uses È^ownaa9()po\iax Synonymous with moral power is moral 
ability, the verse describes, in fact, the anomaly of being morally disabled through the 
wrong use of one's moral ability. 
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bitingly in 1 Cor.8.9 as 'this è^owla of yours.' Similarly, in 1 Cor.9.3-18 
the apostle defends his è^otxria to eat and drink, to take along a spouse, 
and not to work, and puts forth his example of renouncing that freedom 
for the sake of the church. 
The believer's moral power is modulated by the needs of others. 
Unveiling God's purpose in Christ to create a new people, 'Scripture 
reveals something of the deep mystery of our humanness when it 
pictures the position of man not as submission in contrast to freedom, 
but shows in very real and penetrating fashion man's freedom precisely 
in his submission.'^'' Submission or enslavement to Christ and His 
law, and for His sake to fellow-believers (Eph.5.21), is the route toward 
actualizing genuine freedom. In Christ believers recover their status and 
position in creation as divine image-bearers, and are restored to true 
humanness and genuine freedom. And in the church as communio 
sanctorum, liberty reaches its creational purpose as it is placed in service 
to love according to the law. 
On the other hand, as a communion of sancti (&yiov, 'saints,' holy 
ones), the redeemed, set-apart (not isolated!) individual 'does not 
disappear behind the group or become absorbed into the mass, but in 
the community he is assigned a place and there he fulfills an important 
function.''* Communio sanctorum entails the personal responsibility 
of sanctified believers for the growth, well-being and continuation of the 
community (Eph.4.12,14,16). 
3.3 Christian liberty as ecclesial calling 
Every divine gift (Gabe) is also a calling (Aufgabe). So too 
Christian liberty. Because freedom is an ecclesial gift, how, and to what 
end, we employ it is left neither to individual discovery nor to individual 
tastes. 
3.3.1 Weakness as a summons to communio sanctorum 
In Chapter 2 it became apparent how careful we must be in 
equating modem examples of conflict in the church with those discussed 
in 1 Cor.8-10 and Rom.14-15. Our evaluation of suggested parallels 
Berkouwer, Man, 325. 
' j A Heyns, The Church, 86. 
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concluded with the observation that genuine weakness occurs most 
frequently, though not exclusively, among those who've come from a 
pagan past into the Christian faith. From this observation a corollary 
may be derived, namely, that in every age the church will have some 
members who are weak, so long as the church continues pursuing her 
missionary calling. Although the precise content of weakness may vary 
from one period of time to another, and from one culture to another, 
the presence of weak believers is a permanent feature of the church's 
composition. 
Acknowledging this is not to adopt a static view of the strong and 
the weak, for the weak can still contribute to the body's functioning. 
Though described as being weak 'in the faith' and 'in conscience,' such 
believers are not characterized as being weak in their entire faith-life 
experience. Their weakness lies in a particular area, in terms of a 
particular moral application of faith to life. There could well be areas 
in which the weak are quite strong. 
An analogy to this continuing presence in the church of weak 
members is found in modern society, where lawmakers are being 
confronted by the needs and rights of the disabled. Nowadays city 
sidewalks, buildings, vehicles, school curricula and home appliances are 
being designed with consideration for the physically impaired. The very 
presence in society of people with disabilities constitutes a continuing 
challenge and summons to open up ways of social, political and 
economic integration. 
The same could be said about those in the church whose 'weakness' 
provides the occasion for moral caution and courtesy. Apostolic teach-
ing recognizes their continuing presence in the church as an implicit 
summons to forbearance and harmony. Their integration into the life 
of the church is the aim of Paul's series of exhortations to the Roman 
congregation: 'Receive one who is weak in the faith, but not to disputes 
over doubtful things... .Therefore let us pursue the things which make 
for peace and the things by which one may edify another. . . .We then 
who are strong ought to bear with the scruples of the weak, and not to 
please ourselves. . . .Therefore receive one another, just as Christ also 
received you, to the glory of God' (Rom.14.1,19; 15.1,7). To the 
Corinthians, ecclesial integration is described, in a context dealing with 
spiritual gifts, in terms of 'body language': 'The eye cannot say to the 
hand, 'I have no need of you'; nor again the head to the feet, 'I have no 
need of you.' No, much rather, those members of the body which seem 
to be weaker are necessary. . . .But God composed the body, having 
given greater honor to that part which lacks it, that there should be no 
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schism in the body, but that the members should have the same care for 
one another' (1 Cor. 12.21-22,25). Belonging to one body involves 
reciprocal loyalty and responsibility. Body-members not only act with 
one another, but for each other as well. 
This mutuality has various dimensions in Scripture. It has, for 
example, a christological root and pattern: 'as 1 have loved you,' Christ 
tells His disciples, 'so you also love one another' (Jn. 13.34; 15.12). 
From this flows naturally an ecclesiological motive: 'so we, being many, 
are one body in Christ, and individually members of one another' 
(Rom. 12.5), which at one point serves as the basis for proper use of the 
tongue: 'Therefore, putting away lying, each one speak truth with his 
neighbor, for we are members of one another' (Eph.4.25). Because 
Christ died for the weaker brother (1 Cor.8.11; Rom.14.15), and because 
the strong stands alongside the weak before the same Lord and Master 
(Rom. 14.8-10), both must live and walk together in the church in 
mutual acceptance and love. As the apostle John says, such love is 
incompatible with leading another into sin: 'He that loves his brother 
abides in the light, and there is no occasion of stumbling in him' (1 
Jn.2.10). 
The pneumatic character surfaces clearly in Gal.6.1-2, a passage 
worth looking at more closely. The apostle had been discussing the 
glorious liberty earned by Christ (5.1), a liberty that provides opportuni-
ties for loving service to one another (5.13) in fulfilling the law of 
neighbor love (5.14). Then follows a description of walking in the Spirit 
(5.16-25), and the exhortation to avoid spiritual conceit and mutual envy 
(5.26). Instead, with spiritual meekness, believers are to bear one 
another's burdens. 'Brothers,' the apostle writes, 'if any man is 
overtaken in any trespass, you who are spiritual [oi nvet)naxvKol] restore 
such a one in a spirit [èv mzimau] of gentleness, considering yourself 
lest you also be tempted. Bear one another's burdens, and so fulfill the 
law of Christ' (6.1-2). 
Presumably the apostle refers to a fellow church member who, 
through weakness, inexperience or inattention, falls into a sin.'*' He 
is overtaken or caught in a culpable mistake, as if in a snare. Those 
around him who are more experienced and advanced in Christian excel-
lence (the 7tve\)naTiKoi),^ ** must gently show him his error, and thereby 
199 ' 
'A no(pa7ITQ)^ a is not a settled course of action but an isolated action which may 
make the person who does it feel guilty' (F.F. Bruce, Galatiaiis, 260) 
200 
John Eadie, A Commentary on the Greek Text of the Epistle of Paul to the Galaiians, 
433. 
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bring him back on the path of righteousness. The speciHc exhortation 
of v.l is generalized in v.2; this spirit of gentle restoration should 
pervade ordinary Christian relations.^* In the call to bear each 
other's burdens, poeaxdtCeTe denotes lending a hand to help by lifting 
heavy loads, without including transference of the burden, for v.5 adds 
that each will have his own pack to bear.^ Burden-bearing fulfills the 
law of Christ, since it harmonizes in every way with what Christ taught 
by word and deed. Genuine love fulfills the law (cf. Gal.5.14) also by 
lifting the moral burdens of others. Even as the apostle reminded his 
Roman readers, 'We then who are strong ought to bear with the 
scruples of the weak and not to please ourselves' (Rom.15.1). 
In a certain sense we have returned to the question: Who are the 
weak? Clarity about their identity was necessary, we saw, for analyzing 
scandalum infirmorum. But it is equally necessary for practicing 
communio sanctorum. With the former, we had to emphasize the 
difference between strong and weak, but with the latter we must stress 
the similarity between them. 
In the church of Christ the strong and the weak share a common 
standing before the same Judge, a common loyalty to one Lord, a 
common thanksgiving to the same God, and a common status as 
property of the same Master (Rom. 14.1-21).^ Strong and weak 
together are believers, slaves, disciples, friends, children of God and 
living stones. Their common identity as sancti, holy ones in Christ, 
must determine their communio. 
3^.2 Ecclesial edlGcation as the purpose of Christian liberty 
Love points liberty in the proper direction. And its destination is 
ediHcation: 'Knowledge puffs up, but love builds up' (1 Cor.8.1). And 
though all things may be lawful, they are not thereby edifying (1 
Cor. 10.23). Lawfulness (freedom) doesn't become edification automati-
cally; it requires love. 
If dcYÓuni describes the how of Christian moral conduct, olKo5otié(o 
describes the why or whereunto. According to 1 Cor.8-10, one 'builds 
another up' in the good sense by employing liberty with consideration 
"'Eadie, 435. 
Frederic Rendall, The Epistle to the Galaüans, 189. 
^^linear, Images, 141. 
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of the fellow-believer's conscience and aiming at his advantage and 
benefit, even his salvation (1 Cor.9.19; 10.33). Edification occurs when 
strong believers receive the weak (Rom. 14.1; 15.7), pursue the things of 
peace (Rom. 14.19), bear with the scruples of the weak (Rom. 15.1), and 
please their neighbor for his good unto edification (Rom. 15.2). 
This powerful effect of Christian conduct may come as a surprise to 
us. Our capacity for morally injuring another through our example and 
conduct tends to be obscured by the modern emphasis on individual 
freedom and responsibility. The capacity for morally injuring our 
neighbor points up the inherently social character of moral conduct. 
But we may go one step further: the social character of Christian 
morality is especially ecclesial, since the 'neighbor' is a co-believer whose 
advancement we are called to seek for the edification of the church. 
Without question the target of 'edification' is the individual 
fellow-believer as member of the body of Christ.^ This edification of 
the church is the goal and manifestation ot communio sanctorum: 'every 
one must know himself bound to employ his gifts readily and cheerfully 
for the advantage and salvation of other members' (Heidelberg Cate-
chism, Lord's Day 21, QA 55). Here is the 'assembly of those who are 
saved' which 'all men are in duty bound to join and unite themselves 
with.. .and as mutual members of the same body' be committed to 'serv-
ing to the edification of the brethren, according to the talents God has 
given them' (Belgic Confession, Article XXVIII). 
But the church's edification envisions a broader goal, made clear in 
Eph.4.11-16. Here we learn that behind the divine gift of office lies the 
goal of the church's edification, to be sure. But the proper functioning 
of office aims at the saints' 'work of ministry' and their attaining 'to the 
unity of the faith and the knowledge of the Son of God, to a perfect 
man, to the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ.'^ In a 
description looking very much like a 'well-trained body,' Ephesians 4.16 
subsumes all of these proximate goals under one ultimate purpose: 
^'hilipp Vielhauer, Oikodome: Das Bild vom Bau in der chnstlichen Literatur vom 
Neuen Testament bis Clemens Alexandnnus, 96,114 The goal of congregational edificaUon 
IS in contrast to the modem understanding, which sees the individual and his Christian 
expenence to be the goal, and church membership the means. 'Building up' is measured 
strictly in terms of personal individualistic cntena. Scripture turns that around: the 
individual is built up as member of the body so that the body may function better as a 
unit(y) Vielhauer traces this individualizing notion of edification to the early church 
fathers, where the 'Gemeindegedanke' was first lost from view (162-174). 
On this relationship, see Vielhauer, Oikodome, 129-143. 
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' . . .the whole body, joined and knit together by what every joint 
supplies, according to the effective working by which every part does its 
share, causes growth of the body for the edifying of itself in love.' 
Communio sanctorum (Lord's Day 21, QA 55) describes, then, how the 
ecclesia (Lord's Day 21, QA 54), the body, lives and functions in the 
world. 
By contrast, freedom outside of love destroys a fellow-believer, 
causes a brother to perish (1 Cor.8.11), wounds him (1 Cor.8.12), and 
makes him stumble (1 Cor.8.13). Enticement is the opposite of edifi-
cation. Similar expressions are used m Rom. 14-15, where Paul warns 
against destroying one for whom Christ died, the work of God 
(Rom. 14.15,20). 
EXCURSUS: The Seven Deadly Sins as the contradiction of freedom 
serving love 
Framed first in the cloisters of the Eastern church, the classification of seven 
deadly sins was essentially and originally a list of vices afflicting monastic life. 
Later, Gregory the Great (540-604) so defined these in terms of the normal con-
ditions of everyday life. During the Middle Ages the dangers of these sins were 
expounded ngorously, and came to be the subject of great and enduring literature 
(Chaucer's Canterbury Tales, Dante's Purgatory). 
In his penetrating book The Seven Deadly Sms Today, Henry Fairlie explains 
that 'sin IS the destruction of one's self as well as the destruction of one's 
relationships with others' (4). Speaking of public life in general, he contends that 
'the relationship of the individual to his society has seldom been less harmonious 
than now.' Not only do people lack personal satisfaction in performing social 
responsibilities, but the relationship has become thorough^ utilitarian: the 
individual uses society and society uses the individual. We are facing, in other 
words, a breakdown of any sense of mutuality. 
This could have been written with equal validity about the church. One com-
ponent of this breakdown in the church involves the relationship between the 
strong and the weak. The fabnc of ecclesial obligation has been npped apart by 
the forces of spiritual mdnadualism. 
The sin of pnde (superbia), for example, denies one's need for community 
and refuses the obligation of community with others (40). Envy (mvtdia) destroys 
fellowship not merely because the envious person grieves over another's good, but 
because he views another's good as the reduction of his own (64). Mutuality is 
displaced by competition. Sloth (acedia) is too weary to invest in relationships 
with others, believing that the individual can find hilfillment and redemption in 
nothing but his or her own self, denying that we are members of one another 
(117). Avarice {avantia) treats others as objects to be possessed, dominated or 
manipulated. Gluttony (gu/a) and lust (luxuna) seek pleasure without fellowship, 
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always in pursuit, always walking away empty. 
Although Fairlie's analysis is deficient at significant points, its benefit lies in 
the underscored realization that sin, freedom, and love are social realities. The 
core of each of these seven deadly sins, and all of them together, is their negative 
answer to Cain's question, 'Am I my brother's keeper?' In the public arena, these 
sins yield a social dysfunction of one sort or another. Similarly, among believers 
they produce ecclesial dysfunction. 
All of this may be applied to the process of stumbling described in 
Chapter 2, where we distinguished five stages in the collision between 
the strong and the weak: 
Stage 1: common confession, but differing permissions 
Stage 2: acting without the weak's knowledge 
Stage 3: acting in the presence of the weak believer 
Stage 4: moral dissonance in the weak 
Stage 5: imitation and injury 
In terms of these stages, we might say that Paul exhorts strong believers 
in Corinth and Rome to avoid Stage 3 (acting in the presence of the 
weak) in order to prevent Stage 5 (the weak's violation of his own con-
science). The kind of edification resulting from freedom serving love 
requires that the strong avoid exercising their moral permissions in front 
of the weak, to prevent harmful imitation. Here is where the title of 
Voetius' treatment of offense fits: 'Concerning the Good Example.' 
You may recall that in Chapter 2 we also suggested that the conflict 
between the strong and the weak need not, and sometimes does not, 
move beyond Stage 4. This is due to the fact that the weak's conviction 
may override his dissonance, in a situation where, for example, the 
believer who, while condemning another's actions, would not be induced 
to imitate it. Must the strong in that case alter his conduct? In other 
words, must the strong avoid Stage 3 when there is little likelihood that 
a weak believer will move from Stage 4 to Stage 5? Does not the con-
science of the weak then dominate the behavior of the strong? 
Here the distinction between Stage 2, where the strong acts without 
the knowledge of the weak, and Stage 3, where he acts in the presence 
of the weak, is useful. It seems to us that in many conflicts where some 
invoke the privilege accorded to the weak merely because the conduct 
of others generates moral dissonance, the "weak' tend to universalize 
and apply their moral restriction in such a way that already at Stage 2 
the 'strong' are thought to be culpable. This is the domination by the 
weak so often feared, but it is a tendency that has no biblical legitimacy. 
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Nevertheless, the requirements of ecclesial ediHcation, on the other 
hand, seem to oblige the strong to avoid those otherwise permissible 
actions in the presence of the weak which may generate moral disso-
nance, even if there is little likelihood of imitation. Christian liberty 
aims at the edification of the individual as member of the congregation, 
and thus cultivates fellowship in the midst of differing moral convic-
tions. Christian liberty is nox provocative freedom; it cultivates the other 
with patience, forbearance, and humility. Genuine freedom suffers long 
and is kind; Christian liberty does not envy, does not parade itself, is 
not puffed up, does not behave rudely, does not seek its own (1 
Cor. 10.24; cf. 13.4-5). 
'The kingdom of God is not food and drink, but righteousness and 
peace and joy in the Holy Spirit,' writes the apostle Paul to believers 
(Rom. 14.17; cf. 14.19). If we may view that coming kingdom, with its 
divine rule and all its redemptive fruits, as the goal and destination 
toward which believers travel together, then we have here, finally, the 
criteria for evaluating our use of Christian liberty, arranged in a 
particular order of importance. We must ask first: Does our liberty 
serve both God's and our righteousness in the world? Second, does it 
preserve peace among believers? And third, will it occasion joy in the 
Holy Spirit?^ These are not three separate tests, but integrated 
components of an ecclesial ethic. In the church, through Christ, 
righteousness yields peace (Rom.5.1), and both righteousness and peace 
produce joy (R.om.5.2-3). 
^Vhen J.A. Bengel comments on this verse that God's kingdom 'does not consist 
in the bold and careless use of hberty, tor instance, in meat and drink,' he is correct in 
seeing our use of liberty as the issue; we see no warrant, then, for his description of the 
apostle's subsequent series, namely, righteousness in respect of God, peace with regard to 
neighbor, and joy as respects ourselves (Bengel's New Testament Commentary, 2:150). S. 
Greijdanus reminds us that righteousness, peace and joy are to be understood first of all 
as benefits of salvation (heilsweidaden), which then include, produce, and come to 
expression as, these Christian virtues or behaviors (Aan de gemeente te Rome, 609). 
EPILOGUE: 
THE ECCLESIAL DIMENSION OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 
As the natural outcome of this study concerning the strong and the 
weak, about the relationship between Christian liberty and neighbor 
love, we would like to make an application to Christian ethics in 
general. 
If freedom gives form to love, then that form is an ecclesia! form, 
since Christian liberty is essentially social in character, and its aim is 
ecclesial edification. The context of liberty is the ecclesial pilgrimage 
heading toward ecclesial perfection. 
All of this suggests an important connection between Christian 
ethics and the church. What is that connection, and how should it 
function? 
The connection between the èKK t^yria and Christian ethics can be 
made in several ways. 
One way is to describe the church as moral agent. This description 
proceeds in two directions at least. 
Paul Lehmann, for example, provides an ecclesial definition of 
ethics: 'Christian ethics, as a theological discipline, is the reflection upon 
the question, and its answer: What am I, as a believer in Jesus Christ and 
as a member of his church, to do? To undertake the reflection upon and 
analysis of this question and its answer—this is Christian ethics.'^ 
The connection between ethics and ixKKvfna. comes into view with the 
identity of the moral agent as church member. Lehmann's view of the 
church, however, appears to be an activistic view, for the koinonia 
(Christ's fellowship-creating presence in the world) exists 'in the 
Paul Lehmann, Ethics in a Christian Context, 25; emphasis his. Several have 
attempted to explain Lehmann's position: M.M. Thomas, 'The New Humanity,' Interna-
tiona Review of Missions, vol. 54,110-112; James M. Gustafson, review in Union Seminary 
Quarterly Review, vol. 19, no. 1, 263-264; Gordon D. Kaufman, review in Harvard Divirtity 
Bulletin, vol. 28, no. 3, 97-99; and Hendrik van Oyen, review in Theoloffsche Literatur-
zeitung, vol. 93, no. 9, 700-703. 
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commumty of faith where prophetic-apostohc witness to revelation and 
response of the fellowship in the Spirit coincide.'^ "* Moreover, he 
seems to fall into the (false) dilemma of a static or a dynamic ethic, of 
principle or person, when he insists that 'a koinonia ethic is concerned 
with relations and functions, not with principles and precepts.'^"^ The 
burden of our study has been to show that communio sanctorum 
consists, in fact, of relationships withm the church that are subject to 
norms and precepts. 
By contrast, the church member as moral agent can also be 
described in what is often called 'social ethics,' dealing with institutional 
relationships ordained by God at creation. These include marriage and 
family, labor, the state, art, and the church. W Geesink argues, for 
example, that Christian ethics must be 'ecclesially determined,' that is: 
It must bear a clearly ecclesial character as it presents 'an ordered 
arrangement of the rules according to which a member of the Christian 
church ought to form his life'"" 
In addition to viewing the church as moral agent, a second way to 
relate ëicidTiaia and Christian ethics is by viewing the church as a 
morally nurturing community. 
At several points in his book. The Great Reversal. Ethics and the 
New Testament, Allen Verhey repeats the claim that 'by tradition and 
vocation Christian churches are communities of moral discourse and 
discernment.'^" Verhey reminds us that the church's moral discern-
ment was from the very beginning governed by the memory of the Lord 
Jesus Christ and the expectation of His return. Presuming that this 
formed the theological basis for the early church's moral discernment, 
the manner of discourse becomes clear when we recall that the apostle 
Paul 'appeals' to his readers' moral judgment, rather than 'commands' 
their obedience. Moreover, Verhey maintains that in Scripture, every 
member of the congregation, whether slave or free, male or female, Jew 
or Gentile, had an equal share in discernment.^ ^^ Now then, this all 
becomes paradigmatic for the Christian community today, what seems, 
in our judgment, to be of primary importance to Verhey is not 
necessarily the what of the Bible's moral content, but the /low—that is: 
^^hmann, 50 51, emphasis his 
Lehmann, 124, emphasis his 
Geesink, Gereformeerde ethiek, 1 176, the word we've translated with 'ecclesial is 
kerkelijk 
^"Verhey, The Great Reversal, 1, 197 
^^erhey, 77M: Great Reversal, 115 
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lts manner or mode or process The eKKkrfsia and Christian ethics 
intersect precisely at this point. The church ought to be the kind of 
community that nurtures moral discernment, following the example—and 
thereby standing in the line of—the apostolic church, the precipitate of 
whose moral discernment we find in Scripture. 
These two emphases that we are describing in this Epilogue are not 
only compatible, but also comprehensive. For the èKx i^ioia is not one 
segment or topic treated in Christian ethics, but pervades the whole of 
Christian ethics. Considering Christian moral agents as church members 
is eminently biblical and thoroughly apostolic 'Paul knows nothing of 
the ethical autonomy of the individual, because the modern process of 
individualization set in for the first time many centuries later. Indeed, 
the Christian must and can act, love, suffer wrong, etc., as an individu-
al—Paul IS no collectivist—but he does these all as member of the 
community. Modern contrasts like 'Christian v. church' or 'individual 
V society' are entirely foreign to Paul Every one of his declarations 
about the community shows this. Because the Spirit of God dwells m 
and permeates the community, there is no such thing as the heteronomy 
(external authority) of the group over the individual, thus, he is also not 
the slave of a hierarchy, and if Paul can demand very resolute submis-
sion from his communities, he does that as apostle of Christ and for the 
sake of obedience toward Christ (2 Cor.). The community-ethic 
therefore does not know the modern distinction between an individual 
ethics and a social ethics '^" 
Without question, this characterization of Paul's writings must be 
extended to the rest of Scripture. A similar extension ought to be made 
of Wendland's observation that'. . .both the fact of the church as well 
as the pauline concept of the church became the foundation of and 
prerequisite for Paul's ethic. Every directive serves the edifying of the 
community.'^^^ 
This last sentence identifies the inadequacy of the relation between 
the bxkvpixx and Christian ethics outlined thus far True enough, the 
church may be viewed as moral agent, even as moral teacher, but beyond 
these, she must also be seen as moral goal and motive. That is to say: 
for conduct to be Christian, it must aim at and intend, among other 
things, the church's well-being. The edification of the church is to 
function as one of the intended consequences, or motives, of Christian 
"hi -D Wendland, Ethik des Neuen Testaments, 65 
Zendland, 67, emphasis added 
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conduct. The characteristic goal of Christian freedom—ecclesial edifica-
tion—may be extended to all moral conduct. This is the thrust of 
apostolic exhortations in the passages examined in our study: don't 
judge one another anymore; don't put a stumbling block or a cause to 
fall in our brother's way; pursue the things which make for peace and 
the things by which one may edify another; neither eat meat nor drink 
wine nor do anything by which your brother stumbles or is offended or 
is made weak; each please his neighbor for his good, leading to 
edification (Rom.14.13,19,21; 15.2). If food makes a brother stumble, 
never again eat meat, lest the brother stumble; all things, though lawful, 
do not edify; each one seek the other's well-being (1 Cor.8.13; 10.23b-
24). And one more: 'Give no offense, either to the Jews or to the 
Greeks or to the church of God, just as I please all men in all things, not 
seeking my own profit, but the profit of many, that they may be saved' 
(1 Cor. 10.32-33). 
Nowadays it is customary in the realm of politics that those who 
draft legislation also draw up, in defense of a proposed bill or law, an 
'environmental impact statement' detailing the effects of the new law on 
the natural environment. The need and desire to protect natural habitat 
for wildlife, to maintain the subtle and delicate balances of nature's 
beauty and biology, require lawmakers, industries and city planners to 
assess as carefully as possible consequences of present decisions. 
Similar care and intentionality ought to be devoted, in product develop-
ment, city planning and social engineering, to the needs of society's 
disabled persons. A 'disability impact statement' demonstrates concern 
for the well-being of the whole through strengthening the weak. 
Similarly, Christian moral thinkers must commit themselves, as they 
analyze moral problems and recommend solutions, to factoring into 
their efforts an 'ecclesial impact statement.' The church is, for believers, 
the moral stimulus and context of many decisions. Considering the 
impact on fellow members of Christ's body, of our moral choices, is con-
stitutive for Christian morality. Which of the Ten Commandments does 
not involve the church of Jesus Christ? Many contemporaty moral 
problems touch upon the church's identity and well-being. Situations 
involving marriage and family (whether to marry or not, family planning 
and child rearing, divorce, and such) may rightly be termed 'church 
questions' in the sense that the church's well-being is directly affected. 
Indeed, it is difQcult to imagine a moral problem with no connection to 
or effect upon 'the people of God.' 
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The primary aim of our study has been to show that Christian moral 
responsibility includes intending, as one consequence of our actions, 
that others are not morally injured (negative), but protected from moral 
harm and assisted in their moral progress (positive). Here, consequence 
and motive merge to form a partnership; considering, as best one can, 
the negative and positive effects of one's action upon another person 
ought to shape one's motive for committing or omitting that action. 
Our trek began with a look at the relation between 'strong' and 
Sveak' in the church. This relation, fractured in scandalum infirmorum, 
is repaired and restored in Christ, and respected in communio 
sanctorum. Moral harm and injury gives way to moral compassion and 
edification. When the divine gifts of Christian liberty and neighbor love 
are employed and understood not as competitors, but as collaborators, 
the church can live as a band of ordinary pilgrims on its way to the 
coming kingdom of God. On this trek, all Christ's followers—no matter 
what their moral ability—must travel together, rest together, and arrive 
together. 
SUMMARY 
We began in Chapter 1 by identifying as the primary aim of our 
study to show that Christian moral responsibility includes intending, as 
one consequence of our actions, that others are not morally injured 
(negative), but protected from moral harm and assisted in their moral 
progress (positive). Considering, as best we can, the negative and 
positive effects of our action upon another person ought shape our 
motive for committing or omitting that action. 
With this as our delimited field of inquiry, we proceeded to consider 
two specific cases of moral injury addressed by the apostle Paul (1 
Cor.8-10 and Rom. 14-15), cases involving the relation between the 
'strong' and the Veak.' The moral injury of the 'weak' consisted of 
inducing him to act, in imitation of the 'strong,' against his conscience. 
The moral permissions exercised by the 'strong' contradicted the duties 
of love for the "weak.' 
In the Corinthian congregation the occasion for this moral stum-
bling was the use of idol-food at idol-meals, in the market, and at 
another's home. While the apostle clearly agrees with the position of 
the 'strong' that idols are nothing and idol-food is permissible in itself, 
he nevertheless turns his attention to a problem deeper than the ques-
tion of food. The question whether it was right or wrong to enjoy 
idol-food was to be settled, finally, with reference to the brother and not 
to divine permissions. Paul is concerned about the effects of actions on 
fellow-believers (and possibly unbelievers) and on the church as a 
whole. All claims to knowledge and freedom must be placed in service 
to love. The "weak' believer is in danger of sinning by acting against his 
settled moral convictions, and the 'strong' by misusing Christian liberty 
in disregard for the effects of his action on others. 
The 'strong' and the 'weak' in the missionary congregation in Rome, 
by contrast, are defined in terms of their attitude toward the use of and 
abstinence from certain foods (meat). This attitude arises from the 
content and confidence of faith: the weak one is weak 'in the faith,' 
unable to exercise the freedom born of the faith which knows that 
nothing is unclean of itself. Clearly, weakness has a religious origin and 
character, since the one who abstains from meat does so 'to the Lord' 
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(14.6) and is to be fully persuaded in his own mind (14.5). 
Both weak and strong are called to act on the basis of firm con-
viction (14.5,22-23). Each is answerable to his Master and Lord 
(14.4,12). Yet, both positions must be tolerated in the church. This 
diversity must be practiced without mutual recrimination or scorn, each 
welcoming the other for the building up of the church. For the strong 
to impose their convictions upon the weak would lead the latter astray, 
to their eternal, spiritual and moral destruction. And to impose the 
view of the weak on the strong would be to prescribe a law for him 
which the Master, Jesus Christ, has not. 
But where the practice of the strong might provide a negative 
example to the weak, love requires from the strong a voluntary 'accom-
modation' and renunciation of 'rights' for the sake of the weak. 
Turning from Scripture to the history of Christian ethics, we 
selected four representative spokesmen who have dealt at some length 
with the terms, classifications and biblical insights involved in what is 
called scandalum infirmorum (offense of the weak). From their own 
writings the views of Thomas Aquinas, John Calvin, Gisbert Voetius and 
Carl Henry were explained in detail. 
On the basis of the material presented thus far, we framed four 
questions to guide our evaluation of these positions: (1) What is the 
nature of weakness? (2) What is the process of scandalum infirmorum? 
(3) What is the arena ot scandalum infirmorum? (4) What is the theo-
logical context ot scandalum infirmorum? 
In an attempt to lend concreteness and liveliness to our study, we 
offered five examples of alleged scandalum infirmorum, organized 
according to the conflict's point of origin, whether from a believer's pre-
Christian past, from potential transgression of God's law, or from the 
contact between believers and their culture. 
In Chapter 2 we continued to analyze and evaluate the nature and 
dynamics of scandalum infirmorum, using the four questions and five 
examples just mentioned. 
In the light of 1 Cor.8-10 and Rom. 14-15, we summarized the weak-
ness involved in scandalum infirmorum as an incapacity for a particular 
moral undertaking caused by a knowledge deficient in applying certain 
elements of the Christian faith to life. Unlike other kinds of Sveakness' 
commonly spoken of, wherein conscience should function as either a 
moral roadblock or a moral stop sign, this condition of weakness 
requires that conscience signal the need for a moral detour. This kind 
of weakness is not inherently culpable, since Scripture nowhere urges 
the "weak' to repent because of his weakness, and this 'weakness' is 
Summary • 131 
nowhere described or chastised as irresoluteness or vacillation. In fact, 
the tendency of the weak in Rome to judge the strong suggests anything 
but moral indecision. One can be both weak in the faith (Rom.14.1) 
and yet 'fully convinced in his own mind' (Rom. 14.5). This weakness 
has a religious origin and character, since the Roman believer who 
abstained from meat did so 'to the Lord' (Rom. 14.6). 
But even if weakness is not culpable, should it be overcome through 
education and moral growth? Aquinas, Calvin and Henry each spoke 
of weakness as ignorance, as an undesirable (if not culpable) condition 
requiring education and enlightenment. Aquinas insisted that rejecting 
this enlightenment of conscience can turn scandalum pusillorum (offense 
of the little ones) into scandalum Pharisaeorum (proceeding from 
malice). Henry argued that if one wishes to continue a practice contrary 
to another's conscience, one must simultaneously seek to enlighten the 
other about the correctness of moral permissions being exercised. In 
our judgment, the thread of the apostolic argument suggests the con-
tinued coexistence in the church of those who, in terms of a given situ-
ation, are weaker and those who are stronger. Far from calling the 
weak in Corinth or Rome to reconsider their position, the apostle 
acknowledges that not everyone possesses such knowledge (Corinth) and 
insists that each must be fully convinced (Rome). Particular care must 
be taken to avoid a static view of 'the' weak and 'the' strong in the 
church. 'Weak' and 'strong' are metaphorical terms whose meaning 
should be determined per casum. These terms do not cover the entire 
faith-life of any group within the church, but are situational, and 
therefore partial, metaphors. 
In the next section we identified five stages in the process of 
offending the weak. The first is that both strong and weak share a 
common confession, but enjoy differing moral permissions, resulting in 
part from a different growth in the Christian faith. Stage 2 involves the 
strong acting without the weak's knowledge, while Stage 3 occurs exactly 
when the strong acts contrary to the weak's scruples in his presence. 
The moral dissonance issuing from the judgment of the weak's con-
science is Stage 4. But the actual moral injury occurs in Stage 5, where 
the weak imitates the strong, though he lacks the faith (Rom. 14.23) or 
acts out of a weak conscience (1 Cor.8.7,10-13). Our conclusion was 
that the point of the apostle's teaching was to exhort strong believers in 
Rome and Corinth to avoid Stage 3 (acting in the presence of the weak) 
in order to prevent Stage 5 (the weak's violation of his own con-
science). The moral injury which constitutes scandalum infimiorum 
occurs in a particular situation only when one believer's conduct (the 
'strong'), although it contradicts another believer's convictions of 
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conscience (the Veak') and generates moral dissonance, induces the 
latter to violate the permissions or prohibitions of his conscience. 
Throughout the history of this question, people have identified the 
arena of offending the weak as 'adiaphora,' or indifferent things. As an 
idea coming to us from the Stoics, we observed that it is a very abstract 
notion. The creation is abstracted from its Creator, the present from 
the past, and the individual person from the rest of creation. And 
'cultural products' are viewed as morally neutral because they result 
from 'common grace.' Aquinas and Calvin avoided these kinds of 
abstractionism by directing attention to indifferent actions rather than 
indifferent things, and by insisting that everything could be evaluated in 
terms of a proper moral use. In spite of this, we preferred to abandon 
the term 'adiaphora,' since Scripture indicates that people stand before 
the face of God in all of their decisions and actions. Every human 
decision, and every created thing, has a moral quality. It is the search 
for this moral quality that forms the content of the apostle's prayer in 
Phil.1.9-11, where he speaks of approving 'the excellent things,' or the 
things that excel or really matter. Moreover, the distinction between a 
thing and its use, though valid, is dangerous if employed to obscure the 
fact that 'things' can entail or exhibit a context of values both moral and 
religious. The key to using anything is whether or not it can be 
'received with thanksgiving; for it is sanctified by the word of God and 
prayer' (1 Tim.4.4-5). 
We had noticed in Chapter 1 that Aquinas treated scandalum infir-
morum as a vice contradicting the virtue of love. For Calvin, it is the 
abuse of Christian liberty, which is an appendage of justification by 
faith. Carl Henry saw avoiding offense of the weak as a necessary quali-
fication of the primary moral principle of Christian freedom. In our 
judgment, the best theological context or point of entrance into the 
analysis and resolution of scandalum infimiorum in the locus de ecclesia. 
This helps to avoid the moral individualism which threatens if we place 
it in the context of Christian freedom and the exercise of Christian con-
science. This also helps to expose the impulse driving both strong and 
weak, namely, to universalize either the permissions or restrictions of 
conscience among others of like faith. Finally, by discussing offense of 
the weak as a church problem, we see more clearly the church's itiner-
ant, pilgrim character—emphasizing the need for strong and weak to 
walk together toward the coming kingdom. 
Concerning the five examples presented at the end of Chapter 1, we 
learned that although Examples 3 and 5 were the closest to scandalum 
infimiorum, the others helped show us what offense was not. There 
need be no offense where there are 'weak' and 'strong' who practice (or 
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omit practicing) in each other's presence certain customs deriving from 
a pre-Christian past. Not every difference of moral judgment proceeds 
from weakness, nor does variety in moral behavior in such situations 
constitute offense. Moral disability can result from lack of self-control, 
which may require others to modify their behavior, but for reasons other 
than avoiding offense to the weak. Matters like Sunday-observance and 
contact between believers and their surrounding culture can be occa-
sions for genuine scandalum infirmorum. This is so because ecclesial 
judgments about cultural practices change from one generation to 
another. During such periods of transition, the terms, process and 
resolution of the conflict can be relevant. 
Perhaps the most useful application of our study is its conclusion 
that we must understand, and use, terms like 'weak' and 'strong,' phrases 
Uke 'giving offense' and 'causing others to stumble' as case-specific 
designations. Following the example of moralists and historic church 
synods, who have applied the apostle's permission to remarry after 
desertion (1 Cor.7.10-16) to instances of desertion by a believing spouse, 
we recommend that the insights of 1 Cor.8-10 and Rom.14-15 be used 
per analogiam, whereby we conclude that minimally, the danger of 
offending the weak exists only where a difference of practice among 
believers has the potential for inducing someone who is convinced of 
the inherent impermissibility of an act, to act contrary to the permis-
sions or prohibitions of his conscience by imitating another's behavior. 
Without this potential, the danger of scandalum infirmorum does not 
exist, and the terms and appeals appropriate to 'offense of the weak' are 
unsuitable. 
In Chapter 3 we offered a brief description of the opposite of 
scandalum infirmorum, or the positive calling embodied in the confes-
sion and practice of communio sanctorum as the context for Christian 
liberty serving neighbor love. In our judgment, the frequent description 
of love as the limit or restriction upon Christian freedom is quite 
mistaken. Such a construction puts the two at odds with one another; 
love and liberty remain competitors, rather than becoming collaborators. 
They are in fact gifts of divine grace, coming to believers through Christ. 
This unique brother-love and spiritual freedom are correlative. The one 
cannot exist meaningfully without the other. 
This is seen most clearly perhaps in the fellowship-impulse of 
freedom. This impulse originated at creation, where the Triune God 
created people in His image, in fellowship and for fellowship. The 
freedom was to have been made real (or real-ized) along the path of 
love for God and neighbor. Human freedom is essentially relational. 
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Gal.5.13 teaches us that genuine freedom is exercised in the servitude 
of love for neighbor, which in turn fulfills the law (Gal.5.14). In the 
church as communio sanctorum, liberty reaches this creational purpose. 
The 'communion of the saints' entails a personal responsibility of 
sanctified believers for the growth, well-being and continuation of the 
community (Eph.4.12,14,16). 
The divine gift of liberty is accompanied with a calling to employ it 
properly. In every age the church will have some members who are 
weak, as long as the church continues pursuing her missionary calling. 
This permanent feature of the church's composition provides the occa-
sion for moral caution and courtesy. The mutual forbearance and eccle-
sial harmony urged by Scripture has a christological root and pattern, 
an ecclesiological motive, and a pneumatic or Spirit-determined 
character. The existence of the weak is, then, a summons to employ 
Christian liberty for the edification of the church. This edification of 
Christ's body unto completion, perfection, and maturity is the goal and 
manifestation of communio sanctorum. 
In terms of resolving the conflict between 'strong' and "weak' in the 
church, ecclesial edification obliges the strong to avoid those actions in 
the presence of the weak which may generate moral dissonance, even if 
there is little likelihood of imitation. Christian liberty must be 
employed, according to Rom.14.17, in service to righteousness, peace 
and Spirit-induced joy—which are nothing but the redemptive benefits 
of Christ's work, and the reigning blessings of His coming kingdom. 
In the Epilogue we sought to describe the important connection 
between Christian ethics and the church. That connection is seen by 
some in terms of the church as moral agent (P. Lehmann and W. 
Geesink), by others in terms of the church as the morally nurturing 
community and teacher (A Verhey). Beyond these, however, the 
church should also be viewed as the goal and motive of Christian ethics. 
That is to say: for conduct to be Christian, it must aim at and intend, 
among other things, the church's well-being. The characteristic goal of 
Christian liberty—ecclesial edification—must be the aim of all moral 
conduct. 
As in the realm of politics and civil legislation, lawmakers fashion 
policy in the light of 'environmental impact statements' and 'disability 
impact reports,' so too Christian moral thinkers must pay attention to 
the ecclesial impact of moral choices. Such consideration is constitutive 
for Christian morality. 
SAMENVATTING 
In Hoofdstuk 1 beginnen wij met het primaire doel van onze studie 
te formuleren. Wij willen aantonen wat in christelijke morele 
verantwoordelijkheid als één van de gevolgen van ons handelen ligt 
opgesloten, n.l. (negatief geformuleerd) dat anderen moreel niet 
geschaad mogen worden, maar (positief geformuleerd) tegen morele 
schade beschermd moeten worden en in hun morele ontwikkelingen 
bijgestaan. Het zo goed mogelijk afwegen van de negatieve en positieve 
gevolgen van ons handelen tegenover een andere persoon, moet onze 
motivering vormen om een handeling te doen of na te laten. 
Binnen dit door ons omschreven gebied van onderzoek vervolgen wij 
met het overwegen van twee specifieke gevallen waarin morele schade 
toegebracht wordt. Ze worden behandeld door de apostel Paulus (1 
Kor. 8-10 en Rom. 14-15) en hebben te maken met de relatie tussen de 
'sterke' en de 'zwakke'. Het moreel schade toebrengen aan de 'zwakke' 
wordt veroorzaakt door hem ertoe te bewegen tegen zijn geweten in te 
handelen door het gedrag van de 'sterke' na te volgen. Wat moreel 
toegestaan is en door de 'sterke' in praktijk gebracht wordt, is in strijd 
met de verplichtingen van de liefde die hij tegenover de 'zwakke' heeft. 
In de gemeente van Korinte was de aanleiding voor dit morele 
struikelblok het gebruik van offervlees tijdens offermaaltijden, op de 
markt en bij iemand thuis. Terwijl de apostel het duidelijk eens is met 
de houding van de 'sterke', dat de afgoden niets zijn en offervlees als 
zodanig toegestaan is, richt hij niettemin zijn aandacht op een probleem 
dat verder reikt dan het vraagstuk van het offervlees. Het vraagstuk of 
het goed of verkeerd is offervlees te eten, moet tenslotte niet beslecht 
worden met een beroep op wat van Godswege toegestaan is, maar met 
aandacht voor de broeder. Paulus is bezorgd voor de gevolgen van 
handelingen ten opzichte van medegelovigen (en mogelijk ongelovigen) 
en van de kerk als geheel. Elk beroep op kennis en vrijheid moet in 
dienst van de liefde gesteld worden. De 'zwakken' lopen het gevaar te 
zondigen door tegen hun gevestigde morele overtuiging in te handelen, 
en de 'sterken' door misbruik van de christelijke vrijheid te maken in 
het negeren van de gevolgen die hun handelen op anderen hebben. 
In onderscheid tot de gemeente van Korinte gaat het bij de 'sterke' 
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en de 'zwakke' in de zendingsgemeente van Rome om hun houding ten 
opzichte van het gebruik of onthouding van bepaalde voedingsmiddelen 
(vlees). Deze houding hangt samen met de inhoud en vrijmoedigheid 
van hun geloof: de zwakke is zwak 'in het geloof, omdat hij niet in staat 
is de vrijheid te benutten, die geboren wordt uit het geloof dat weet 
heeft van het feit dat niets in zichzelf onrein is. Wel is duidelijk dat 
deze zwakheid van oorsprong en karakter religieus is, omdat de zwakke 
die zich onthoudt van vlees, dat doet 'om de Here' (Rom. 14, 6) en ten 
volle overtuigd dient te zijn in zijn eigen geweten (14, 5). 
Zowel de zwakke als de sterke worden geroepen te handelen op 
grond van een vaste overtuiging (Rom. 14, 5.22-23). Ieder is 
verantwoordelijk tegenover zijn Meester en Here (Rom. 14, 4-12). 
Beide houdingen moeten in de kerk getolereerd worden. Deze 
verscheidenheid moet zonder wederzijdse beschuldiging of minachting 
kunnen bestaan, waarbij de een de ander graag accepteert voor de 
opbouw van de kerk. Als de sterken hun overtuiging zouden opleggen 
aan de zwakken, zou dat de laatsten op het verkeerde pad brengen en 
hun eeuwige, geestelijke en morele ondergang tot gevolg hebben. En 
als het standpunt van de zwakke aan de sterke opgelegd zou worden, 
zou dit betekenen, dat hem een wet voorgeschreven wordt, iets wat zijn 
Meester, Jezus Christus, niet gedaan heeft. 
Maar waar het handelen van de sterke een negatief voorbeeld voor 
de zwakke zou kunnen zijn, vereist de liefde een vrijwillige 'aanpassing' 
en 'afzien van rechten' van de sterke ten bate van de zwakke. 
Vervolgens hebben wij ons van de Schriftgegevens naar de 
geschiedenis van de ethiek gewend om daaruit vier representatieve 
woordvoerders te kiezen, die zich min of meer uitvoerig hebben bezig 
gehouden met terminologie, classificaties en bijbelse inzichten met 
betrekking tot het zogenaamd scandalum inftrmorum (ergernis van de 
zwakken). De standpunten van Thomas van Aquij o, Johannes Calvijn, 
Gijsbertus Voetius en Carl Henry worden aan de hand van hun eigen 
geschriften gedetailleerd uiteengezet. 
Op basis van het bij hen gevonden materiaal, geven wij onze 
evaluatie van hun opvattingen aan de hand van vier vragen: (1) Wat is 
de aard van zwakheid? (2) Wat is het proces van scandalum 
infirmorum? (3) Wat is het terrein waarop het scandalum infirmorum 
zich afspeelt? (4) In welke theologische context staat scandalum 
infirmorum? 
In een poging onze studie meer concreet en levendig te maken, 
hebben wij vijf voorbeelden gegeven van wat als scandalum infirmorum 
vaak wordt gekwalificeerd, geordend naar de oorsprong van het conflict, 
voortkomend uit hetzij het niet-christelijke verleden van een gelovige. 
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hetzij een mogelijke overtreding van Gods wet, hetzij het contact tussen 
de gelovigen en de hen omringende cultuur. 
In Hoofdstuk 2 vervolgen wij onze analyse en evaluatie van de aard 
en dyamiek van scandalum infirmorum, waarbij we de zojuist genoemde 
vier vragen en vijf voorbeelden hebben gebruikt. In het licht van 1 Kor. 
8-10 en Rom. 14-15, vatten wij de zwakheid die gelegen is in scandalum 
infirmorum samen als een vorm van onvermogen om een bepaalde 
morele handeling te verrichten tengevolge van kennis die onbekwaam 
is bepaalde beginselen van het christelijk geloof toe te passen. In 
tegenstelling tot andere soorten van 'zwakheid' waarover men gewoon-
lijk spreekt, en waarin het geweten moet functioneren hetzij als een 
morele wegversperring, hetzij als een moreel stopbord, vereist deze 
vorm van zwakheid dat het geweten het signaal geeft moreel een andere 
weg in te slaan. Dit soort zwakheid stelt niet inherent schuldig, daar de 
Bijbel nergens de 'zwakke' tot berouw over zijn zwakheid maant. Deze 
zwakheid wordt ook nergens aangeduid of bestraft als besluiteloosheid 
of weifeling. Integendeel, de neiging van de zwakke in Rome om de 
sterke te veroordelen, wijst allesbehalve op morele besluiteloosheid. 
Iemand kan tegelijk zwak in het geloof zijn (Rom. 14, 1) en toch 'ten 
volle overtuigd zijn voor eigen besef (Rom. 14, 5). Deze zwakheid is 
religieus van oorsprong en karakter, omdat de gelovige in Rome die 
zich van vlees onthield, dat deed 'om de Here' (Rom. 14, 6). 
Maar zelfs als zwakheid niet schuldig stelt, behoort zij dan niet 
overwonnen te worden door onderwijs en morele groei? Thomas, 
Calvijn en Henry spraken ieder over zwakheid als onwetendheid, als 
ongewenste (zo niet schuldige) toestand, die vraagt om onderricht en 
een beter inzicht vereist. Thomas legde er de nadruk op, dat bij 
verwerping van dit inzicht scandalum pusillorum (ergernis van de 
kleinen) kan overgaan in scandalum pharisaeorum (ergernis die 
voortkomt uit kwaadwilligheid). Henry betoogde dat als iemand een 
manier van handelen wenst voort te zetten tegen het geweten van een 
ander in, hij tegelijkertijd moet proberen de ander tot het inzicht te 
brengen van de juistheid van wat moreel toelaatbaar is en daarom 
gepraktiseerd wordt. Naar ons oordeel geeft de rode draad door het 
apostolisch betoog aan dat zij, die in een gegeven situatie zwakker en 
sterker zijn, in de kerk voortdurend op elkaar zijn aangewezen. Het is 
er verre van, dat de apostel in Rome en Korinte de gelovigen oproept 
hun stellingname te herzien; want de apostel benadrukt dat 'niet 
iedereen dezelfde kennis heeft' (Korinte), en dat ieder 'ten volle 
overtuigd moet zijn' (Rome). Bijzondere zorg moet in acht genomen 
worden om een statische visie op 'de' zwakke en 'de' sterke in de kerk 
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te vermijden. 'Zwak' en 'sterk' zijn metaforen, waarvan de betekenis/7er 
casum moet worden bepaald. Deze uitdrukkingen slaan niet op het 
totale geloofsleven van welke groep dan ook binnen de kerk, maar zijn 
metaforen die op een specifieke toestand en op een aspect van het 
geloofsleven betrekking hebben. 
In het daaropvolgende gedeelte hebben we vijf stadia onderscheiden 
in het proces van het aanstoot geven aan de zwakken. Het eerste 
stadium is dat beiden, sterk en zwak, delen in dezelfde belijdenis, maar 
verschillen op het punt van wat moreel toelaatbaar is, als gevolg van een 
verschillende groei in christelijk geloof. Stadium 2 omvat het handelen 
van de sterke zonder dat de zwakke daarvan kennis heeft, terwijl 
stadium 3 juist intreedt wanneer de sterke in aanwezigheid van de 
zwakke tegen diens gewetensbezwaren in handelt. De morele botsing, 
die voortkomt uit het oordeel van het geweten van de zwakke, vormt 
stadium 4. Maar de eigenlijke morele beschadiging vindt plaats in 
stadium 5, waar de zwakke de sterke navolgt, hoewel het hem aan geloof 
ontbreekt (Rom. 14, 23), of waar hij vanuit een zwak geweten handelt 
(1 Kor. 8, 7.10-13). Onze conclusie luidt, dat het onderricht van de 
apostel toegespitst is op de vermaning aan de sterkere gelovigen om 
stadium 3 te vermijden (het handelen in het bijzijn van de zwakken) om 
zo stadium 5 te voorkomen (het schenden door de zwakke van zijn 
eigen geweten). Het morele letsel waarin scandalum infirmorum bestaat, 
ontstaat in een bijzondere situatie alleen wanneer het gedrag van de ene 
gelovige (de 'sterke')- dat ingaat tegen het geweten van de andere 
gelovige (de 'zwakke') en een morele botsing veroorzaakt -laatstge-
noemde ertoe brengt in te gaan tegen dat wat zijn geweten toelaatbaar 
acht, of juist verbiedt. 
Door de hele geschiedenis van dit vraagstuk heen, heeft men het 
terrein van het aanstoot-geven van de zwakke laten samenvallen met dat 
van de 'adiaphora' of 'middelmatige dingen'. We constateren dat het 
idee, afkomstig van de Stoici, een zeer abstract begrip is. De schepping 
wordt geabstraheerd van zijn Schepper, het heden van het verleden, en 
de individuele persoon van het overige van de schepping. 'Cultuur-
produkten' worden beschouwd als moreel neutraal, omdat ze het 
resultaat zijn van 'algemene genade'. Thomas en Calvijn vermeden zulk 
soort abstracties door eerder de aandacht te vestigen op middelmatige 
handelingen dan op middelmatige dingen, en door erop aan te dringen 
alles te beoordelen naar het juiste morele gebruik. Desondanks geven 
we er de voorkeur aan, de uitdrukking 'adiaphora' te laten varen, omdat 
de Schrift er op wijst, dat mensen voor het aangezicht van God staan in 
al hun beslissingen en handelingen. Elk menselijk besluit en elk 
geschapen ding heeft een morele kwaliteit. Het is het zoeken naar deze 
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morele kwaliteit, die de inhoud vormt van het gebed van de apostel in 
Fil. 1, 9-11, waar hij spreekt van een goedkeuren v?n 'the excellent 
things' (King James Version e.a.), of de dingen die uitmunten of 
werkelijk van betekenis zijn. Bovendien is het onderscheid tussen een 
ding en het gebruik ervan gevaarlijk -hoewel geldig-, als het gebruikt 
wordt om het feit te camoufleren dat 'dingen' een samenhang van 
morele en religieuze waarden kunnen vormen of vertonen. De sleutel 
tot het gebruik van alles bestaat hierin, dat iets al dan niet 'met 
dankzegging aanvaard wordt; want het wordt geheiligd door het Woord 
Gods en door gebed' (1 Tim. 4, 4-5). 
We merkten in hoofdstuk 1 dat Thomas scandalum infirniorum 
behandelde als een ondeugd die de deugd van de liefde tegenspreekt. 
Voor Calvijn is er sprake van misbruik maken van de christelijke 
vrijheid, die meekomt met de rechtvaardigmaking door het geloof. Carl 
Henry zag het vermijden van aanstoot-geven aan de zwakken als een 
noodzaak die verbonden is aan het eerste morele principe van de 
christelijke vrijheid. Naar ons oordeel vormt de locus de ecclesia de 
beste theologische context, of het beste startpunt om van daaruit 
scandalum infirmorum te analyseren en tot een oplossing te brengen. 
Dit helpt ons het morele individualisme te vermijden, dat dreigt als we 
scandalum infirmorum in de context van de christelijke vrijheid en de 
oefening van het christelijk geweten plaatsen. Dit helpt ook de neiging 
te ontmaskeren, die zowel de sterke als de zwakke stuwt. Zij houden 
namelijk aan de anderen die hetzelfde geloof bezitten, als algemeen 
geldig voor wat men zelf toelaatbaar of ontoelaatbaar acht. Tenslotte, 
door de aanstoot van de zwakken te bespreken als een kerkelijk 
probleem, zien we duidelijker wat het betekent dat de kerk onderweg is 
en een pelgrimage-karakter heeft. We leggen immers de nadruk op de 
noodzaak voor sterken en zwakken om samen te wandelen op weg naar 
het komende koninkrijk. 
Wat betreft de vijf voorbeelden, die wij aan het einde van hoofdstuk 
1 gaven, zien we dat, terwijl voorbeeld 3 en 5 het dichtst bij scandalum 
infirmorum staan, de andere ons juist helpen om te laten zien wat 
aanstoot niet is. Er hoeft geen aanstoot te zijn waar 'sterken' en 
'zwakken' in eikaars aanwezigheid bepaalde gewoonten in praktijk 
brengen (of dat nalaten te doen) die overblijfselen zijn uit een voor-
christelijk verleden. Niet elk verschil in moreel oordeel komt uit 
zwakheid voort, en ook hoeft in zulke situaties variatie in moreel gedrag 
geen aanstoot te geven. Moreel onvermogen kan het gevolg zijn van 
gebrek aan zelfbeheersing. In dat geval zouden misschien anderen hun 
gedrag moeten veranderen, maar dan om andere redenen dan het 
vermijden van aanstoot-geven aan de zwakken. Zaken als 
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zondags-heiliging en contact tussen gelovigen en de hen omringende 
cultuur kunnen aanleiding geven tot een echt scandalum infirmorum. 
En wel omdat het kerkelijk oordeel over culturele praktijken verandert 
van generatie op generatie. Gedurende zulke overgangsfases kunnen de 
terminologie, het verloop en de oplossing van het conflict relevant zijn. 
Misschien vloeit de meest nuttige toepassing van onze studie voort 
uit haar conclusie, dat we termen als 'zwak' en 'sterk', zinsneden als 
'aanstoot geven' en 'anderen doen struikelen', moeten verstaan en 
gebruiken als aanduidingen voor een zeer bepaalde (zendings-) situatie. 
Ethici en belangrijke kerkelijke synodes pasten met betrekking tot de 
toestemming die de apostel gaf tot hertrouwen na verlating (vgl. 1 Kor. 
7, 12-16), deze toestemming/>er analogiam ook toe op gevallen van 
verlating door een gelovige echtgenoot (echtgenote). Zo vinden wij het 
raadzaam de inzichten van 1 Kor. 8-10 en Rom. 14-15 per analogiam te 
gebruiken. We concluderen daarbij op z'n minst, dat de gevaren om 
aanstoot te geven aan de zwakke slechts daar bestaan, waar verschil in 
praktijk onder gelovigen aanleiding kan zijn iemand, die overtuigd is 
van de wezenlijke ontoelaatbaarheid van een handeling, tegen de 
vrijheden of beperkingen van z'n geweten in, ertoe te brengen het 
gedrag van een ander na te volgen. Zonder deze mogelijkheid is er 
geen sprake van het gevaar van scandalum infirmorum. De terminologie 
en het beroep op 'aanstoot-geven aan de zwakke' gaat dan niet op. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 geven wij een korte beschrijving van het tegenover-
gestelde van scandalum infirmorum, of van de positieve roeping die ligt 
opgesloten in de belijdenis en praktijk van communio sanctorum, als 
context voor de christelijke vrijheid die de naastenliefde dient. Naar 
ons oordeel is de vaak voorkomende omschrijving van liefde als grens 
of beperking van christelijke vrijheid geheel onjuist. Een dergelijke 
tekening plaatst de twee tegenover elkaar; liefde en vrijheid blijven 
concurrenten in plaats dat zij compagnons worden. In werkelijkheid 
zijn het gaven van de goddelijke genade, die de gelovigen ontvangen 
door Christus. Deze unieke broederliefde en de geestelijke vrijheid 
staan in correlatie tot elkaar. Het bestaan van het een heeft geen zin 
zonder dat van het ander. 
Dit is misschien het duidelijkst zichtbaar in de gemeenschaps-
gerichtheid van de vrijheid. Deze gerichtheid vond haar oorsprong bij 
de schepping, waar de drieënige God mensen schiep naar Zijn beeld, in 
gemeenschap en voor gemeenschap. De vrijheid moest verwerkelijkt 
worden langs het pad van de liefde voor God en de naaste. Menselijke 
vrijheid is in haar kern relationeel. Gal. 5, 13 leert ons, dat ware 
vrijheid wordt uitgeoefend in de dienst van de naastenliefde, die op haar 
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beurt de wet vervult (Gal. 5, 14). In de kerk als communio sanctorum 
bereikt de vrijheid dit scheppingsdoel. De 'gemeenschap der heiligen' 
brengt een persoonlijke verantwoordelijkheid van de geheiligde 
gelovigen met zich mee voor de groei, het welzijn en het voortbestaan 
van de gemeenschap (Ef. 4, 12.14.16). 
De genade-gave van de vrijheid gaat gepaard met de roeping deze 
op juiste wijze te gebruiken. De kerk zal altijd sommige leden hebben 
die zwak zijn, zo lang zij haar zendingsroeping blijft najagen. Deze 
permanente trek in de samenstelling van de kerk biedt de gelegenheid 
om moreel voorzichtig en voorkomend te zijn. Het elkaar wederzijds 
verdragen en de eenheid binnen de kerk, waartoe de Schriit de kerk 
aanspoort, is christologisch in wortel en patroon, heeft een kerkelijke 
beweegreden en een pneumatisch, of door de Geest bepaald, karakter. 
De aanwezigheid van de zwakken is dus een oproep, de christelijke 
vrijheid te gebruiken voor de opbouw van de kerk. Die opbouw van het 
lichaam van Christus tot voltooiing, volmaaktheid en volwassenheid, is 
het doel en de onthulling van de communio sanctorum. 
Met betrekking tot het oplossen van het conflict tussen de 'sterken' 
en de 'zwakken' binnen de kerk, ligt in kerkelijke opbouw opgesloten 
dat de sterken die handelingen in aanwezigheid van de zwakken 
vermijden, die een morele botsing kunnen veroorzaken, ook al is de 
kans gering dat zij het gedrag van de sterken navolgen. Christelijke 
vrijheid moet volgens Rom. 14, 17 gebruikt worden in dienst van 
rechtvaardigheid, vrede en van door de Geest aangespoorde vreugde -
die niets anders zijn dan de verlossende weldaden van Christus' werk en 
de vorstelijke zegeningen van zijn komende koninkrijk. 
In de Epiloog trachten wij het belangrijke verband tussen de 
christelijke ethiek en de kerk te beschrijven. Dat verband wordt door 
sommigen beschreven in termen van de kerk als morele actor (P. 
Lehmann en W. Geesink), en door anderen in termen van de kerk als 
een gemeenschap en leraar die moreel opvoedt (A. Verhey). Maar de 
kerk moet ook worden beschouwd als het doel en de beweegreden van 
christelijke ethiek. Dat wil zeggen: om gedrag christelijk te kunnen 
noemen, moet het in z'n doelstelling o.a. gericht zijn op het welzijn van 
de kerk. Het karakteristieke doel van christelijke vrijheid -namelijk 
kerkelijke opbouw- moet het doel zijn van alle moreel gedrag. 
Zoals op het gebied van politiek en van burgerlijke wetgeving, waar 
wetgevers de politiek vorm geven in het licht van 'environmental impact 
statements' (die de effecten van de nieuwe wet op het milieu aangeven) 
en 'disability impact reports' (die de effecten op de gehandicapten in de 
samenleving aangeven) - zo moeten ook christelijke morele denkers 
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letten op de kerkelijke effecten van morele keuzes. Deze aandacht is 
grondslag voor christelijke moraliteit. 
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